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Abstract 
I investigate how career concerns influence banking analysts’ forecasts and find 
that banking analysts issue relatively more optimistic forecasts early in the year 
and more pessimistic forecasts later in the year for banks who could be their future 
employers. This pattern is not observed when the same analysts forecast earnings 
for banks with no equity research departments. Using the Global Settlement as an 
exogenous shock on career concerns, I show that this forecast pattern is 
pronounced after the Settlement. Moreover, I find that analysts benefit from this 
behaviour as analysts that are more biased in their forecasts towards potential 
future employers are more likely to move to a higher reputation bank.   
Textual analysis of analyst reports is also valuable due to the private 
information and analysis conveyed in the text. Second paper therefore examines 
analyst reports with consistent and conflicting signals in terms of qualitative and 
quantitative outputs. I find that investors react more strongly when the sentiment 
and earnings forecast bias are consistent. Interestingly, when the tone of report 
text does not coincide with the earnings forecast, investors place greater weight on 
the text rather than the EPS forecasts. I also find that consistent reports with both 
optimistic sentiment and forecast bias have a strong positive market reaction but 
they are low in forecast accuracy. Markedly, forecasts with pessimistic sentiment 
have higher accuracy than those of optimistic sentiment. Hence, pessimistic 
sentiment is a good indicator of the quality of forecast reports.  
Finally, in my last paper, I explore whether there is any association between 
firm-specific investor sentiment and the subsequent tone of firms' quarterly reports. 
Firm-specific investor sentiment is measured using the methodology from Aboody 
et al. (2016), which  proxies  for market confidence relating to a specific firm. Given 
the potential cost-benefit trade-off in the reporting strategy, I argue and find 
different responses from managers in their 10-Qs in terms of their investor 
sentiment. I focus on the tone of optimism, readability and the proportion of 
uncertain words in the 10-Q filings. For firms with extremely high levels of investor 
sentiment, managers tend to be more conservative by using less optimistic words 
to avoid future disappointment. In comparison, in firms with extremely pessimistic 
investor sentiment, managers tend to use more optimistic and easy to understand 
language, and minimize their proportion of uncertainty in their 10-Q filings. By 
doing so, perhaps they are trying to alter their investor sentiment. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and Contributions 
The motivation of this thesis is to examine the implications of earnings forecast 
bias and sentiment of sell-side analyst reports, as well as managers’ strategic use 
of the tone of 10-Q filings based on investor sentiment. First, I contribute to the 
literature of analyst behaviour by investigating the sources of bias in analyst 
forecasts (Cowen et al., 2006, Chen and Matsumoto (2006), Guan, Lu, and Wong 
(2012)). I complement this line of research by documenting a different source of 
conflict of interest: analyst career concerns. Second, my study extends the analyst 
literature by evaluating the market reaction to the information in the quantitative 
and qualitative signals of analyst reports. Using manually collected analyst reports 
for S&P 500 firms, I provide generalizable results of investor reactions to analyst 
reports that contain conflicting messages and those that contain consistent 
messages. Third, I contribute to the research of investor sentiment in behavioural 
finance by documenting managers’ responses to different levels of investor 
sentiment in terms of 10-Qs tone strategy. To the best of my knowledge, I am the 
first to apply firm-specific investor sentiment empirically. 
1.1.1 Banking analysts: forecast pattern and career concerns 
Sell-side analysts are specialists in analysing firm performance. Market participants 
use analyst reports to help them make investment decisions. I focus on sell-side 
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analysts who cover investment banks (‘banking analysts’ for short) in Chapter 2. 
Banking analysts are important information intermediaries and thus important ‘gate 
keepers’. However, analysts are criticized for strategically distorting their forecasts 
due to conflicts of interest. Prior literature shows that the conflicts of interest faced 
by analysts mainly stem from underwriting business (O’Brien, Mcnichols, and 
Hsiou-Wei (2005) and Arand and Kerl (2015)), the generation of trading 
commissions (Beyer and Guttman (2011) and Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu (2015)) 
and the access to the management team (Lim (2001) and Chen and Matsumoto 
(2006)). Hong and Kubik (2003) and Ke and Yu (2006) examine analysts’ career 
concerns. Ke and Yu (2006) focus on the probability of being fired while Hong and 
Kubik (2003) investigate the likelihood of moving up to better ranked brokerage 
houses. They find that analysts’ favourable job separation is less sensitive to 
accuracy but more to forecast optimism, due to brokerage houses’ incentive of 
trading commissions and underwriting activities. My study in Chapter 2 focuses on 
a unique conflict of interest faced by banking analysts: job separations. Unlike 
analysts covering non-bank firms, banking analysts also view other investment 
banks that they forecast for as potential sources of employment, especially those 
who work in lower-ranked brokerage houses. Even if a banking analyst does not 
end up moving to the bank she has covered, keeping a good relationship with the 
managers from other banks is still important since the network plays an important 
role in job movement. Moving up to a better-ranked brokerage house gives an 
analyst the benefits of higher compensation, more research resources and a better 
11 
 
 
 
chance to be elected as a star analyst (Sorenson (2013) and Kucheev and 
Sörensson (2015)).  
To examine whether banking analysts curry favour with other investment banks 
which have sell-side equity research department (‘employers’ for short), I focus on 
the pattern in the bias of their forecasts. To disentangle other factors that may 
influence analysts’ forecasts, I hold the analyst constant by requiring that the same 
analyst is forecasting earnings for employers and non-employers. I find that 
banking analysts issue forecasts that are relatively more optimistic for employers at 
the beginning of the year. At the end of the year, the opposite is true; banking 
analysts issue forecast revisions that are relatively more pessimistic for employers. 
I then use the Global Settlement in 2003 as an exogenous shock to examine the 
effect of career concerns of banking analysts. In general, the Global Settlement 
mitigates analysts’ incentive to curry favour with the firm they cover (Balboa, 
Gómez-Sala, and López-Espinosa (2009) and Hovakimian and Saenyasiri (2014)), 
but also decreases job availability due the budget cuts in the research department. 
I find that before the Settlement, there was no bias difference between forecasting 
employers and non-employers, but after the Settlement, banking analysts are more 
biased for their employers relative to non-employers. This suggests that due to the 
Global Settlement, the increased pressure of job competition exacerbates the walk-
down pattern from banking analysts because of their career concerns. It also 
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suggests that banking analysts do face a unique conflict of interest when 
forecasting employers and the Settlement did not take this into account.  
Thirdly, I examine whether banking analysts benefit from distorting their forecasts. I 
find that banking analysts with more pessimistic last forecasts are more likely to 
experience favourable job separations and move to better-ranked brokerage 
houses. No such an effect is found for non-employer forecasts. 
Chapter 2 extends the analyst literature in a number of ways. First, in the literature 
examining conflicts of interest faced by analysts, I contribute to this by 
documenting a new source of conflict of interest faced by banking analysts: career 
concerns. Second, in the literature studying the opaqueness of financial institutions, 
I complement this line of research by revealing the poor information environment of 
a financial intermediary.  
1.1.2 Consistent and conflicting signals in analyst reports: investor 
reactions and analyst forecast accuracy 
Chapter 2 examines one of the analyst attributes: forecast bias and the 
implications for such bias: analyst career advancement. Chapter 3 adds another 
dimension: the qualitative attribute, i.e. the tone of analyst reports. I investigate the 
implications of these two signals for investors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
textual discussions in analyst reports are valued more than quantitative forecasts 
for investors, but only a few studies have examined the content of analyst reports 
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due to data availability and the lack of computer power of linguistic analysis. With 
all analyst reports forecasting for S&P 500 firms hand-collected and the availability 
of a financial-specific dictionary from Loughran and McDonald (2011), I analyse the 
sentiment/tone of analyst reports from 1999 to 2014. This qualitative signal (i.e. the 
sentiment of analyst report) and the quantitative signal (i.e. the EPS forecast bias) 
in a report could be consistent or conflicting with each other. I investigate a) 
whether investors react differently to analyst reports with consistent signals versus 
those with conflicting signals, b) which signal the market places greater weight on 
when the qualitative and quantitative signals do not coincide and c) the forecast 
accuracy difference between analysts’ reports with a conflicting signal and those 
with a consistent signal. 
Huang, Zang, and Zheng (2014) find that investor reactions to upward (downward) 
earnings forecast revisions are stronger when the overall textual opinion of the 
analyst report is more positive (negative). I focus on the market reaction when 
earnings forecast bias and textual opinion do not coincide. By ranking analyst 
sentiment score and earnings forecast bias per firm per year, I observe four types 
of analyst reports; the first two contain consistent messages and the last two 
contain inconsistent messages. 1) An OTOB analyst report: a report containing an 
optimistic textual sentiment (OT) and an optimistic forecast bias (OB). 2) A PTPB 
analyst report: a report containing a pessimistic textual sentiment (PT) and a 
pessimistic forecast bias (PB). 3) An (OTPB) analyst report: a report containing an 
optimistic textual sentiment (OT) and a pessimistic forecast bias (PB). 4) An (PTOB) 
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analyst report: a report containing a pessimistic textual sentiment (PT) and an 
optimistic forecast bias (OB).  
I find that investors react more strongly to reports with consistent signals (OTOB 
and PTPB reports) than conflicting signals (OTPB and PTOB reports). Moreover, the 
intensity of the market reaction to PTPB forecasts is stronger than that of OTOB 
reports. Second, I find that when the tone of the report text does not coincide with 
the earnings forecast bias, investors place greater weight on the tone rather than 
the earnings forecast bias. This suggests that textual analysis is more important 
than earnings forecasts when investors use them to make investment decisions. 
Although I find that consistent reports with both optimistic sentiment and optimistic 
forecast bias have a strong positive market reaction, further analysis reveals that 
these reports are associated with lower forecast accuracy. The reports associated 
with the highest forecast accuracy are those that contain a pessimistic tone (PTPB 
and PTOB reports). This suggests that pessimistic sentiment per se maybe a good 
indicator for the quality/credibility of the forecast reports. 
There are several contributions in Chapter 3. First, my study extends the sell-side 
analyst literature by first examining the combination effect of quantitative and 
qualitative signals from analyst reports, especially when the two signals do not 
coincide. My findings suggest that investor find that textual discussions of analyst 
reports are more credible than quantitative measures. Moreover, I find that reports 
with relative pessimistic sentiment are better in terms of accuracy. Second, my 
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sample is more generalizable than that of Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005) and 
Twedt and Rees (2012) in terms of sample size, as well as being more objective 
and easier to replicate than that of Huang, Zang, and Zheng (2014) in terms of 
tone measurement techniques. 
1.1.3 Investor sentiment and the tone of 10-Q filings 
Chapter 3 documents that the sentiment of analyst reports has an impact on the 
market while Chapter 4 examines how investor sentiment influences firm managers’ 
responses when preparing their10-Q filings.  
Managers have incentives to maximize their firms’ appeal to sentiment-driven 
investors while maintaining their reputation and integrity. Baker (2011) documents 
that this sentiment-induced shift in disclosure costs leads to different 
communication strategies. Managers’ disclosure strategy may vary according to 
different levels of investor sentiment. Chapter 4 investigates whether there is any 
association between firm-specific investor sentiment and the tone of firms' 
subsequent quarterly reports. Specifically, I examine how managers respond to 
investor sentiment by using (1) the optimism of the tone, (2) the readability of the 
10-Q filings and (3) the level of inclusion of uncertain information. The measure of 
firm-specific investor sentiment is adapted from Aboody et al. (2016).  
On average, I find that when firm-specific investor sentiment is optimistic 
(pessimistic), the tone of the subsequent 10-Q filings is optimistic (pessimistic). For 
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ease of reading, I find that when investor sentiment is optimistic (pessimistic), the 
subsequent 10-Qs are easier (harder) to read. For the proportion of uncertain 
words, I find that firms with optimistic (pessimistic) investor sentiment have low 
(high) proportion of uncertainty in the subsequent 10-Qs. These findings suggest 
that, on average, the way managers present their 10-Qs is neutral in terms of tone 
optimism and uncertainty. However, managers could obfuscate the negative 
statements by increasing the complexity of the text, which is consistent with the 
obfuscation hypothesis (Courtis (1998)).  
I future examine this issue by investigating manager response when firms 
experience extreme investor sentiment. The prior literature shows that managers 
recognize the high and low investor sentiment periods and respond to them 
differently (Brown et al. (2012), Simpson (2013) and Hribar and Quinn (2013)). I 
compare firms with extremely high investor sentiment to firms with average high 
investor sentiment and find that managers tend to be more conservative by using 
less optimistic words to avoid future disappointment when investor sentiment is 
extremely high. These firms have a low proportion of uncertain words in their 10-
Qs but no significant difference in terms of readability. I also compare firms with 
extremely pessimistic investor sentiment to firms with average low investor 
sentiment. I find that for firms with extremely pessimistic investor sentiment, 
managers tend to use more optimistic and easy to understand language, and 
minimize their proportion of uncertainty in their 10-Q filings when investor 
sentiment is low. They act differently compared with firms with extremely optimistic 
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investor sentiment because their priority is to regain investor confidence by 
providing information in a more positive light. In summary, when preparing 
corporate filings, managers need to obey SEC laws to provide truthful information, 
while also acknowledging the level and the change of investor sentiment. 
Therefore, it appears that managers try to influence investors by using this subtle 
way of tone management, especially for those firms who experience extreme 
investor sentiment. 
To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to apply firm-specific investor sentiment 
empirically. The prior literature investigates managers’ behavioural difference 
assuming investors have the same sentiment towards all firms during the same 
period while we adopt a finer proxy using firm-specific investor sentiment 
developed by Aboody et al. (2016). Second, I extend the literature by examining 
the relationship between the tone of financial disclosure and investor sentiment. I 
focus on whether managers adjust the tone of optimism in the quarterly reports 
according to different firm-specific investor sentiment. It highlights that the 
managers may be trying to influence investors using a more subtle soft approach 
instead of earnings management or earnings guidance. Third, my study 
complements the investor sentiment literature by investigating the association 
between firm-specific investor sentiment and tone of uncertainty as well as 
readability in 10-Q filings.  
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1.2 Thesis Structure 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2, 3 and 4 are the main research 
bodies with their own introduction, literature review and hypotheses development, 
data and methodology, as well as conclusion. Chapter 5 concludes and provides 
information on future work that I will be conducting.                  
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Chapter 2 
Career Concerns of Banking Analysts 
2.1 Introduction 
Sell-side analysts are important information intermediaries in capital markets and 
as a result, their research has been under scrutiny. While a large number of 
studies document that analyst coverage and forecasts have economic 
consequences (Bailey et al. (2003) and Jackson (2005)), an equally large number 
of studies document that analyst forecasts are influenced by conflicts of interest 
(Beyer and Guttman (2011); Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006); Hong and 
Kubik (2003); Jackson (2005); Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2004); Lim (2001) 
and Schipper (1991)). In this chapter I concentrate on the banking industry and 
investigate whether banking analyst forecasts are biased because of their career 
concerns. 
Past studies have documented that analyst forecasts can be biased because of 
underwriting activities in the investment banking business, the pressure to 
generate trading commissions, and analysts’ career concerns (Dugar and Nathan 
(1995); Hunton and McEwen (1997); Lin and Mcnichols (1998); Michaely and 
Womack (1999); Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (2000); Hong and Kubik (2003) and 
O’Brien, Mcnichols, and Hsiou-Wei (2005)). In terms of career concerns, past 
studies have demonstrated that more optimistic analysts tend to experience 
favourable job separations (Hong and Kubik (2003)) and younger analysts tend to 
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herd more (Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000)). In these studies, the underlying source of 
career concerns is the pressure from investment banking and/or the brokerage 
business to please firms or buy-side portfolio managers respectively.  
In this chapter, I concentrate on a different source of conflicts of interest. Banking 
analysts issue forecasts for firms that constitute a large part of their outside 
opportunities in terms of employment. These analysts view the banks that they 
issue forecasts for as potential sources of employment, thereby increasing their 
incentives to satisfy those clients. This is independent of incentives to generate 
investment banking business or trading commissions, which exist for all firms they 
cover.  
In order to examine whether this pressure to satisfy future potential employers is 
influencing analyst forecasts, I examine the pattern in the bias of their forecasts. In 
my  research design, I hold the analyst constant by requiring that the same analyst 
is forecasting earnings for firms with sell-side equity departments (‘employers’) and 
for firms with no sell-side equity departments (‘non-employers’). I then show that 
banking analysts issue forecasts that are relatively more optimistic for employers at 
the beginning of the year. At the end of the year, the opposite is true; banking 
analysts issue forecasts that are relatively more pessimistic for employers. 
Therefore, my research design is similar to a differences-in-difference specification, 
where I observe the forecasting pattern early and late in the year and I compare 
this pattern for employers and non-employers for the same set of analysts. I limit 
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my sample to those analysts who are not employed by the top investment banks 
and therefore could have relatively greater career concerns. Analysts that are 
already working for bulge investment banks have greater career opportunities and 
less incentives to move as they already work at the most reputable banks. 
Therefore, I treat analysts working at the top banks as a control group that allows 
me to scale my dependent variable for forecast bias. I report results using both this 
relative bias variable and an absolute bias variable relative to the earnings of the 
firm and document similar results. 
To further identify the effect of career concerns from forecasting earnings of a 
potential future employer, I exploit an exogenous shock to future career 
opportunities. The Global Settlement decreased the budgets for sell-side research 
significantly and as a result, directly impacted the outside opportunities for sell-side 
analysts (Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006)). This could lead to an 
exacerbation of career concerns and as a result a more pronounced walk-down to 
beatable earnings for employers. On the other hand, after the Global Settlement, 
the analysts could be more reluctant to substantially bias their forecasts because 
that might anger other constituents using their forecasts, raising the probability of 
dismissal. The probability of a promotion at another firm might not look as attractive 
if analysts are more worried about just keeping their jobs after the Settlement. I find 
that after the Global Settlement the transition from optimistic to pessimistic 
forecasts closer to the year-end is stronger. These findings are consistent with 
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banking analysts’ understanding that their forecasts could impact future career 
opportunities and as a result, provide a walk-down to beatable earnings.  
I analyse future job separations to understand whether analysts benefit from such 
forecasting activity. I find that banking analysts who are pessimistic about their 
latest forecast are more likely to experience favourable job separations and move 
to a higher status broker. This result is presented only for analysts that exhibit this 
behaviour towards employers, which is again consistent with analysts strategically 
biasing their forecasts because of career concerns. 
My identification strategy aims to mitigate the likelihood that other sources of bias, 
unrelated to a revolving door story, might cause my results. I do so by 
differentiating both across the types of firms being forecasted (i.e. a bank with or 
without a research department) as well as across analysts (i.e. employed by a top-
bank versus a non-top bank). I show that a walk-down to beatable earnings and 
upward job mobility is more pronounced when an analyst works for a non-top bank 
and forecasts earnings of a bank with a research department. It is hard to reconcile 
these findings with biases due to incentives to generate investment banking 
business or trading commissions, which should be presented in both types of 
forecasted firms or analysts. For example, bias arising from incentives to generate 
investment banking business should be strong for banks with or without research 
departments and it should be less pronounced after the Global Settlement. 
Similarly, incentives to generate trading commissions should be as strong for 
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analysts working at top banks and when forecasting earnings for banks without 
research departments. Of course, if for example, investment banking business or 
trading commissions are significantly higher for banks with research departments 
and analysts in non-top banks have stronger incentives to bias their forecasts to 
generate investment banking business or trading commissions that could explain 
my results. However, in my  matched sample, banks with and without research 
departments exhibit very similar market capitalization, valuation ratios, analyst 
following, share turnover, and risk; all variables that could be related to investment 
banking or trading commission sources of bias. Moreover, reduced competition, 
due to brokerage house closures, following the Global Settlement could explain my  
results (Hong and Kacperczyk (2010)). I address this concern by examining 
whether the pattern I document holds for firms in which analyst coverage did not 
decrease after the Global Settlement and therefore the competition effect is not at 
play. I find similar results for this subsample. 
My  results contribute to a body of literature that investigates the sources of bias in 
analyst forecasts (Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006)). I complement this line of 
research by documenting a different source of conflict of interest. Effectively the 
conflict I  document here relates to the ‘revolving-door’ phenomenon, which has 
been investigated in relation to audit partners (Menon and Williams (2004); Geiger, 
Lennox, and North (2008)), SEC lawyers (deHaan et al. (2015)), and credit rating 
analysts (Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Xia (2016)). I  show that this effect 
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generalizes in settings outside auditing and, consistent with Cornaggia, Cornaggia, 
and Xia (2016), affects information intermediaries more broadly.  
The results contribute also to a literature that seeks to understand whether 
financial institutions are more opaque and therefore characterized by higher 
information asymmetry and more information risk (Morgan, 2002; Flannery et al., 
2004).  Given that sell-side analyst activity significantly improves the information 
efficiency of capital markets, my results suggest that the career concerns banking 
analysts are facing will contribute to the poor information environment of financial 
institutions.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, I review the related literature and 
form the hypotheses of this study. Section 2.3 describes the data and the research 
design. Section 2.4 details the descriptive statistics and the results. I conclude in 
Section 2.5. 
2.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.2.1 Forecast bias of bank and non-bank analysts 
2.2.1.1 Optimistic bias and the incentives 
If analyst forecasts are formed objectively and errors arise from unforeseen events, 
there should not be any trend over time in the distribution of earnings surprises. 
Similarly, if analyst forecasts are unbiased, there is no reason to think that the 
distribution of surprises should differ across different types of firms or industries. 
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However, the existence of an optimistic bias in analyst forecasts is well 
documented in many studies (Fried and Givoly (1982); Brown et al. (1987); O’brien 
(1988);Klein (1990); Affleck-Graves, Davis, and Mendenhall (1990); Boni and 
Womack (2002) and Malmendier and Shanthikumar (2014)).  
The evidence of forecast bias has led many studies to propose and test incentive-
based explanations. For example, analysts have incentives to maximize the trading 
volume in the stock they cover to increase trading commissions (Jackson (2005); 
Cowen et al., 2006; Beyer and Guttman (2011) and Brown et al. (2015)). Bilinski et 
al. (2016) show that analysts facilitate short-term institutional investors with 
profitable trades by issuing biased target prices. Similarly, evidence suggests that 
analysts from brokerage houses that have underwriting relationships with a firm 
tend to issue more optimistic forecasts (but not less accurate) than unaffiliated 
analysts (Dugar and Nathan (1995); Hunton and McEwen (1997); Lin and 
Mcnichols (1998); Michaely and Womack (1999); Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 
(2000); O’Brien et al., 2005 and Ljungqvist et al. (2007)). 
Similarly, analysts are likely to take into account the impact their forecasts may 
have on their relationship with management (to increase investment banking 
business or to curry favour with management to obtain and maintain access to 
private information) by issuing favourable (Schipper (1991) and Lim (2001)) or 
beatable (Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2004)) earnings forecasts. Chen and 
Matsumoto (2006) show that managers provide more information to those analysts 
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who issue favourable recommendations. Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura (2014) and 
Brown et al. (2015) show that private communication and good relationships with 
firm managers benefit analysts’ careers.  
2.2.1.2 Inter-temporal pattern 
Other literature examines the inter-temporal pattern in analyst forecast bias and 
finds a trend from optimism to pessimism within both the quarterly and annual 
forecasts (Cowen et al., 2006; Richardson et al., 2004; Ke and Yu (2006)). Cowen 
et al. (2006) document for a sample of forecasts issued from 1996 to 2002 that 180 
day+ forecasts are positively biased, 91 to 180-day forecasts are unbiased, and 0- 
to 90-day forecasts are negatively biased. Similarly, Richardson et al. (2004) 
document the optimistic to pessimistic pattern (or ‘walk-down’) of both annual and 
quarterly forecasts and Ke and Yu (2006) find that annual forecasts are on average 
optimistic and quarterly forecasts are pessimistic. In terms of management 
guidance, Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki (2006) find that analyst forecasts for guiding 
firms are significantly less optimistic than the control sample after the guidance is 
issued. The consensus analyst forecast is 1.7 times as likely as the control sample 
to be pessimistic after the guidance is issued. Baik and Jiang (2006) and Bartov, 
Givoly, and Hayn (2002) have similar results.  
2.2.1.3 Banking analyst vs Non-banking analyst 
Banking analysts may face more conflicts of interest than non-bank analysts. First, 
investment banks work together as they syndicate bonds and loans for each other. 
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Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2009) show that investment banks have strong 
business ties among each other and banks syndicated with other banks that are 
themselves better networked for underwriting mandates. Second, since they 
forecast their own industry, writing unfavourable reports of other banks may 
indicate a poor situation of the whole industry and eventually may affect investors’ 
confidence in their own banks. Hence, they have the incentive to talk up their own 
industry.  
The third conflict of interest is the analyst career concerns. Hong and Kubik (2003) 
point out that analysts face fierce career competition, which is supported by Ke and 
Yu (2006), who find that 15% of analysts were fired from prestigious brokerage 
houses  between 1983 and 2000. These findings suggest that the incentive of bank 
analysts’ forecast bias could stem from their career concerns, since competitor 
banks are their potential employers. Unlike other analysts, banking analysts issue 
forecasts for firms that constitute a large part of their outside opportunities in terms 
of employment. These analysts may view the banks that they issue forecasts for as 
potential sources of employment, thereby increasing their incentives to satisfy 
those clients, independent of incentives to generate investment banking business 
or trading commissions for their own employers that should exist when making 
forecast for all firms they cover. If this is true then an analyst who forecasts both 
employers and non-employers will have stronger career incentives (resulting in a 
greater need to curry favour with the managers from these potential employers), 
and therefore are more likely to bias their forecasts for the potential employers (i.e. 
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investment banks) relative to the non-employers they cover. This leads to my first 
hypothesis: 
H1: The change in the bias of the forecasts over time from optimistic to 
pessimistic is greater when forecasting earnings of employers relative to 
non-employers.    
2.2.2 Exogenous shock: Global Analyst Research Settlement 
To further explore the effect of analyst career concerns I employ the Global 
Settlement as an exogenous shock. The Global Settlement was initiated to curb 
the biased research produced by brokerage houses and resulted in ten of the 
largest banks paying nearly $1.4 billion in fines. Among other provisions, the 
Global Settlement created a “Chinese Wall” between the research divisions and 
the investment banking divisions of brokerage houses. This regulation changed the 
way brokerage firms profit from analyst activity and thereby increased the level of 
competition in the sell-side analyst labour market. Importantly, these provisions 
prohibited the explicit cross-subsidization of research activities from underwriting 
activities, drastically altering the demand for sell-side analysts at investment banks. 
This regulatory shock changed the labour market landscape. As Cowen et al. 
(2006) note, investment banks decreased their spending on equity research by 
more than 40% as compared to 2000 levels, which reduced the analyst head count 
on average by 15% to 20% and cut analysts’ compensation by a third or more. This 
significant increase in competition in the sell-side analyst labour market allows me 
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to test the effect of analysts-related future career concerns on their forecast bias. 
The sign of this effect of increasing or reducing analyst bias, however, is unclear. It 
could be the case that, following the Global Settlement, forecast biases have 
decreased as analysts have switched their focus to one of keeping their current job 
rather striving for promotion at another investment bank. Under this scenario, 
analysts may take fewer risks and be reluctant to issue significantly biased 
forecasts just in case it annoys their clients and thereby increases the likelihood of 
dismissal.1 An alternative scenario is that following the Global Settlement, analyst 
career concerns may have been exacerbated and consequently analysts may have 
stronger incentives to walk down their forecasts to beatable earnings. This may be 
particularly true for my sample, as the Global Settlement was focused more on the 
top banks (which were the subject of the Settlement) than the medium and low tier 
banks. Ultimately, the effect of the Global Settlement on analyst career concerns is 
an empirical question and leads to my second hypothesis: 
H2: The bias of the forecasts over time from optimistic to pessimistic due to 
career concerns changes following the Global Settlement.  
2.2.3 Analyst career concerns 
The literature discussed above suggests that managers prefer optimism in 
beginning-of-period and pessimism in end-of-period analysts’ forecasts 
(Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (2004), Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki (2006) and 
                                            
1
 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this possible scenario. 
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Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006)), but this leaves open the question of why 
analysts appear to cooperate with management and issue forecasts that are 
consistent with their preferences.  
Compared with examining analysts’ forecasts, there are a limited number of 
studies investigating whether forecast bias is associated with an analyst’s career 
advancement (Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999); Hong and Kubik, 2003;Horton 
and Serafeim (2009) and Lourie (2015)). Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu (2015) show 
that pre-analyst work experience of sell-side analysts leads to favourable career 
outcomes: higher probability of becoming star analysts, but I examine analysts’ job 
separation. The closest paper to mine is that of Hong and Kubik (2003), who find 
that the association between accuracy and turnover varies with the analysts’ level 
of optimism and affiliation status. The turnover decisions of affiliated analysts 
depend less on accuracy and more on optimism than those of unaffiliated analysts. 
My study focuses on analysts that move up to better ranked brokerage houses or 
move down to lower ranked brokerage houses. Compared with Ke and Yu (2006), 
who only use data before the Regulation Fair Disclosure in 2001, I also explore the 
effect after 2001. Furthermore, Ke and Yu (2006) focused on the incentive of 
accessing management’s private information whilst I investigate the motivation of 
favourable job separation.  
The revolving-door literature also provides evidence that career incentives may 
cause individuals to lose objectivity in their assessment of potential future 
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employers. Lourie (2015) investigates the forecast bias of analysts who leave the 
profession and are subsequently hired by firms the analyst had previously covered. 
He finds that prior to their new employment, analysts provide more optimistic 
recommendations and higher target prices for the firms that subsequently hire 
them, although he finds no systematic forecast earning bias for these firms. 
Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Xia (2016) investigate the revolving door phenomenon, 
in relation to credit rating analysts and find that transitioning credit rating analysts 
become more favourable to their future employers prior to their transitions. They 
conclude that these conflicts of interest at the analyst level distort credit ratings. 
If analysts are biasing employers’ forecasts because of future career incentives 
then following the findings of Hong and Kubik (2003), I would expect such analysts 
to benefit from this activity and thereby experience more favourable job 
separations. This leads to my third hypothesis: 
H3: Analysts who provide more biased earnings forecasts for employers are 
more likely to experience favourable job separations. 
2.3 Data and Methodology  
2.3.1 Sample of analysts 
I obtain data on all individual analysts’ forecasts of annual earnings per share from 
the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) Detail File. For a sample period 
from 1999 to 2006, I identify all banks with investment arms. This identification 
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starts with the SIC codes 60-62,2 and the Bloomberg categorization of investment 
services, but in order to be confident in my identification process, I also use the 
information disclosed in the banks’ annual reports and websites to validate my 
identification. I start from the year 1999 because the Institutional Broker Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S) Price Target file with analyst names starts from 1999. I use this 
file to match the analyst code with the analyst name and also the brokerage house 
code with the brokerage house name. I do not include observations post 2006 due 
to the financial crisis, although I find that my results are not sensitive to extend the 
sample period to 2014, excluding the financial crisis.3 From this sample, I extract 
sell-side analysts that follow both firms with sell-side equity departments (for 
convenience, I term these ‘employers’) and firms with no sell-side equity 
departments (again for convenience, I term these ‘non-employers’). Requiring that 
the same analysts make forecasts across both groups mitigates the probability that 
differences in the results are driven by differences in the types of analysts making 
the forecasts. Moreover, since I find that over 90% of the investment bank sample 
is within the S&P 500, I also limit my analysis to S&P500 firms only; this again 
mitigates the probability that differences in the results are driven by differences in 
the types of firms being forecasted. However, if I relax both of these requirements 
the results continue to hold. An alternative sample uses analysts with forecasts for 
both investment banks and other banks (mainly commercial banks). Compared 
                                            
2
 I do not however classify those firms with a SIC code of 6099 (commercial banks) and 6111 (credit and debit card issuer) 
as employers. 
3
 The global financial crisis is commonly believed to have begun in July 2007, and given I am investigating both the first 
and last analyst forecasts, I limit the sample period to the end of 2006.  
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with the main sample, these latter firms operate in a more similar setting and 
therefore have more similar risks. The control variables of market value and book 
to market ratio are from Compustat. Equity return data is available on CRSP.  
I consider only the last and first forecast for each analyst-firm pair during the twelve 
months of the annual earnings release date reported by I/B/E/S period. The reason 
I look at first and last forecast revisions is that investors normally appraise firms at 
three points in time: in response to the (a) initial analyst forecast, (b) revised 
analyst forecast, especially forecast revision shortly before the actual earnings 
announcement and (c) the actual earnings announcement. Econometrically 
speaking, I could only choose one observation per firm per year per year. 
Otherwise, cross-correlation problems could arise due to multiple observations 
from the same analyst. This is also consistent with prior literature (Hong et al., 
(2000); Richardson et al., (2004); Kim et al., (2011)). I exclude observations with 
forecast horizons shorter than one month and longer than one year (Clement and 
Tse (2005)) and also exclude those observations with negative price-to-book ratios 
and stock prices less or equal to one dollar, thereby ensuring that illiquid stocks do 
not influence my results. I also drop firms followed by fewer than three analysts, as 
my forecast bias measure requires intra firm-year variation (Clement and Tse 
(2003) and Kerl and Ohlert (2015)). Furthermore, I drop analysts with only one 
forecast per year since I observe analysts’ first and last forecasts. Consistent with 
Clement and Tse (2003), I eliminate the scaled forecast bias in the top and bottom 
one percent of revisions to reduce the effect of outliers.  
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Given my focus is on analysts’ career concerns, I exclude from my sample all 
analysts who are employed by the top brokerage houses as these analysts will 
have lower career concerns as they already work for a top brokerage4 house and 
they are less likely to bias their forecasts to satisfy potential future employers. If 
this assumption is incorrect and analysts at top investment banks have equally 
strong incentives to walk-down expectations this would bias my analysis against 
finding any results. Thus, my sample only captures those analysts who have 
stronger incentives to satisfy potential future employees and move up the 
brokerage house echelons. This results in an overall unique sample of 228 
individual analysts who issue forecasts in the same year for both employers and 
non-employers. The additional firm-specific data is obtained from Compustat. 
2.3.2 Measuring forecast bias 
To measure analyst optimism I adopt a similar approach to prior literature(Jacob, 
Lys, and Neale (1999); Clement (1999); Hong and Kubik, 2003; Cowen et al., 2006; 
Walther and Willis (2013)). My first measure compares the optimism of a given 
analyst’s forecast for a particular firm and time period to the mean optimism of all 
analysts employed by the top brokerage houses who make forecasts for the same 
firm and time period within a comparable forecast horizon. This requires me to 
exclude those firms followed by fewer than three analysts from the top brokerage 
houses as my  forecast bias measure requires intra firm-year variation (Clement 
                                            
4
 Although I exclude the analysts from the top brokerage houses from the sample I do use their forecasts to determine the 
relative forecast bias. 
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and Tse (2003); Kerl and Ohlert (2015)). Note, this constraint reduces the number 
of firm-year observation but not the number of individual analysts. This relative 
performance metric controls for any firm or time-specific factors that affect forecast 
optimism. I define forecast optimism of the analyst i for firm j in year t (FBijt) as the 
signed difference between the forecast and the actual earnings per share (EPS).  
Where: 
FBijt=Forecast EPSijt-Actual EPSijt 
 
and to control for the firm-year effects the demeaned version of FBijt is
5
: 
Rel_DFBijt=
[FBijt-Avg(TopFBjt)]
|Avg (TopFB
jt
)|
 
 
My second measure, consistent with Walther and Willis (2013), is an absolute 
forecast bias based on the signed forecast error as a percentage of share price: 
Abs_DFB
ijt
= [
FBijt
Pjt
] ×100 
where Pjt is the share price from firm j for year t issued 10 trading days before the 
forecast release date. 
                                            
5
I deflate the variable with the absolute mean of the top analyst’s forecast error for each firm-year since Clement (1999) 
shows that this procedure reduces heteroscedasticity. 
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If either Rel_DFBijt or Abs_DFBijt is positive, then the analyst forecast is 
optimistically biased (positively biased) whereas if it is negative then the analyst 
forecast is pessimistically biased (negatively biased). I calculate two Rel_DFBijt 
(and two Abs_DFBijt) one for each time period, the first forecast and last forecast 
revision analyst i makes for firm j in year t.  
2.3.3 Modelling forecast bias between employers and non-employers 
To test H1, that employer forecasts are relatively more biased than non-employer 
forecasts, I estimate the following cross-sectional regression with an indicator 
variable EMPLOYER that equals one if the analyst is forecasting earnings of a 
future employer and zero otherwise: 
Rel_DFBijt  (or  Abs_DFBijt )=  α  + 1EMPLOYER + 2Earn_Stdijt+ 3Ln(MVjt ) 
+4Ln(BTMjt)+5Ln(Followjt)+ 6F_Horizonijt +7dayElapijt +8frijt +9Firm_Expijt + 
10Gen_Expijt + 11Num_Coijt + 12Num_Indijt  + 13Num_Anaijt + 14Year_F.E + ijt
                                                                                                                                                            (1.1) 
I estimate model (1.1) for both the first forecast and last forecast the analyst makes 
for firm j at time t. If employer forecasts are relatively more biased than non-
employers’ forecasts then I would expect 𝛽1 to be significantly different from zero. I 
expect 𝛽1  to be positive and significant for the first forecast and negative and 
significant for the last forecast. Equation (1.1) includes a number of control 
variables proposed in the prior literature that are also likely to be related to forecast 
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bias. I also include as year fixed effects (Year_F.E.). Robust standard errors are 
clustered at the firm and analyst pair. 
2.3.4 The control variables 
Control variables are standardized the same way as forecast bias. I include analyst 
characteristics and firm characteristics following the prior analyst literature 
(Clement and Tse (2003), Lehavy, Li, and Merkley (2011) and Walther and Willis 
(2013)). 
jt
jtijt
ijt
sticCharacteriRaw
sticCharacteriRawsticCharacteriRaw
sticCharacteri
_
__ 
  
Analyst Characteristics Proxies 
Proportional Forecast Horizon (
ijtHorizonF _ ) 
Forecast Horizon (FH ijt) is the number of days between analyst i’s estimation and 
firm j’s earning announcement in year t (year t based on forecast period end date 
in I/B/E/S). It is a proxy for forecast timeliness.    
jt
jtijt
ijt
FH
FHFH
HorizonF

_  
Where  ijtijtijt DatenouncementEarningsAnteForecastDaFH   
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Days Elapsed ( ijtdayElap ) 
Days Elapsed is the number of days since a prior forecast from any analyst 
forecast for the same firm for the same year. The measure of the days is calculated 
as the days between analyst i’s forecast of firm j’s earnings in year t and the most 
recent preceding forecast of firm j’s earnings by any analyst, minus the average 
number of days between two adjacent forecasts of firm j’s earnings by any two 
analysts in year t, with this difference scaled by the average days between two 
adjacent forecasts of firm j’s earnings in year t. 
Forecast Revisions ( ijtfr ) 
Clement and Tse (2005) include the number of reports of firm j written by analyst i 
in year t. It is reasonable to say that an analyst revises the report because she 
acquires some more valuable information that turns out to be inconsistent with the 
conclusion she made before. Therefore, higher accuracy is expected for high 
forecast frequency analysts. 
The measure of analyst i’s forecast frequency for firm j, calculated as the number 
of firm j forecasts made by analyst i following firm j in year t minus the average 
number of firm j forecasts for analysts following firm j in year t, with this difference 
scaled by the average number of firm j forecasts issued by analysts following firm j 
in year t. 
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Number of companies followed ( ijtcoNum _ ) 
Following the methodology of Clement & Tse (2005), I measure the number of 
firms by counting firms tickers the analysts issued forecasts for using the I/B/E/S 
database. 
The measure of the number of firms analyst i follows in year t is calculated as the 
number of firms followed by analyst i following firm j in year t minus the average 
number of firms followed by analysts who follow firm j in year t, with this difference 
scaled by the average number of firms followed by analysts following firm j in year t. 
Number of industries followed ( ijtIndNum _ ) 
The measure of the number of industries analyst i follows in year t is calculated as 
the number of two-digit SICs followed by analyst i following firm j in year t minus 
the average number of SICs followed by analysts who follow firm j in year t, with 
this difference scaled by the average number of two-digit SICs followed by analysts 
following firm j in year t. 
Number of Analysts Working in a Brokerage House (Num_Anaijt) 
Num_Anaijt is a proxy for brokerage house size. It is calculated as the number of 
analysts in the brokerage house. Large brokerage houses tend to have better 
access to resources.   
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Proxy for Portfolio Complexities 
Firm Size ( jtMVLn )( ) 
Larger firms have more complex businesses and higher variation than those of 
smaller ones. Therefore, firm size is incorporated here following Kothari, Li, and 
Short (2009). It is the natural log of firm j’s market value at the end of year t. 
Book-to-Market Ratio ( jtBTMLn )( ) 
Book-to-market ratio is a proxy for the growth or riskiness of the firm. Growth firms 
have more unrecorded, intangible assets, whose valuation depends heavily on 
future profitability. jtBTMLn )(  is the natural log of the ratio of book value of equity 
to market value of firm j at the end of year t. 
Number of Analysts Following (Ln(Followjt)) 
Ln(Followjt) is measured as the natural log of analysts following firm j in year t. It is 
proxy for firm size and potential profitability from the brokerage house aspect.  
Standard Deviation of Prior Earnings ( jtStdEarn _ ) 
Gu and Wu (2003) find that forecast errors are greater for firms with more volatile 
earnings. I use the standard deviation of a firm’s 5-year earnings to control for the 
relation between the firm’s earning volatility and analysts’ forecast errors.  
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Proxy for Analyst Ability 
Analyst Experience  
Analysts’ experience is a proxy for their ability. Clement (1999) finds that both 
general and firm-specific forecasting experiences have a positive relationship with 
forecast accuracy, but the relationship with firm-specific experience is stronger.  
Firm-specific Experience ( ijtExpFirm _ ) 
The measure of analyst i’s firm-specific experience is calculated as the number of 
years of firm-specific experience for analyst i following firm j in year t minus the 
average number of years of firm-specific experience for analysts following firm j in 
year t, with this difference scaled by the average years of firm-specific experience 
for analysts following firm j in year t. 
General Experience ( ijtExpGen _ ) 
The measure of analyst i's general experience is calculated as the number of years 
of experience for analyst i following firm j in year t minus the average number of 
years of experience for analysts following firm j in year t, with this difference scaled 
by the range of years of experience for analysts following firm j in year t. 
To examine the effects of the Global Settlement and test hypothesis 2, I re-run 
equation (1.1) separately for periods before and after the Global Settlement. 
However, to control for the possibility that any results are driven by changes in the 
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composition of the analysts’ pool (and not by analysts changing their behaviour) 
after the Global Settlement, my sample for this analysis is restricted to only those 
analysts that appear in both periods. 
2.3.5 Propensity score matching 
Propensity score matching (hereafter PSM) is a widely used technique to find a 
treatment group and a control group with similar characteristics, mitigating the 
effect of selection bias. The advantage of PSM is that it is effective at selecting 
observations that are closely matched (Minutti-Meza (2013)). I employ the PSM 
technique to match one employer firm with one non-employer firm for the same 
analyst in the same year. This could minimize the difference between employer 
firms and non-employer firms and therefore isolate the effect of career concerns 
from other factors. Banks with and without investment arms could be different in 
their risks, opaqueness or size. Following Anolli, Beccalli, and Molyneux (2014), I 
calculate propensity scores based on z-score (proxy for insolvency risk), and 
standard deviation of monthly return (proxy for total risk), market value, book-to-
market ratio and bid-ask spread.  
Although the construction of such risk proxies can be influenced by accounting 
conventions/policies that differ across banks and countries, the Z-score has been 
widely used in the literature (Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi (2007); Laeven and 
Levine (2009); Liu and McConnell (2013) and Anolli, Beccalli, and Molyneux 
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(2014)). It is calculated as a risk metric including net accounting income, total 
assets and total equity. 
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where jq  is net accounting income after taxes of firm j in each quarter q of year t; 
jqA  is total assets; jqE  is total equity; ROAjts  is the estimated standard deviation of 
ROA. 
I also match it based on analysts’ related variables: the number of analysts 
following the firm and the firm-specific experience of the analysts following the firm. 
2.3.6 Measuring brokerage house status 
To investigate the impact of forecast bias on job separation I obtain a sample of all 
analysts who moved brokerage houses during 1999-2006. This yields a total of 886 
analysts. I am unable to identify the exact name of the brokerage house (since 
I/B/E/S simply provides a code for each brokerage house not the name 6) the 
analyst works for and therefore I am not able to measure the brokerage house 
status using an external ranking system, such as the one published by Institutional 
Investor and used in prior studies (Hong and Kubik, 2003). However, Hong and 
Kubik (2003) find that an alternative measure of brokerage house status based on 
the size of a brokerage house is highly correlated to the Institutional Investor 
                                            
6
 I was unable to obtain the Broker Transaction file, which would enable me to identify the brokerage houses’ name. 
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ranking system and their results are not sensitive to this alternative status measure. 
Following Carter and Manaster (1990) and Huang et al, 2014, I measure the status 
of the brokerage house based on the number of analysts from each brokerage 
house. To replicate Hong and Kubik’s (2003) proportions of brokerage houses 
identified as high, medium and low status, I identify a high-status house as a 
brokerage house with a house size in the top 3% each year. Low-status is any 
brokerage house size below the average house size each year and the remaining 
are identified as middle-status houses. I classify as high status the top 3% of 
brokerage houses in terms of number of analysts employed. Consistent with Hong 
and Kubik (2003), who report that approximately 29% of their sample analysts are 
identified as employed by high status brokerage houses, I find approximately 31.5% 
of my sample analysts are identified as being employed by high-status houses. 
Moreover, I find that approximately 22.2% and 46.3% of analysts worked in low-
status houses and median-status houses respectively, which again is consistent 
with the proportions reported by Hong and Kubik (2003).7 
2.3.7 Modelling forecast bias and job separation 
I estimate the following ordinal logit specification to test H3: 
Move_statust+1 = 1 BIASijt + 2EMPLOYER + 3 BIASijt * EMPLOYER + 4Gen_Expijt + 
5Num_Coijt + 6Accuracy +7Status F.E. + 8Year F.E + ijt                         (1.2) 
Move_status takes a discrete value of -1, 0, 1, or 2, depending on whether the 
                                            
7
 I find however, my results are not sensitive to either a 1% increase or decrease of this identification metric.  
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analyst has moved that year to a higher or lower status house and the size of the 
jump made. For example, analyst i who moves up to a higher status brokerage 
house (i.e. is promoted) in year t is given the value 1 if it involves one movement 
up the hierarchy of brokerage house status (i.e. low status to middle status) and 
the value of 2 if the move up represents a move of two hierarchies (i.e. low status 
to high status). An analyst who moves down one hierarchy or two will be given a 
value of -1 or -2. However, because I limit the sample to those analysts moving 
from medium-status and low-status brokerage houses the maximum drop in 
hierarchy possible is -1 (medium to low). Move_status equals 0 if analyst i moves 
within the same hierarchy status. Consistent with Hong and Kubik (2003), I do not 
classify a status movement for the analyst if it is only the brokerage house that 
changes status during the year since the analysts has not experienced a job 
separation and I also exclude brokerage houses which merged during the year.   
I follow a similar methodology to that of Hong and Kubik (2003) and measure a 
relative forecast bias for each firm the analyst forecasts in each year (Rel_DFB) 
(i.e. relative to the average bias of analysts from top brokerage houses) and then 
average across the stocks that the analysts from top brokerage houses cover, 
which gives a bias measure for analyst i in year t. However, this relative bias 
measure will be noisy for analysts that only follow a few firms in a year. Therefore, 
consistent with Hong and Kubik (2003), I create the measure Rel_BIAS, which is 
the average of the analyst’s forecast biases in year t and the two previous years. 
For those analysts that forecasted both employers and non-employers, I measure 
46 
 
 
 
separate Rel_BIAS for their employers’ forecasts and their non-employer 
forecasts.8 For those analysts covered only non-employers, the Rel_BIAS measure 
is based on all firms covered.9 I also construct Abs_Bias in a similar manner. Due 
to data limitation, I am unable to identify the position and hierarchy of an analyst in 
the brokerage house. I assume analysts experience favourable job separation 
when they move to better-ranked brokerage houses, which is also consistent with 
the prior literature. 
In addition, I also control for general experience in terms of the number of years 
the analyst has been forecasting for (Gen_Exp), the number of firms the analysts 
follows during the three year window (Num_Co) and whether the analysts is in the 
top decile of forecast accuracy during the period the BIAS is calculated (Accuracy). 
Additionally, I also include indicator variables for the status of the brokerage house 
the analyst currently works for, as well as year fixed effects.  
I estimate model (1.2) for both the first and last forecast the analyst makes for firm j 
at time t. If the forecast bias for employers is more important for job separation 
relative to a non-employer forecast then I would expect  𝛽3  to be significantly 
different from zero.  
                                            
8
 The results are not sensitive to excluding the non-employer forecasts for those analysts forecasting both employer and 
non-employer. 
9
 Since I am unable to identify the brokerage house name that an analyst works for (as I do not have access to a Broker 
Transaction file) I am unable to directly link an analyst who moved to a particular investment bank that she had previously 
covered. Given I argue that biased forecast help the analysts build relationships with prospective employers then a 
banking analyst will always provide a more pessimistic forecast irrespective of whether they ultimately work for a specific 
investment bank they cover or not.  
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2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1.1 Panel A reports analyst characteristics before standardization. The 
distributions are consistent with prior studies, such as that of Clement and Tse 
(2003). For example, every analyst issues an average of four forecast revisions per 
firm per year and follows about twenty one firms per year. The number of industries 
an analyst follows decreases from five from Clement and Tse (2003) to two in my 
sample due to the data selection process. I also report distributions for the scaled 
variable in Panel B. The variables are scaled to range from zero to one, but 
preserve the relative positions of each observation within a firm-year.  
I report correlations among the analysts’ forecast bias and analyst forecast and 
firm characteristics in Panel C. EMPLOYER is positive and significantly correlated 
to bias for the first forecast and negative and significantly correlated to bias for the 
last forecast. EMPLOYER is also significantly correlated to a number of firm and 
standardized analyst characteristics, specifically a positive correlation is noted for 
firm size (Ln(MV)), book-to-market (Ln(BTM)), and analysts following (Ln(Follow)); 
a negative correlation is noted for earnings dispersion (Earn_Std), forecast 
frequency (fr) and analysts’ general experience (Gen_Exp). Consistent with prior 
research, I find the firm characteristics of earning dispersion, firm size, book-to-
market and analysts’ following to be significantly correlated to forecast bias. The 
correlations among forecast characteristics and forecast bias are not significant, 
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except for forecast horizon and forecast revisions. None of the analyst 
characteristics are significantly correlated with forecast bias.  
2.4.2 Forecast bias for employers versus non-employers 
Table 1.2 Panel A presents estimates of equation (1.1), where the dependent 
variable is relative forecast bias (Rel_DFB) in columns 1 and 2 and absolute bias 
(Abs_DFB) in columns 3 and 4, for the analyst’s first or last forecast. The 
coefficient on the indicator variable EMPLOYER for both the first forecast (column 
1) and last forecast (column 2) is economically and statistically significant.  
Specifically, the coefficient on EMPLOYER for the first forecast is positive, 
indicating an optimistic forecast, and significant at the five percent level. The size 
of the EMPLOYER coefficient indicates that the average relative first forecast bias 
for employers is 17.7% more optimistic than for non-employers. In contrast, for the 
last forecast the coefficient on EMPLOYER is negative, indicating a pessimistic 
forecast, and is significant at the ten percent level. The size of the EMPLOYER 
coefficient indicates that the average last relative forecast bias (Rel_DFB) for 
employers is 36.9% more pessimistic than for non-employers. These results 
provide support to hypothesis one that analysts are more biased with respect to 
employers’ forecasts than non-employers’ forecasts and that this bias follows an 
optimistic to pessimistic pattern documented in prior studies (Richardson et al., 
2004, Ke and Yu, 2006; Bradshaw et al., 2014). The alternative bias measure 
Abs_Bias (column 3 and 4) provides a similar pattern to Rel_Bias. The first 
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forecast bias for employers is 12.7% more optimistic and significant at the one 
percent level, whilst the last forecast bias for employers is 18.6% more pessimistic 
and significant at the one percent level.  
These findings are consistent with my argument that analysts who forecast 
earnings of both employers and non-employers will have stronger career incentives 
with respect to their employer forecast and a greater need to curry favour with 
these managers. In unreported results, I find the analysts’ first employer forecast is 
significantly more accurate than their first non-employer forecast, whilst the last 
employer forecast is not significantly different compared with the last non-employer 
forecast. Thus, the optimism I observe for the first employer forecast cannot be 
attributed to the difficulty of the task (Bradshaw, Lee, and Peterson (2016)).  
Among the non-standardized control variables in columns (3) and (4) the 
coefficient estimates for earning dispersion (Earn_Std) and book-to-market 
Ln(BTM) are positive and significantly different from zero for both the first and last 
forecast analyses. In addition for the first forecast, forecast revision (fr), analyst 
firm experience (Firm_Exp) and general experience (Gen_Exp) and number of 
industries followed (Num_Ind) are significantly different from zero. For the last 
forecast analysis, the number of analysts covering the firm (Ln (Follow)), forecast 
horizon (F_Horizon), number of firms followed (Num_Co) and industries covered 
(Num_Ind) by the analysts are significantly different from zero.  
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2.4.2.1 Only banks 
I test the sensitivity of these results to alternative samples. First, from my main 
sample, I focus only on analysts with forecasts for banks with and without 
investment arms (mainly commercial banks, therefore excluding other financial 
institutions). Certainly, these latter firms operate in a more similar setting and 
therefore have more similar risks and regulations compared to firms that provide 
non-financial services. The results are reported in Table 1.2 Panel B. I find for both 
measure of bias a similar pattern, EMPLOYER is positive and significant, with a 
coefficient of 0.182, for the first forecast when bias is Rel_Bias (Column 1) and 
negative and significant, with a coefficient of 0.430, for the last forecast (Column 2). 
For the Abs_Bias the EMPLOYER is positive and significant, with a coefficient of 
0.141 (Colum 3) and negative and significant, with a coefficient of 0.272, for the 
last forecast (Column 4). The results are therefore not sensitive to this alternative 
sample. 
2.4.2.2 Propensity score matching for employers and non-employers  
Second, I employ propensity score matching (PSM) and use a one-to-one matched 
pair design to identify for each analyst an employer and a non-employer. My 
matching algorithm uses variables typically related to analyst forecast accuracy 
and firm-specific variables highlighted in the banking literature (Flannery, Kwan, 
and Nimalendran (2004) and Anolli, Beccalli, and Molyneux (2014)). Specifically, I 
match on a number of firm characteristics, namely, book-to-market (BTM), size 
(MV), bid-ask spread (Qspread), stock turnover (Turnover), stock return volatility 
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(Total Risk), insolvency risk (Zscore) and analysts’ related variables: number of 
analysts following the firm (Follow) and the firm-specific experience of the analyst 
following the firm (Firm_Exp). I also investigate the sensitivity of my results by 
creating a sub-sample of banks with and without equity departments. For this sub-
sample, I match on all variables noted above along with one additional firm-specific 
variable, return-on-assets (ROA). I include this additional variable given that the 
accounting is similar for this sub-sample of firms, unlike for the full sample. In the 
matching process, I set caliper equals to 0.001 and neighbour equals to 1 with 
common support. I included five-year senior CDS spreads (proxy for credit risk) 
initially, but the number of observations dropped significantly because the data 
starts from year 2003. Although the results still hold, I do not include it.  
Table 1.3 (Panels A and B) reports the mean difference in covariate values for the 
first and last forecasts using the full sample and the banking sub-sample 
respectively. I assess the balance with reference to the bias reduction and t-test 
(columns 7 and 8). As Oakes and Kaufman (2006) suggest, the standardized bias 
below 10% after matching is desirable. Both panels reveal the impact of the 
matching process. In Panel A (full sample), other than Firm_Exp and Qspread (and 
BTM for first forecast sample), all covariate mean differences pre-matching are 
statistically significant (consistent with the correlations noted above) but after 
matching only Total Risk (for the first forecast sample) and BTM still differ 
significantly, although their residual bias is below 10%. The bank sub-sample, 
Panel B, provides a similar picture with the majority of covariate means differing 
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significantly pre-match (for both first and last forecast samples) and only a few 
covariate means differ significantly after the match, again all the residual biases 
are below 10%.  
Panel C reports the regression estimates using the matched samples for the full 
sample. Consistent with the prior results, using either Rel_DFB or Abs_DFB the 
variable of interest, EMPLOYER, is positive and significantly different for the first 
forecast at 5% and 1% levels respectively (columns 1 and 3) and negative and 
significantly different for the second forecast at 5% level (columns 2 and 4).  The 
size of the EMPLOYER coefficient (column 1) indicates that the average relative 
first forecast bias for employers is 20.4% more optimistic than for non-employers 
and the last forecast bias is 75.2% more pessimistic than for non-employers 
(column 2). Similarly, for the banking sub-sample (Table 1.3, Panel D) the first 
forecast is positive and significant at the 1% (for both the relative and absolute 
forecast biases) and negative and significant at the 5% and 10% for the last 
relative forecast bias and absolute forecast bias respectively. 
2.4.2.3 Non-linear controls 
Lastly I test the sensitivity of the results by controlling for firm-specific and analyst’s 
specific characteristics in non-parametric analysis. I recast all the control variables 
as indicator variables according to the quintile in which the value of the variables 
falls. Therefore, instead of controlling for firm specific experience with a linear 
variable, I include four indicator variables as controls. Table 1.4 presents these 
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results, which are consistent with the prior findings and thus the results are 
therefore not sensitive to this alternative specification. 
2.4.3 Exogenous shock: Global Settlement 
Table 1.5 presents the results of the impact of the Global Settlement on analysts’ 
career concerns and hence their forecast bias. Columns (1) and (2) are pre Global 
Settlement period and columns (3) and (4) are for the post-settlement period, for 
first and last forecasts respectively. As noted earlier, for this analysis I only include 
those analysts that are in both the pre and post periods. This is to exclude the 
potential explanation that analysts are different before and after the Global 
Settlement. I find for the first forecast the EMPLOYER coefficient is positive both 
before and after Global Settlement, but only becomes significant after Settlement. 
This indicates that following the Global Settlement employer analysts’ first forecast 
is 23.6% relatively more optimistic than non-employers, unlike the pre-settlement 
period when it was only 5% relatively more optimistic than non-employers. For the 
last forecast analysis, I find in both periods that the EMPLOYER coefficient is 
negative. However, following the Global Settlement, the last forecast is 55.4% 
relatively more pessimistic than non-employers and statistically significant, 
compared to the prior period when it was 9.2% relatively more pessimistic. These 
findings are consistent with the Global Settlement increasing analyst incentives to 
bias their forecast and as a result provide an even steeper walk-down to beatable 
earnings. Moreover, to the extent that the Global Settlement mitigates other 
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sources of conflict of interest, one would expect to find the opposite result.  
However, reduced competition due to brokerage house closures following the 
Global Settlement could explain my results (Hong and Kacperczyk (2010)). 
Therefore, I re-run the model (1.1), but exclude from the pre and post sample those 
firms who experienced a decrease in analyst coverage following the Settlement. 
This new sample thereby reduces the possibility of the competition effect, noted by 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2010), from influencing my results. The results are reported 
in Table 1.5 Panel B. I find similar results to those of the main sample (Table 1.5 
Panel A).  
I use Rel_DFB not Abs_DFB because the global settlement also has an impact of 
the analyst view of investment banking and analysts are pessimistic about banks 
relative to non-banks following the Global Settlement. If I use the absolute measure, 
it is difficult to ascertain whether the bias is driven by career concerns or by a 
general pessimistic view of the banking sector as the Global Settlement may have 
an impact on the firms’ profitability and price. Therefore by choosing the relative 
measure, I remove the general pessimism following the Global Settlement. 
Overall, the results suggest that the exacerbation of career concerns prevents any 
decrease in bias from potentially mitigating other conflicts of interest, consistent 
with the intention of the Settlement. 
55 
 
 
 
2.4.4 Robustness check 
2.4.4.1 Opaqueness  
Some researchers assert that banks are more opaque, so banks are more difficult 
to forecast. Morgan (2002) claims that what is different about banks lies in the 
opacity of a bank’s portfolio because lending to opaque borrowers may cause 
opaque banks. However, based on the literature of equity market microstructure, 
Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004) state that if banks were relatively difficult 
for outsiders to understand, their shares should exhibit distinctive trading 
characteristics in variables such as their bid-ask spreads, the “adverse selection” 
component of those spreads, their trading volume, and maybe their return volatility. 
Although some may claim that banks are more difficult to forecast due to the risks 
taken by banks, Anolli, Beccalli, and Molyneux (2014) document that bank-specific 
risks did not influence forecasting abilities before the 2008 financial crisis. 
Therefore, I compare the microstructure of investment banks and compare groups 
to explore whether investment banks are more opaque, which leads to a greater 
difficulty with forecasting, compared with non-bank firms. In this sub-sample, I 
choose non-employer firms with an equity market value closest to employer firms 
and  a stock price within in 25% of the price of investment banks matched from the 
proper trading venue of NASDA and NYSE/AMEX, which is consistent with 
Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004). I select all firms on the CRSP that 
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survived the entire calendar year and are re-selected at the start of each calendar 
year.  
Table 1.6 compares the microstructure of investment banks and the non-bank 
group (hereafter “control group”) with a similar stock price and equity value. I find 
no evidence that banks are more opaque than non-banks. For each variable, mean 
values and the statistical significance of the difference between banks and non-
banks groups are presented. To assess the economic importance of these 
differences, a proportional (Prop’al) difference for each bank–nonbank pair is 
calculated, equal to the difference between the two firms’ values (the non-bank’s 
value minus the bank’s value), divided by their mean value. 
The first two rows in Table 1.6 confirm that the control group’s market values and 
prices closely resemble the banks’. The first row (markv) also illustrates the large 
size difference between the NASDAQ and NYSE subsamples: the typical NYSE-
traded banks are four times larger than their NASDAQ counterpart. Most of my 
bank samples are traded in NYSE and the difference of return volatility (std), 
trading volume between banks and control group in NYSE are not statistically 
significant. qspread and jspread describe bid–ask spreads and their components. 
The proportional difference is statistically insignificant, indicating that banking firms 
are unusually not opaque to market investors. Since I match the sample on the 
basis of equity market value and price, each firm in a pair has a similar number of 
shares outstanding, and thus the difference between the turnover (tover)  of the 
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control group and the bank is large. 
2.4.4.2 Forecast Accuracy 
I also compare forecast accuracy of analysts forecasting employer firms and non-
employer firms from equation (1.3). It is it the same methodology as investigating 
forecast bias, but accuracy is the absolute value of Rel_DFBijt . One possible 
explanation for analysts to be more optimistically biased towards employers is that 
employer firms are more difficult to forecast (Bradshaw, Lee, and Peterson (2016)). 
Therefore, I compare the forecast accuracy of employers and non-employers.  
 
                                                                                                                                        
Table 1.7 presents the estimation of equation (1.3), where the dependent variable 
is relative forecast accuracy (absolute value of Rel_DFB). In the first forecast of 
column 1, I find analysts are more accurate at forecasting employers than non-
employers, with the coefficient of EMPLOYER  being positive and significant. In the 
last forecast of column 3, there is no difference in accuracy between forecasting 
employers and non-employers, with the coefficient of EMPLOYER insignificant. The 
results show that banking analysts are more accurate in the initial forecast, thus 
the optimism I observe for the first employer forecast cannot be attributed to the 
difficulty of the task. 
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2.4.5 Forecast bias and job separation 
Table 1.8 Panel A reports the percentage of analysts who work in high-status and 
low-status brokerage houses. Consistent with Hong and Kubik (2003), I find 
approximately 31.5% of analysts worked in high-status brokerage houses each 
year. High-status brokerage houses in aggregate should not employ the majority of 
analysts; otherwise, there would be little meaning to being considered a prestigious 
house. Table 1.8 Panel B reports the summary statistics of those analysts in the 
I/B/E/S database who leave their brokerage house but stay in the profession. 
About 6% of analysts changed brokerage houses each year during the 1999-2006 
period. Of these movers approximately 7% were analysts who covered employers 
(column 2). As a fraction of these movers, about 51% moved up the hierarchy, 
about 30% moved down the hierarchy and the remaining were lateral movers. 
These percentages were very similar to the all analyst sample (Column 1). 
Taking a slightly different look at these job separation patterns, on average during 
the period approximately 16% of bank analysts moved from either high-status or 
low-status brokerage houses. The biggest movers are from mid-status houses, 
where nearly 68% of bank analysts moved from this group. Again these 
percentages are similar to the all analyst sample. 
Table 1.8 Panels C and D present the results of estimations from the ordinal logit 
model, equation (1.2), for the various job separation measures involving 
movements along the brokerage house hierarchy. As noted earlier, the sample I 
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use only includes those analysts from the medium and low-tier brokerage houses. 
In Panel C, column 1, the Rel_BIAS relates to the first forecast bias, in column 3 it 
relates to the last forecast bias. I find the first forecast bias is not associated with 
job separation along the brokerage house hierarchy, and that analysts who 
forecast employers are not significantly different from other analysts, since the 
coefficient on the interaction variable (EMPLOYER*BIAS) is not significantly 
different from zero. However, I find the last forecast bias (column 3) for analysts 
who forecast employers is associated with job separation along the brokerage 
hierarchy. Specifically, the coefficient on the interaction variable 
(EMPLOYER*BIAS) is negative, indicating that analysts who issue pessimistic 
forecasts for employers are relatively more likely to move up the brokerage 
hierarchy, compared to analysts who forecast non-employers. This result supports 
my hypothesis that analysts who bias their employer forecasts are more likely to 
experience favourable job separations. Panel D presents results using Abs_BIAS 
and again I find the results are consistent. 
Given that interaction terms do not have a straightforward interpretation in 
nonlinear models as in linear models, I follow Ai and Norton (2003) and estimate 
marginal effects for different cells. Moreover, I report odds ratios for all estimated 
coefficients. I note that no odds ratios can be calculated for the interaction effect 
but rather I report the ratio of the odds ratio for the interaction effect. Figure 1 
shows the marginal effect for a unit change in bias for movements up or down the 
hierarchy based on whether the analyst makes forecasts for an employer or non-
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employer in the last forecast. As can be seen, non-employer bias does not affect 
movements. For non-employers, the marginal effect is 0.09% (z-stat=0.26) for 
downward movement and -0.25% (z-stat=-0.26) for upward movement as an 
analyst’s bias increases. In contrast, for employers, the marginal effect is -1.51% 
(z-stat=-2.63) for downward movement and 7.28% (z-stat=2.07) for upward 
movement as an analyst’s bias increases. Therefore, more biased analysts in 
forecasts for employers are significantly more likely to be promoted by moving to 
higher reputation banks. 
2.5 Conclusion 
I investigate how career concerns of analysts that forecast the performance of 
potential future employers influence their forecasts. I find evidence of a walk-down 
to beatable earnings when forecasting earnings of future employers but not of firms 
that are unlikely to be future employers. Moreover, this pattern is more pronounced 
after the Global Settlement, which exacerbated career concerns of analysts by 
limiting their outside opportunities. Consistent with career concerns about future 
employment biasing forecasts, I find that bias in potential future employers’ 
forecasts leads to favourable career outcomes. No such effect is found for bias in 
non-employer forecasts. I find a source of conflict of interest for analysts, which are 
also discussed in other settings, such as auditing. The generalizability of the 
phenomenon to the analyst setting is important as it suggests that other 
information intermediaries might be affected by such conflicts.  
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Analyst forecast accuracy (unsigned) and bias (signed) are related, but they 
do not subsume each other. If as suggested by my results that, given biased 
banking analysts have greater opportunities to move to higher status 
investment banks, does this imply that investment banks are employing poor 
quality analysts?  The answer I believe is no as the analysis in Table 1.7 
suggests the quality of the analysts forecasts for investment banks relative 
to non-investment banks forecast is no worse and in some cases is better. 
Specifically, I do not find that banking analysts forecast accuracy is of a 
lower quality for their investment banks forecast relative to their non-
investment bank forecasts. This is  consistent with Lim (2001) and Jacob, 
Rock, and Weber (2008) who show that higher levels of optimism bias does 
not necessarily imply reduced accuracy. Indeed, an analyst could trade off 
some amount of bias in their forecasts in exchange for access to additional 
information that improves their accuracy.  
My findings should be of interest to investors and policy makers who want to know 
the incentives that drive biased forecasts. Jackson (2005) shows that retail 
investors find it difficult to debias analysts’ forecasts. My findings, that the walk-
down pattern exists in banking industry, could help small investors identify and 
correct for such bias, thereby obtaining more informative forecasts. For securities 
regulators, my findings may help them to scrutinize factors which lead analyst to 
strategically distort their forecasts. Although the Global Settlement reduces the 
frequency of issuing buy recommendations (Balboa et al (2009)), my results show 
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that the Settlement did not mitigate conflicts of interest faced by banking analysts. 
It is possible that such biased forecasts for banking industry have implications for 
an efficient market and could lead to the mispricing of banks but I suspect only in 
the short-run. 
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Chapter 3 
Analyst reports with consistent and conflicting signals: market 
reaction and forecast accuracy 
3.1 Introduction 
Recent research finds that the sentiment of the analyst report provides incremental 
information beyond the quantitative measures such as target prices or earning 
forecasts (Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005), Twedt and Rees (2012) and Huang, 
Zang, and Zheng (2014)). The textual discussion is an important part of an analyst 
report because it provides investors with the analysis and justification behind the 
forecast figures the analyst has arrived at. This private information and the 
analyst’s understanding of the stocks contained in the discursive element of the 
report are found to be valuable to investors. Specifically, Huang et al. (2014) finds 
that when the sentiment of the analyst report is optimistic (pessimistic), investors 
react more strongly to upward (downward) earnings revisions. This finding focuses 
primarily on those analyst reports that contain consistent signals between the 
qualitative and quantitative elements of the report. However, it is unclear how 
investors will react to conflicting signals between these two elements and therefore 
I investigate investor reactions to analyst reports which contain conflicting signals 
and those that contain consistent signals. 
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Specifically, I focus on the sentiment (i.e. qualitative measure10) and earnings 
forecast bias (i.e. quantitative measure) of analyst reports. I investigate the 
following three questions: First, does the market react differently to analyst reports 
which contain consistent signals compared to those with conflicting signals? 
Second, when the analyst textual discussion and earnings forecast bias do not 
coincide, which attribute do investors place greater weight on? Lastly, is there any 
difference in terms of forecast accuracy between those analysts’ reports that 
contain a conflicting message and those that have a consistent message?  
I therefore group the analyst reports into the four possible combinations of 
quantitative and qualitative messages. The first two contain consistent messages 
and the last two contain inconsistent messages: 
1. A report containing an optimistic textual sentiment (OT) and an optimistic 
forecast bias (OB), resulting in an OTOB analyst report.  
2. A report containing a pessimistic textual sentiment (PT) and a pessimistic 
forecast bias (PB), resulting in a PTPB analyst report.  
3. A report containing an optimistic textual sentiment (OT) and a pessimistic 
forecast bias (PB), resulting in an (OTPB) analyst report. 
4. A report containing a pessimistic textual sentiment (PT) and an optimistic 
forecast bias (OB), resulting in an (PTOB) analyst report. 
Investors spend millions of dollars subscribing to the full analyst reports even 
though they have access to analyst quantitative outputs. Survey evidence from 
Brown et al. (2015) suggests that textual analysis of analyst reports could be more 
                                            
10
 I use textual discussion, text, sentiment and qualitative measure interchangeably.  
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valuable than the final EPS forecasts or stock recommendations because they 
provide detailed analyses with a lower probability of being affected by conflicts of 
interest. Yet the existing literature focuses almost exclusively on the quantitative 
properties such as target price, earnings forecasts and stock recommendations 
while only a few studies have examined the qualitative attributes of the analysts’ 
reports. This was highlighted by Bradshaw (2011), who advocates that there 
should be more studies investigating  elements other than the analysts’ quantitative 
output. Certainly, there is evidence that investors value the analysis of the analyst 
reports far more than their final conclusions (The Institutional Investor magazine, 
2011). We answer Bradshaw (2011) call by examining the market reaction to the 
interaction effect of quantitative and qualitative attributes in analyst reports.  
I manually collected all sell-side analyst reports of S&P500 firms from 1999 to 2014.  
From these I measure the sentiment of analyst reports using the Loughran and 
McDonald (2011)11 methodology. I then compare the market reaction to analyst 
reports which contain consistent signals (OTOB and PTPB reports) and those which 
contain conflicting signals (OTPB and PTOB reports). Although, Huang et al. (2014) 
find that investors react to optimistic (pessimistic) earnings forecast revisions more 
intensively when they are supported by optimistic (pessimistic) text, the focus of my 
research is based in part on the persuasion theory, which suggests that there may 
be some incremental benefit from having conflicting signals, in so far as a proper 
amount of negative argumentation could improve analyst credibility (Crowley and 
                                            
11
 I use LM hereafter. 
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Hoyer (1994)). My first empirical test finds that investors react more strongly when 
the sentiment of textual discussion and earnings forecast bias are consistent 
relative to those reports containing inconsistent signals. In other words, OTOB and 
PTPB reports have a stronger market reaction than OTPB and PTOB reports.   
Focusing on the conflicting reports, I investigate which conflicting signal investors 
put greater weight on, the text or the forecast bias. I find that when the tone of the 
text does not coincide with the earnings forecast bias, investors place greater 
weight on the tone rather than the forecast bias, i.e. an OTPB report has a positive 
reaction while a PTOB report has a negative reaction. It suggests that, although 
more costly, investors believe the textual information disseminated by analysts is 
more valuable than their final numerical conclusion. This is consistent with Brown 
et al. (2015) argument that the model and analysis behind the final EPS forecasts 
are important12.  
Although I find that consistent reports with both optimistic sentiment and optimistic 
forecast bias have a strong positive market reaction, further analysis reveals that 
these reports are associated with lower forecast accuracy. The reports associated 
with high forecast accuracy are those that contain a pessimistic tone (PTPB and 
PTOB reports). This suggests that pessimistic sentiment per se maybe a good 
indicator for the quality/credibility of the analyst reports. Furthermore, of these two 
types of reports - PTPB and PTOB reports, I find those with relatively pessimistic 
sentiment, but an optimistic earnings bias (PTOB) are associated with the highest 
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 This is also consistent with the discussions I had with analysts and fund managers. 
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forecast accuracy. Compared with PTPB reports, PTOB reports show two-sided 
argumentation, which indicates analyst awareness of both positive and negative 
aspects of the stock they cover. 
My study complements the analyst literature by examining the interaction effect of 
different signals contained in analyst reports, especially when those signals do not 
coincide. I believe I am the first to show that investors react differently to analyst 
reports with conflicting and consistent signals. More importantly, within those 
reports which contain conflicting signals, investors place greater weight on the 
textual analysis relative to the forecast numbers. In addition, I complement the 
literature on analyst forecast accuracy by investigating which combinations of 
quantitative and qualitative attributes in analyst reports enjoy the highest accuracy. 
I find that reports with pessimistic sentiment are more credible because they are 
associated with a high accuracy. Lastly, I complement the research in the textual 
analysis of analyst reports by providing large sample evidence, compared with 
Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005) and Twedt and Rees (2012), who conducted pilot 
tests by using non-random and small sample sizes. The dictionary-based 
technique enables me to measure the tone of analyst reports more objectively and 
makes it easier to replicate, compared with the machine learning technique applied 
by Huang, Zang, and Zheng (2014). 
Section 3.2 discusses relevant prior studies and develops the hypotheses; Section 
3.3 provides the dictionary-based approach for sentiment analysis; Section 3.4 
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presents data and the methodology being applied in this chapter; Section 3.5 
discusses the empirical results and Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
3.2.1 Market reaction to the different combinations of the sentiment and the 
EPS forecast bias of the analyst reports 
3.2.1.1 Sentiment of financial disclosures 
With the development of linguistic software, researchers have tried to understand 
how the sentiment of financial disclosures influences the market. The qualitative 
information that has been analysed by textual sentiment researchers in finance 
comes predominantly from three sources: a) public corporate disclosures 
(Schleicher and Walker (2010), Li (2010), Feldman et al. (2010), Rogers, Buskirk, 
and Zechman (2011), Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012), Price et al. (2012), 
Jegadeesh and Wu (2013), Kravet and Muslu (2013), Ferris, Hao, and Liao (2013), 
Merkley (2014), Muslu et al. (2015) and Davis et al. (2014), Tama-Sweet (2014) 
and Blau, DeLisle, and Price (2015)), b) media articles (Tetlock, Saar-tsechansky, 
and Macskassy (2008), García (2013), Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012), 
Schumaker et al. (2012), Yu, Duan, and Cao (2013), Chen et al. (2013) and Rees, 
Sharp, and Twedt (2015)), and c) social media posts and personal correspondence 
(Chen et al. (2014), Hillert, Niessen-Ruenzi, and Ruenzi (2014) and Wang et al. 
(2015)). 
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It has been shown that the sentiment of financial disclosure can significantly affect 
the capital market response to the release of other types of information by 
conditioning the market expectations. Davis, Piger, and Sedor (2012) investigate 
language used in firm earning press releases. They find a positive relationship 
between the sentiment of earnings press releases and future ROA. Furthermore, 
they find that market responds to the sentiment of the earnings press release. 
Additionally, Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) find that the tone of positive words in the 
annual report is positively correlated with the market reaction. Earning conference 
calls is another area where researchers have examined managerial choice of 
words. Using a sample of 10,062 conference call transcripts during 2003-2005, 
Matsumoto, Pronk, and Roelofsen (2011) find that both the manager’s presentation 
and the Q&A sections of the conference call add information beyond the preceding 
press release. Since all of their conference calls occurred during the trading 
session, the authors were able to measure the market’s immediate reaction (i.e., 
abnormal absolute returns) to each portion of the call. Although Matsumoto et al. 
(2011) do not measure the sentiment of the earnings conference call, they do 
create a list of financially oriented words. The list contains mostly financial jargon 
terms such as leasing, ROA, ROI, cash, costs, and prepayment. They find that 
firms with stronger prior accounting operating performance use more financially 
oriented words during management presentations, compared to those with weaker 
accounting operating performance. 
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The tone used in media reports has also been analysed. Liu and McConnell (2013) 
examine the media influence on 636 acquisitions with negative announcement 
reactions from investors during 1990-2010. They find that managers are sensitive 
to their reputational capital. They report that both the level of media attention 
(measured by number of articles) on the proposed acquisition and the tone of the 
corresponding news articles (measured as a percentage of LM negative words13) 
can significantly affect the probability of abandoning the deal. Having more articles 
with a negative tone is associated with managers being more likely to drop the 
proposed acquisition.  
Other studies such as that by Hillert, Niessen-Ruenzi, and Ruenzi (2014) 
investigate the tone of mutual fund letters during 2006-2012 after controlling for 
past performance and fund characteristics. They document that the tone of the 
mutual fund letter directly affects money flows. A more negative tone in the 
shareholder letter is linked with significantly lower net flows into the open-end 
mutual fund. 
So far, only three studies have examined the sentiment of analyst reports. They all 
find that textual analysis of analyst reports provides incremental information and is 
priced by market. Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005) conducted a preliminary study by 
manually computing the sentiment score for 193 analyst reports. Their seminal 
study concludes that the tone of analyst reports can explain market reactions. 
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However, it must be noted that their sample is non-random as they only include 
top-ranked analysts. 
Twedt and Rees (2012) examine the tone and detail of analyst reports. Tone is 
measured by General Inquirer. Detail is measured by complexity (Fox Index), 
length, and visual aids. They find that the ranking of these two qualitative attributes, 
tone and detail, provides incremental information beyond the standard deviation 
between analysts’ stock recommendation and that of consensus, as well of the 
standard deviation between analysts’ earnings forecasts and that of consensus. 
They also document that the tone and complexity of analyst reports help explain 
cross-sectional variation in investors’ reactions around the issuing dates of reports. 
Twedt and Rees (2012) selected 2,057 analyst reports from 2006 and only 
examine the analysts’ initiation reports because they manually read each report, 
which is very time-consuming.  
Huang, Zang, and Zheng (2014) substantially extend the sample and are the first 
to apply the machine learning approach to calculate the sentiment of analyst 
reports. They find that investors react stronger to negative sentiment than to 
positive sentiment. They also argue that investors value the reports more if the 
reports focus on non-financial topics and are written more assertively and concisely. 
They utilize the machine learning method, which is viewed as more accurate but 
more labour intensive, less objective and therefore less generalizable. In the 
machine learning method, a researcher manually classifies words into different 
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categories after reading some analyst reports. Unfortunately, different people 
usually have different views towards the tone of a sentence, which introduces 
consistency problems in replicating the results. Their study finds that the text of 
reports facilitates investors to make decisions when it is consistent with the 
quantitative measure. I complement and add to this paper by comparing the market 
reaction to reports with consistent signals and conflicting signals. Furthermore, I 
also explore within the conflicting reports which signal provides the greatest 
incremental information to investors.  
3.2.1.2 Forecast bias 
There is an extensive literature on analyst forecast bias indicating that it has 
economic incentives beyond pure judgement error. The most important two 
reasons for conflicts of interest are underwriting relationships (Dugar and Nathan 
(1995); Lin and Mcnichols (1998); Michaely and Womack (1999); and Dechow, 
Hutton, and Sloan (2000)) and the generation of trading commissions (Jackson 
(2005); Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy (2006); Beyer and Guttman (2011) and 
Bradley, Gokkaya, and Liu (2015)). For example, O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin 
(2005) find that banking ties increase an analyst’s reluctance to reveal negative 
news.  Similarly, Arand and Kerl (2015) demonstrate that the aggregate number of 
simultaneous business ties with a reported firm is positively associated with the 
optimism level in the target prices and in the recommendations. Maintaining a good 
relationship with managers also creates forecast bias. Lim (2001) finds that 
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analysts tend to be optimistically biased in order to secure management access. 
Moreover, Hong and Kubik (2003) document that underwriter analysts who issue 
more optimistically biased earnings forecasts are more likely to experience 
favourable career outcomes. These studies investigate analyst incentives to 
optimistically bias their forecasts. Recent research identifies analysts’ incentives to 
walk-down their forecast revisions and pessimistically bias their last forecasts. 
Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki (2006), Ke and Yu (2006) and Pinello (2008) argue that 
managers prefer beatable forecasts and therefore negative forecast bias facilitates 
firms to beat market expectations.  Due to the equity incentives of management 
teams, some studies find a positive relationship between negative forecast bias 
shortly before earnings announcement dates and net sellers of stock after an 
earnings announcement. This game is examined by Richardson, Teoh, and 
Wysocki (2004); Cheng and Warfield (2005); Cheng, Warfield, and Ye (2011);  
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006);  Cheng and Kin (2006); Tama-Sweet (2014). 
Examining the relationship between forecast bias and task difficulty, Bradshaw, 
Lee, and Peterson (2016) find that analysts tend to issue optimistically biased 
forecasts when they are less certain about their forecasts. Their finding supports 
the argument that pessimistically biased forecasts are more credible. 
3.2.1.3 Market reaction 
Several studies investigate market reaction when investors take into account the 
analysts’ incentives mentioned above. Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2007) 
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demonstrate that the market reacts stronger to recommendations made by 
independent analysts than by affiliated analysts. Focusing on buy 
recommendations,  Lin and Mcnichols (1998) find that the market does not react to 
favorable recommendations made by affiliated analysts, suggesting investors’ 
awareness of analysts’ strategic bias. Iskoz (2002), Malmendier and Shanthikumar 
(2007), Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (2007) and Malmendier and Shanthikumar 
(2014) compare reactions from large and small investors and find that the large 
investors discount recommendations, in particular affiliated ones, while small 
investors do not.  
While these studies above examine investor reactions to recommendations around 
earnings announcement dates, others investigate the market response to earnings 
forecast bias. Kasznik and McNichols (2002) find that for those firms with low 
analyst following and institutional ownership, investors react stronger to positive 
earnings surprises (i.e. meeting or beating consensus forecast). Hirshleifer et al. 
(2008) focus on retail investors. Their study documents that retail investors tend to 
buy stocks after extreme negative and positive earnings surprises. Malmendier and 
Shanthikumar (2014) extend the study and show that small investors react more 
positively than larger investors to (meet or beat) earnings news, but do not 
consider the specific quantity of good news or bad news. Ivkovic and Jegadeesh 
(2004) focus on forecast revisions and find that the market reacts strongly to 
forecast revisions in the week after the earnings announcement. However, 
75 
 
 
 
Altınkılıç, Balashov, and Hansen (2013), using intraday returns, do not find 
analysts' forecast revisions informative.  
3.2.1.4 Consistent signals vs. conflicting signals  
Engelberg (2008) states that making investment decisions based on a synthesis of 
information, although more costly, is more reliable than investing based on a single 
indicator. Opdyke (2002) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (2010) 
advise investors to not just rely on analyst summary outputs since they might be 
strategically distorted due to conflicts of interest. Francis and Sofferf (1997) 
examine how investors react to two indicators interactively. They examine both 
analyst stock recommendations conditional on the earnings forecast and vice-
versa. Francis and Soffer (1997) find lower precision of favourable 
recommendations. Consequently, they find that investors put more weight on 
earnings forecasts when buy recommendations are issued. Winchel (2015) also 
examines the interaction effect of two attributes of analyst reports by running 
experiments with 40 MBAs. She studies the presence of a causal explanation and 
positive conclusions. She finds that investors react strongly to an optimistic analyst 
report when the report provides unambiguous positive arguments. In contrast, 
when ambiguous optimistic arguments are presented, investors give more credit to 
two-sided argumentation. Both these studies show that investors do not rely on 
one attribute in analyst reports but the interaction effect.  
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So overall, the above findings would suggest investors are likely to react more 
intensively to reports with consistent signals (OTOB and PTPB), especially given the 
findings of  Huang et al. (2014), who find that the market reacts more strongly 
when the text support the quantitative outputs, compared with quantitative outputs 
only. However, investors may react more intensively to reports with conflicting 
signals (OTPB and PTOB reports). These two-sided argumentation reports could be 
more credible to investors because they contradict analysts’ institutional incentives 
and show analyst effects in providing both positive and negative aspects of the 
covered firms (Winchel (2015)). Therefore, it is an empirical question as to whether 
the market reacts differently to the types of analyst reports. This leads to my first 
hypothesis: 
H1: Market reactions to analysts’ reports containing conflicting signals will 
be different to those containing consistent signals.  
3.2.1.5 Text vs. bias 
Some investors prefer to look at the final outputs such as EPS forecasts and do not 
fully read the complete analyst reports (Huang et al, (2014)). These investors may 
pay more attention to the conclusions due to time constraints. Therefore, investors 
may react more to EPS forecasts and use them directly while reacting less to the 
text of full analyst reports since they are too time-consuming to read and costly to 
obtain.  
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On the other hand, it is also possible that the market reacts more strongly to the 
textual discussion of analyst reports. Investors spend millions of dollars to 
subscribe to full analyst reports while they already have access to analyst earnings 
forecasts or recommendations via news services. This extra payment suggests 
that investors value more the written reports since analysts’ final numerical outputs 
are more likely to be influenced by conflicts of interest (Guan, Lu, and Wong (2012), 
Kadan et al. (2009), Agrawal and Chen (2005), Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok 
(2007)). Therefore, when analyst earnings forecasts are not consistent with their 
textual discussion, investors might show a greater reliance on the textual 
discussion of analyst reports. In addition, surveys from Institution Investor 14 
magazine show that buy-side analysts and fund managers value both private and 
proprietary information conveyed in the sell-side analyst reports as well as the 
analysts’ interpretation of this information. This is confirmed by Soltes (2014) and 
Brown et al. (2015), who find that analyst reports are more valuable if private 
discussions with management are mentioned. Some investors could prefer to use 
information they believe is trustworthy to make their own decisions, without relying 
on the analyst EPS forecasts. Final quantitative outputs are merely aggregations of 
all the information, assumptions, analysis and biases of the analysts. Investors 
may adjust the assumptions and or biases and use alternative valuation models 
based on the financial and non-financial information which the analysts have 
provided (Institutional Investor (2011)). Using their professional resources, the 
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 For details, see various October issues of the Institution Investor magazine. 
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information gathered by analysts can be more valuable for investors than the 
analysts’ final quantitative outputs. Moreover, psychology literature also shows that 
a proper amount of negative argumentation could improve credibility (Crowley and 
Hoyer (1994) and Elsbach and Elofson (2000)). Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
H2: If the sentiment of the textual discussions contained in the analyst 
reports does not coincide with their forecast bias, then investors will react 
more to the sentiment relative to the forecast bias.  
3.2.2 Forecast accuracy of the different combinations of the sentiment and 
the EPS forecast bias of the analyst reports 
3.2.2.1 Determinants of forecast accuracy 
Prior literature investigates the accuracy of analyst reports focusing on analyst 
characteristics, their incentives and other factors that influence forecast accuracy 
and the subsequent benefits of accurate forecasts. Clement (1999) and Jacob, Lys, 
and Neale (1999) find that analyst experience, portfolio complexity, forecast 
horizon, forecast revisions and broker size are determinants of analyst forecast 
accuracy. Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999) provide evidence that low accuracy 
leads to a higher probability of analyst turnover. Walther and Willis (2013) find that 
analysts are quite optimistic and least accurate when market confidence is high, 
while  Ertimur, Sunder, and Sunder (2007) find that more accurate analysts make 
more profitable recommendations.  
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3.2.2.2 Pessimistic sentiment and forecast accuracy 
Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000), Hugon and Muslu (2010) and Huang et al. (2014) find 
that pessimistic information contained in analyst forecasts receive more intense 
investor reactions. Analysts may have the incentive to hype the stocks they cover 
(Lin and Mcnichols (1998), O'Brien, Mcnichols, and Lin (2005), Jackson (2005), 
Ljungqvist et al. (2007) and Bartholdy and Feng (2013)) because optimistic reports 
are likely to be driven by conflicts of interest such as trading commissions (Cowen, 
Groysberg, and Healy (2006)) and management relationship (Mayew (2008)). 
Therefore, reports with pessimistic text are less likely to suffer from strategic bias 
and may be of a higher quality. In addition, Bradshaw, Lee, and Peterson (2016), 
supported by the cognitive psychology literature, find a significant association 
between analyst forecast optimism and the difficulty of the task. Therefore, unlike 
analysts with an optimistic outlook, analysts with a pessimistic sentiment might be 
more credible and confident in their information since the forecasting task is simply 
less difficult. Furthermore, O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin (2005) and Kadan et al. 
(2009) examine the conflicts of interest faced by analysts. They find that the 
affiliated analysts are reluctant to reveal negative news or downgrade those firms 
with investment banking ties. This leads to my third hypothesis: 
H3: If the analyst’s report contains a pessimistic textual discussion it is 
associated with higher forecast accuracy relative to a report containing an 
optimistic textual discussion. 
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3.3 The Method of Textual Analysis  
3.3.1 Different techniques 
Textual analysis is a multi-disciplined study, involving computational linguistics, 
statistical language processing, information retrieval and content analysis. In early 
financial text research, Bryan (1997) and Callahan, Cook, and Smith (2004) 
conducted sentiment analysis on small-size samples based on manually coded 
data. This method enjoys the advantages of being more precise, detailed and 
tailored to the specific research setting. However, the disadvantages are obvious; it 
is very time-consuming and is only therefore only appropriate for small samples. 
The improvement of computer knowledge recently, however, now enables 
researchers to conduct textual analysis with larger samples. The most common 
content analysis methods includes the dictionary-based approach and machine 
learning. In the dictionary-based approach, different wordlists are available. In 
addition, there are two word frequency measures: equal-weighting and inverse 
document frequency weighting. Henry and Leone (2016) use both content analysis 
methods and compare these two word frequency approaches, and overall 
advocates for a dictionary-based approach, an equal-weighting scheme with a 
financially-specific wordlist. I therefore apply this method to my current study. 
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3.3.1.1 The dictionary-based method 
The working principle for this method is that it maps each text file with counts on 
dictionary-supplied categories. That is, it indentifies and counts word frequencies, 
matching them against words. People can customise which dictionaries they use. 
This approch has at lease three benefits: First, the output results are continuous 
rather than categorical, which increases the power of analysis; second, the 
measure is normalized by word count, which allows for comparisons between 
disclosures of vastly different lengths; and finally, the process is objective, which 
means it can be applied to large quantities of text, and provides results that are 
replicable by other researchers. 
Diction, General Inquirer and Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count are the most 
commonly used types of software to apply this technique. Their working principles 
are the same. The major difference in these software types is that they have 
different dictionaries. Diction uses a series of thirty-three dictionaries (word-lists) to 
search text passages for different semantic features such as, e.g., praise, 
satisfaction, or denial, while General Inquirer uses the Harvard-IV-4 Psychological 
Dictionary with Lasswell dictionaries. In recent years, Diction software has gained 
more popularity in accounting and finance research  since it accepts a larger 
number of files within a single project (Demers and Vega (2010), Rogers, Van 
Buskirk, and Zechman (2011), Loughran and Mcdonald (2011), Ferris, Hao, and 
Liao (2013) and Demers and Vega (2014)). 
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3.3.1.2 The machine learning method 
Machine learning involves one or more algorithms reading a training set and writing 
a ‘model’ containing its statistics. Specifically, researchers first manually classify 
words into ‘positive’, ‘negative’ or other training sets. Then, a selection of sentiment 
analysis algorithms such as the Naïve Bayesian algorithm is then trained on the 
training corpus. The algorithm ‘learns’ the sentiment classification rules from the 
pre-classified data set, and apply these rules out-of-sample to the whole context. 
Finally, sentiment measures can be derived using various combinations of the 
classifications used in the training corpus. 
Compared with the dictionary-based approach, machine learning is more time-
consuming and costly because the training set must be manually classified. It also 
leads to another disadvantage of a lack of objectivity and generalizability since 
different researchers may get a different training set for the same context. Although 
Li (2010) claims that machine learning has a higher accuracy than the dictionary-
based approach, the “Black Box” nature and the difficulty of replications limit its 
development.  
Li (2010) uses the Naïve Bayesian algorithm to study the relationship between the 
MD&A section of the 10-K and subsequent earnings and shows that the sentiment 
of the forward-looking statements (FLS) in the MD&A are positively related to 
future earnings for the firm. Buehlmaier (2013) uses the machine learning 
approach to gauge tone in newspaper articles regarding US merger 
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announcements and finds that positive media content about the acquirer predicts 
takeover success. Huang, Zang, and Zheng (2014) measure analyst report 
sentiment using Naïve Bayesian machine learning and find that an analyst’s report 
text has predictive value in terms of determining future earnings growth in the 
subsequent five years.  
3.3.1.3 The choice of wordlist  
It is important to select a proper wordlist to perform an accurate sentimental 
analysis using the dictionary-based approach. Four different dictionaries are 
commonly used by researchers: Harvard’s General Inquirer (GI), Henry (2008), 
Diction & Loughran and McDonald (2011). 
1. Harvard’s General Inquirer (GI) 
The Harvard General Inquirer wordlist is a group of lists used historically in the 
sociology and psychology literature. It combines Harvard-IV-4 Psychological 
Dictionary with the Lasswell dictionaries, which contains 4,187 negative words. 
However, this wordlist may not be appropriate for textual analysis of financial 
disclosure.  
Prior literature examines whether sentiment provides incremental information 
content using GI. The common theme in the literature is the slow diffusion by 
investors of soft information. Tetlock (2007) finds that pessimistic sentiment of the 
Wall Street Journal column temporarily lowers the level of the Dow Jones Industrial 
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Average, but the economic meaning is limited, with only one standard deviation 
increase in pessimism leading to an 8.1 basis points decline in the Dow the 
following day. Tetlock, Saar-tsechansky, and Macskassy (2008) and Engelberg 
(2008) examine firm-specific news and earnings announcements in the Dow Jones 
News Service and find that negative sentiment is associated with lower subsequent 
earnings and stock prices respectively. Kothari, Li, and Short (2009) use more 
sources of financial disclosures and demonstrate that disclosure tone affects both 
stock return volatility and analyst forecast error dispersion. Hanley and Hoberg 
(2010) study the tone of the initial prospectus (Form S-1). IPOs with more 
informative content in their S-1 have lower offer price revisions and first-day returns.  
2. Diction  
Diction has 35 different dictionary subcategories. It defines optimism as “language 
endorsing some person, group, concept or event or highlighting their positive 
entailments” and the Diction formula for net optimism is [praise + satisfaction + 
inspiration]-[blame + hardship + denial]. 
The Diction wordlist provides a general measure of tone and has been used in 
many contexts, including earnings announcements (Davis, Piger, and Sedor (2012);  
Demers and Vega (2010); Bligh and Hess (2007); Yuthas, Rogers, and Dillard 
(2002)); presidential speeches (Bligh, Kohles, and Meindl (2004)); corporate 
annual reports (Yuthas, Rogers, and Dillard (2002); Davis and Tama-Sweet 
(2012)); and other business communications (Ober and Zhao (1999)). 
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Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012) and Davis, Piger, and Sedor (2012) both examine 
the sentiment of corporate disclosure and subsequent return on assets (ROA). 
Davis and Tama-Sweet (2012) find that the more pessimistic the MD&A tone of 
Form 10-K, the lower is the subsequent ROA while Davis, Piger, and Sedor (2012) 
find that the positive tone of earnings press releases is positively associated with 
ROA. Focusing on shareholder litigation, Rogers, Van Buskirk, and Zechman 
(2011) find that one standard deviation increase in net Diction optimism is related 
to a 52% increase in being sued by shareholders. 
3. Limitations of Harvard and Diction wordlists 
In relation to business text, the Harvard General Inquirer wordlist misclassifies 
some words as negative which are commonly used in corporate filings, such as tax, 
cost and capital. Words such as cancer and crude do not convey negative 
sentiment in the oil and pharmaceutical industries, but the Harvard General 
Inquirer wordlist identifies them as negative words. The Diction wordlist has similar 
problems. It categorises words such as respect and necessary as positive words, 
but they usually do not have a positive meaning when managers describe future or 
current operations.  
Several research papers have demonstrated the limitation of measuring sentiment 
of financial documents using the GI and Diction wordlists. Applying the GI wordlist 
to news articles, higher optimistic sentiment is associated with higher pessimistic 
sentiment since Heston and Sinha (2013) find a positive correlation (0.51) between 
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the proportion of positive and negative words. In contrast, Heston and Sinha (2013) 
find a more sensible negative relationship between the frequency of positive and 
negative words using Loughran and McDonald (2011) wordlist. Loughran and 
McDonald (2011) argue that around 75% of negative words from the Harvard 
wordlist do not exhibit negative sentiment in Form 10-K. Li (2010) fails to find a 
relationship between the tone of the MD&A section of 10-Ks using GI and Diction. 
4. Henry (2008) 
Neither GI nor Diction wordlists are designed for a financially-specific context. 
Henry (2008) claims that a general wordlist likely omits words that would be 
considered positive or negative in the context of financial disclosure and includes 
words that would not. For example, GI classifies shares, and outstanding, as 
positive words, and tax as a negative word. 
Henry (2008) developed dictionaries specifically for financial contexts. Her wordlist 
was created by examining earnings press releases for the telecommunications and 
computer services industries. The weakness of her wordlist is the limited number of 
words in the list. Compared with the Harvard General Inquirer, which has more 
than 4,100 negative words, Henry’s list only contains 85 negative words. Some 
common negative words such as loss, impairment and adverse are surprisingly not 
included in the list. Price et al. (2012) demonstrate that Henry’s list is better than 
that of the Harvard General Inquirer by examining the tone of earnings conference 
calls. Price et al. (2012) find that an optimistic Q&A tone predicts higher stock 
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returns. Doran, Peterson, and Price (2012) look at the real estate investment trust 
(REIT) and find a positive association between the tone of the conference calls and 
stock return during the conference calls. 
5. Loughran & Mcdonald (2011) 
Similar to Henry (2008), Loughran and McDonald (2011) build their own financial 
specific dictionary. As argued by Loughran and McDonald (2011), standard 
dictionaries fail to account for the nuances of finance jargon, and thus the 
categorization. They built this wordlist by examining word usage in a larger sample 
of 10-Ks during 1994-2008 and their list was created based on the most likely 
interpretation of the business environment. Loughran and McDonald (2011) 
wordlist contains 354 and 2,329 positive and negative words respectively.  A recent 
review paper by Kearney and Liu (2014) claims that Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) wordlist has become predominant in more recent studies. Words such as 
greater, beneficial and successful are categorized as LM positive words, but words 
such as trust, secured and outstanding are not included in LM positive words.  
The LM wordlist is the most commonly used dictionary in the accounting and 
finance literature. García (2013) finds that the sentiment of two financial columns in 
the New York Times (1995-2005) can predict future stock returns, particularly 
during recessionary periods. Solomon, Soltes, and Sosyura (2014) find that 
investors chase funds with high past returns only if the funds received media 
coverage of their holdings. Chen et al. (2014) focus on Seek Alpha, which contains 
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articles and comments posted by investors. They find that investor opinions 
provide incremental information since they have predictive power for future stock 
returns and following earnings surprises. In the research of sentiment of analyst 
reports, Twedt and Rees (2012) find that a more positive tone in an analyst report 
is linked with higher stock returns on and around the analyst report issue dates.  
3.3.1.4 Term weighting 
Apart from wordlists, the choice of the weighting scheme is the second most 
important factor influencing a tone score. Equal weighting and frequency weighting 
are two weighting schemes. The magnitude of an equally-weighted tone measure 
is increasing in the proportion of all words appearing in a document that is 
classified as positive versus negative. The magnitude of frequency weighting is 
decreasing in the frequency with which any given positive or negative word 
appears in any document within the specific sample of documents, whether or not 
the word has been correctly classified. 
Therefore, an equally weighted measure is unrelated to the composition of the 
sample, but frequency weighted measure is completely dependent on the 
composition of documents in the sample and can vary dramatically depending on 
which and how many other documents are in the sample. The majority of the 
literature (e.g. Loughran and McDonald (2011), Henry and Leone (2016) and 
Kothari, Li, and Short (2009)) advocate an equal weighting scheme. In my study, I 
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therefore employ the Loughran and McDonald (2011) wordlist and measure using 
the equal weighting scheme. 
3.4 Data and Methodology 
3.4.1 Data matching 
3.4.1.1 Analyst estimates 
Analyst estimates data is collected from the Institutional Broker Estimate System 
(I/B/E/S) for S&P500 firms from 1999 to 2014. The Detail and Price Target tape of 
the database are utilised to download the original data. The earliest year of I/B/E/S 
data is 1999. Other stock price and accounting data is collected from CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT. Consistent with Clement and Tse (2005), I retain observations with 
stock prices greater than $3 per share, firms with more than 3 analysts following, 
positive book-to-market ratio and all variables are winsorized at a one percent level, 
top and bottom. 
3.4.1.2 Analyst reports  
Analyst reports are obtained from Thomson Research Investext® for S&P500 firms 
from 1999 to 2014. Investext is a collection of full-text analyst research reports 
from over 980 of the world’s leading financial firms, including Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley JPMorgan, and Credit Suisse and covering more than 30,000 
firms worldwide. Using the analysts’ full names contained in I/B/E/S/ forecasts 
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output, I match the analyst reports obtained from Investext. Reports are 
downloaded by specifying the time period, firm, resource type, and analysts’ full 
names. 118,527 analyst reports from 3,397 analysts are successfully analysed by 
Diction and matched to the analysts’ names from I/B/E/S. If the report is written by 
more than one analyst, I view the report as belonging to every one of the analysts 
and match them to I/B/E/S15.  
The sentiment analysis of the analyst reports is conducted using the Diction 
linguistic software16. I convert all analyst reports from the pdf format to txt format 
and import them into Diction. Diction allows a customised dictionary, so Loughran 
and McDonald (2011) wordlist is imported to calculate the sentiment score.  
Table 2.1 describes the sample selection process for the sample used in Chapter 3. 
An initial sample of 118,527 analyst reports was collected from Investext. 
Consistent with Clement and Tse (2005), I retain observations with stock prices 
greater than $3 per share, firms with more than 3 analysts following, and firms with 
positive book-to-market ratio. I/B/E/S, CRSP and COMPUSTAT are also used to 
collect the control variable. Consistent with Huang et al., 2014, I include earnings 
forecast revision (ef_rev), which is the earnings forecast difference between current 
revision and last revision, consequently this resulted in all the first reports being 
dropped. Finally, the 2008 financial crisis period is also dropped due to the large 
                                            
15
 My result still holds if I view the report as belonging to the first author who is usually the senior. 
16
See http://www.dictionsoftware.com/testimonials/#academicsoftware for detail. 
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amount of extreme forecasts and high volatility during this period. All these 
adjustments result in a final sample of 20,734 observations. 
3.4.2 Measure of cumulative abnormal returns 
Consistent with Bonner, Hugon, and Walther (2007) and Huang, Zang, and Zheng 
(2014), I calculate market reaction to the sentiment of analyst reports using 
cumulative market-adjusted (value-weighted) abnormal return over the five-day17 
window centred on the forecast report date (-2 day to +2 day).  
3.4.3 Measure of four types of analyst reports 
To capture the combined quantitative measure (i.e. tone of analyst reports) and 
qualitative measure (i.e. earnings forecast bias) contained in the analyst reports, I 
consider the four possible combinations for each analyst report (denoted OTOB, 
OTPB, OTPB, OTPB). This design is similar to that of Ke and Yu (2006), who also 
have four combinations of analyst earnings forecast biases that capture the 
intertemporal pattern of each analyst’s earnings forecasts. In my design, OTOB 
reflects a report with a consistent optimistic signal, in other  words,  an analyst 
report that contains both an optimistic sentiment in their textual discussion and an 
optimistic earnings forecast bias, relative to other analysts who cover that same 
firm during the same year; PTPB represents an analyst report that contains both a 
pessimistic textual sentiment and a pessimistic earnings forecast bias, relative to 
                                            
17
 The result continues to hold if I change this to a three-day event window (-1 day to +1 day). 
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other analysts who cover that same firm during the same year;  OTPB reflects a 
report with inconsistent signals, an optimistic sentiment in their text discussion 
together with a  pessimistic earnings forecast bias, relative to other analysts who 
cover that same firm in the same year; and finally, PTOB denotes the analyst 
reports which contain a pessimistic sentiment in the textual discussion and an 
optimistic earnings forecast bias, relative to other analysts who cover that same 
firm in the same year. 
Following Loughran and Mcdonald (2014), sentiment is defined as the difference 
between the number of positive and negative words, scaled by the total number of 
words.  
 
Consistent with Sidhu and Tan (2011), Hribar and McInnis (2012) and Bradshaw, 
Lee, and Peterson (2016), I measure earnings bias as the difference between 
forecasted earnings and actual earnings, scaled by the absolute value of actual 
earnings.  
 
Reports are categorized as having optimistic (negative) sentiment if their sentiment 
scores are above (below) average, compared with other reports forecasting the 
same firm in the same year (i.e. OT or PT). Similarly for earnings bias, reports with 
above (below) average forecast bias are defined as optimistic (pessimistic) 
ijt
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TotalWords
rdsNegativeWordsPositiveWo
sentiment


|| jt
jtijt
ijt
actualEPS
actualEPSEPSforecasted
bias


93 
 
 
 
earnings bias, compared with other forecasts covering the same firm in the same 
year (i.e. OB or PB). I define optimism and pessimism both relative to peer analysts, 
because the actual earnings are not known at the time investors read their reports. 
By definition, it controls for any firm or industry specific differences.  
3.4.4 Measure of forecast accuracy 
Following Clement and Tse (2003), forecast accuracy is measured as below: 
jtjt
ijtjt
ijt
AFEAFE
AFEAFE
accuracy
minmax
max


  
jtijtijt ActualEPSEPSForecastedAFE   
Analyst forecast accuracy ( ijtaccuracy ) is defined as the maximum absolute 
forecast errors for analysts following firm j in year t minus the absolute forecast 
errors for analyst i following firm j in year t, scaled by the difference between the 
maximum and minimum absolute forecast errors for analysts following firm j in year 
t. By definition, accuracy is bounded from 0 (for the least accurate forecast) to 1 
(for the most accurate forecast) for easy comparison between different firms and 
industry. 
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3.4.5 Empirical model 
3.4.5.1 Different signals from analyst reports 
To test H1, that the market reaction to analysts’ reports containing conflicting 
signals will be different to those containing consistent signals,  I estimate model 
(2.1) where ijtCAR  refers to cumulative market-adjusted (value-weighted) abnormal 
returns over the period beginning two days before the analyst forecast date and 
ending two days after the analyst forecast date18. The reason that I include two 
days before the forecast date is that I/B/E/S may have one or two days’ error when 
recording the analyst forecast date or controlling for some information leakage. 
OTOB, OTPB, PTOB and PPB denote four types of analyst reports with the first letter 
representing textual sentiment and the second letter representing the bias of 
earnings forecast. mix is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the analyst’s 
report contains conflicting signals (OTPB and PTOB reports), and equals 0 for 
analyst reports containing consistent signals (OTOB and PPB reports). 
 
 
 
 
                                            
18
 Cumulative abnormal return over the period one day before the forecast date and ending one day 
after the forecast date yields the same result.  
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In order to examine the intensity of the market reaction to the reports, I also rerun 
model (2.1) using the absolute value of the cumulative abnormal returns 
(absoluteCARijt) instead of the signed cumulative abnormal returns (CARijt). 
Next, to clearly investigate the market reaction to each type of analyst reports, I 
replace mix with individual dummy variables for each type of report (i.e. OTOB, 
OTPB, PTOB and PPB). I rerun this regression four times, each time dropping one of 
the four dummies.                                                                                                      
To eliminate the possibility that the reports overlap with the firm’s annual earnings 
announcement date, forecast dates must be seven days before the current 
earnings announcement date and seven days after the previous annual’s earnings 
release date (Koh, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal (2008)). I also drop observations 
when different analysts’ reports occur on the same day for the same firm because 
it is not clear which analyst’s report the market is reacting (or not) to.  
3.4.5.2 The Control Variables 
Consistent with Huang, Zang, and Zheng (2014), and other literature investigating 
the market reaction to analyst forecasts, the following control variables are 
included in the models: 
Proxy for firm characteristics and market conditions 
Firm Size (logmarkvjt) 
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logmarkvjt is the natural log of the firm j’s market value at the end of year t. 
Investors may react differently from larger and small companies (Li et al. (2013)).  
Book-to-Market Ratio (logBTMjt) 
logBTMjt is the natural log of the ratio of the book value of equity to the market 
value of firm j at the end of year t. Investors may react differently to companies with 
different risks or growth potentials (Neuhierl, Scherbina, and Schlusche (2013)).  
Standard Deviation of prior earnings (std_consensusjt) 
std_consensusjt is the standard deviation of firm j’s prior 5 years earnings in year t. 
It is a proxy for the earnings volatility of company j (Gu and Wu (2003)).  
Prior CAR (CAR_priorjt) 
CAR_priorjt is the cumulative market-adjusted ten-day abnormal returns for firm j 
ending three days before the current report date in year t. It is included to control 
for any short-term momentum or mean revision in the stock price (Huang et al. 
(2014)). 
Earnings Revisions (ef_revijt) 
ef_revijt is calculated as the current report’s earnings forecast made by analyst i for 
firm j in year t minus the last earnings forecast issued by the same analyst for the 
same firm’s same fiscal year (Huang et al. (2014)).  
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Number of Analysts Following (logFollowjt) 
logFollowjt is measured as the natural log of analysts following firm j in year t. 
Investors reaction to each analyst’s forecast may be less if firm j is followed by a 
large number of analysts.  
Analyst Characteristics Proxies 
Because I am interested in investor reactions to individual analysts, the analyst 
charascteristics could also be influencial. Following Clement and Tse (2005), these 
analyst features are also controlled for: 
Proportional Forecast Horizon (fhijt) 
Proportionnal Forecast Horizon measures the amount of information analyst i could 
have at the time they published their forecast report. It is a proxy for forecast 
timeliness. It is the number of days between analyst i’s estimation and firm j’s 
earning announcement in year t.  
ijtijtijt DatenouncementEarningsAnteForecastDaFH   
Days Elapsed (dayElapijt) 
Days Elapsed is the number of days since a prior forecast from an analyst 
forecasting the same firm. The measure dayElapijt is calculated as the days 
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between analyst i’s forecast of firm j’s earnings in year t and the most recent 
preceding forecast of firm j’s earnings by any analyst. 
Forecast Revisions (frijt) 
frijt is the number of firm j forecasts made by analyst i following firm j in year t. 
Number of firms followed (Num_Coijt) 
Num_Coijt is the number of firms analyst i follows in year t, calculated as the 
number of companies followed by analyst i following firm j in year t. 
Number of Industries followed (Num_Indijt) 
The measure of the number of industries analyst i follows in year t is calculated as 
the number of two-digit SICs followed by analyst i following firm j in year t. 
Number of Analysts Working in a Brokerage House (Num_Anat) 
Num_Anaijt is a proxy for brokerage house size. It is calculated as the number of 
analysts in the brokerage house in year t. 
Firm-specific Experience (Firm_Expijt) 
The measure of analyst i’s firm-specific experience, calculated as the number of 
years of firm-specific experience for analyst i following firm j in year t. 
General Experience (Gen_Expit) 
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The measure of analyst i's general experience, calculated as the number of years 
of working experience for analyst i until year t. 
3.4.5.3 Accuracy of different combinations of analyst forecasts 
To test which type of analyst report is associated with the highest forecast 
accuracy, I estimate the following model (2.2), where the forecasting performance 
increases with accuracyijt.  
Firm characteristics and analyst characteristics used in the prior analyst literature 
(Clement and Tse (2003)) are also included.  
 
 
 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 2.2 reports the descriptive statistics. The distributions of all 
variables are similar to prior studies (Clement and Tse (2003) and Huang, Zang, 
and Zheng (2014)). For example, the mean value of the cumulative abnormal 
return around the analyst report issue date is 0, with a relative symmetric 
(2.2) 
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distribution. On average, analysts have 6 years of firm-specific experience, and 
follow three industries.  
Panel B of Table 2.2 presents a correlations matrix. CAR around the analyst report 
date is negatively correlated with PTPB and positively correlated with OTOB, which 
indicates that investors react strongest when both quantitative and qualitative 
measures are consistent with each other. In line with prior findings, and the 
multivariate tests below, CAR is negatively correlated with book-to-market ratio 
(logBTM) and standard deviation of consensus forecast (std_consensus) while 
positively correlated with revision of earnings forecasts (ef_rev), brokerage house 
size (Num_Ana), number of days elapsed (dayElap) and forecast horizon (fh).  
3.5.2 Market reaction to different signals from analyst reports 
Table 2.3 presents investor reaction to the combination of quantitative and 
qualitative measures in analyst reports using different benchmarks.  In column 1, 
panel A of Table 2.3, the dependent variable is the absolute value of the 
cumulative abnormal return. The coefficient of mix here is negative and significant, 
which indicates that the market reacts more intensively to consistent signals PTPB 
and OTOB reports relative to mixed signal reports (OTPB and PTOB). In column 2 of 
panel A, the dependent variable is the signed cumulative abnormal return. The 
coefficient of mix here is positive and significant, thus indicating that despite the 
conflicting signals, these reports (OTPB or PTOB) on average are responded to 
more positively compared to the consistent signal reports (PTPB and OTOB). Further 
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analysis in columns 3 to 6 reveal why this is the case. I use OTPB, PTOB, PTPB and 
OTOB, instead of mix. Specifically, reports with consistent pessimistic signals (PTPB) 
cause the market to react significantly negatively relative to any other type of 
reports. However, with consistent optimistic signals (OTOB), the market reacts more 
positively than any report that contains a pessimistic text (whether consistent with 
the bias signal or not) but not significantly different from a report with an optimistic 
text which is combined with a pessimistic forecast bias. It appears that the market 
reacts negatively to a pessimistic text but this reaction is moderated slightly if the 
report also contains an optimistic forecast bias. However, the market does not 
react significantly differently to an optimistic text, irrespective of the forecast bias.  
Panel B of Table 2.3 re-estimates the market reaction to four types of analyst 
reports by separating the sample into positive CARs and negative CARs. Columns 
1 and 2 use PTOB reports as the benchmark. In column 1, the dependent variable 
is positive CAR (pos_CAR). The coefficients of OTPB and OTOB are both positive 
and significant at the one percent level. This suggests that the market reacts more 
favourably when observing optimistic sentiment (OTPB and OTOB) in the analyst 
reports, regardless of earnings forecast bias, and the conflicting signals do not 
appeal to moderate investors’ reactions. When the dependent variable is negative 
CAR (neg_CAR) in column 2, the coefficient of PTPB is negative and significant at 
the one percent level, indicating the market reacts significantly negatively to PTOB 
reports. This suggests that investors react more negatively when the analyst 
reports show consistent signals of pessimism. The coefficients of OTPB and OTOB 
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are both insignificant. This suggests that, for the negative market reaction, there is 
no significant difference between OTPB and PTOB reports. Taken together with the 
findings in column 1,  these results are consistent with Harbaugh et al. (2016) that 
bad news is less damaging when it is combined with mixed signals. Further 
analysis reveals that OTOB is not significant because there are very few 
observations of negative reactions and their magnitude are therefore small. Using 
different benchmarks, in columns 3 to 8, I find the similar patterns to columns 1 and 
2. 
Overall, these findings support H1 and show that when the signals are consistent, 
whether optimism or pessimism (i.e. PTPB and OTOB), the market reacts more 
strongly than to reports with conflicting signals (i.e. OTPB and PTOB).  
Among the control variables, forecast accuracy is positively associated with market 
reaction. Consistent with Huang, Zang, and Zheng (2014), abnormal returns during 
the ten trading days prior to the report date (CAR_prior) are negative and 
significant, showing a mean reverse effect. Earnings revisions from prior forecasts 
(ef_rev) are positive and significant, suggesting incremental information provided 
by revisions. The negative coefficients of book-to-market ratio (logBTM) and the 
number of analysts following a firm (logfollow) is also consistent with Huang, Zang, 
and Zheng (2014). Investors have more resources to gain information on large 
firms, and therefore react less strongly to each of the individual analysts, compared 
with small firms which have fewer analysts following them. Industry and year fixed 
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effect are also included. Robust standard error is clustered on firm and analyst 
level. The results however are not sensitive to a different cluster specification.  
Table 2.3 also provides the results of H2, which predicts that when quantitative and 
qualitative attributes are not consistent with each other, investors place a greater 
weight on the textual analyses, as opposed to the earnings forecasts bias. Table 
2.3 shows a positive and significant coefficient of OTPB in column 3 and the 
negative and significant coefficient of PTOB in column 4. These results therefore 
support H2,  that the directions of these two coefficients are in line with sentiment 
of the textual discussion, not the earnings forecasts bias. In other words, despite a 
report containing a pessimistic forecast bias the market still responds positively 
due to the optimistic or pessimistic tone of the text contained in the report.  
To examine which attribute has the most influence on investors under the different 
scenarios, in panel A, columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4 compare the market reaction 
to analyst reports holding constant the optimistic sentiment, but allowing for 
different earnings forecast bias, while in columns 3 and 4, I hold constant the 
forecast bias and allow the sentiment of the text to differ. CAR could be either 
positive or negative, therefore, in columns 1 and 3 the dependant variable is the 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR), and in columns 2 and 4 the dependent variable 
is the absolute CAR, which allows me to examine the intensity of market reaction. I 
drop all analyst reports with pessimistic sentiment.  
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Holding constant the textual sentiment, I compare OTOB and OTPB reports. The 
coefficients on OTPB are insignificant in both columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.4. This 
indicates that when the textual sentiment is optimistic, investors do not react 
significantly differently to the earnings forecast bias. However, holding constant the 
bias, columns 3 and 4 indicate that when the earnings bias is optimistic, investors 
react more favourably to reports with optimistic sentiment and more unfavourably 
to reports with pessimistic sentiment. This can be seen from the significant and 
positive coefficients of PTOB in column 3 and the insignificant coefficient of PTOB in 
column 4.  
Panel B of Table 2.4 re-estimates the tests from panel A of Table 2.4 by splitting 
CARs into positive CARs and negative CARs. Columns 1 and 2 hold constant the 
optimistic sentiment and allow for different earnings forecast bias. Consistent with 
the results in panel A of Table 2.4, the coefficients of OTOB in both columns are 
positive but insignificant. This suggests that investors react to the optimistic 
sentiment in the reports and not to the forecast bias associated to these reports. In 
columns 3 and 4, I hold constant the optimistic earnings forecast bias and allow for 
different report sentiments. The coefficient of OTOB in column 3 is positive and 
significant at the one percent level, indicating that conditional on the same earnings 
forecast bias, the market reaction also depends on the sentiment of analyst reports. 
In column 4, the coefficient of OTOB is insignificant due to the small magnitude of 
negative market reaction on OTOB reports. 
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Table 2.5 compares the reports with pessimistic sentiment or pessimistic earnings 
forecast. Analyst reports with optimistic sentiment are dropped. Holding constant 
the pessimistic sentiment, in panel A, the coefficients on PTPB are significantly 
negative in column 1 and significantly positive in column 2. This indicates that PTPB 
reports have significantly more negative and intensive market reaction than PTOB 
reports. This result suggests that when the report contains a pessimistic text, the 
optimistic bias moderates the impact. In Columns 3 and 4 of panel A, I hold 
constant the pessimistic earnings forecast. The coefficient on PTPB is significantly 
negative in column 3 and insignificant in column 4. OTPB reports have a positive 
reaction on average (with mean CAR=0.006) while PTPB reports have a negative 
reaction (with mean CAR=-0.003). These indicate that when earnings biases are 
the same, the direction of market reaction depends on the sentiment. Reports with 
optimistic sentiment (OTPB) have more positive reactions on average while reports 
with pessimistic sentiment (PTOB) have more negative reactions. Industry and year 
fixed effect are also included. Robust standard errors are clustered on the firm and 
analyst levels. The results are not sensitive to a different cluster specification. 
Panel B of Table 2.5 re-estimates the tests from panel A of Table 2.5 by splitting 
CARs into positive CARs and negative CARs. Columns 1 and 2 hold constant 
pessimistic sentiment and allow for different earnings forecast bias. The coefficient 
of PTPB is insignificant in column 1. This suggests that when investors react 
positively, their reactions are not discernibly different from PTPB and PTOB reports. 
Column 2 uses negative market reaction as the dependent variable. The coefficient 
106 
 
 
 
of PTPB is negative and significant at the one percent level, which is consistent with 
the findings when using CAR in column 1, panel A of Table 2.5. This suggests that 
when reports have a pessimistic sentiment, investors moderate their reaction when 
the earnings forecast bias is inconsistent with the sentiment. Columns 3 and 4 hold 
constant pessimistic earnings forecast bias and allow for different sentiment. The 
coefficients of PTPB in columns 3 and 4 are both negative and significant at the one 
percent level. This suggests that, conditional on the same earnings forecast bias, 
investors also rely on the textual discussions in the reports to make their 
investment decisions. Taking all the results from Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 together, 
I find that the sentiment of analyst reports is more impactful than the earnings 
forecasts bias.  
Taking all the results from Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 together, I find that the 
sentiment of analyst reports is more impactful than earnings forecasts bias. This 
result also suggests that, despite processing costs, the information and 
discussions in the analyst reports appear to be more informative than the forecast 
bias. This result is consistent with survey evidence from the Institutional Investor 
magazine and archive findings from Brown et al. (2015) that textual information 
could be more credible than final qualitative outputs.  
3.5.3 Forecast accuracy and different combinations of forecasts 
Table 2.6 reports the results of the association between the different types of 
analyst reports and forecast accuracy. In column 1, the coefficients of PTOB and 
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PTPB is positive and significant at 1% and 5% respectively, showing that they have 
higher forecast accuracy than those of the OTPB and OTOB reports. This result 
demonstrates that forecasts with relatively pessimistic sentiment (PTOB and PTPB) 
enjoy a higher forecast accuracy than that those with relatively optimistic sentiment 
(OTPB and OTOB). This is consistent with my earlier findings that investors react 
more intensely to reports containing pessimistic report.  
In columns 3 and 4, the coefficients of OTOB are both negative and significant at 5% 
level, with the benchmark of PTPB and at 1% level with the benchmark of PTOB. 
This indicates that reports with relatively optimistic sentiment and earnings 
forecasts tend to have a low level of accuracy. The insignificant coefficient of OTPB 
in column 2 shows that OTPB reports are also low in accuracy. In summary, relative 
sentiment is a good indicator of forecast accuracy and reports with unfavourable 
sentiment tend to be more accurate.  
In addition, the coefficient of PTOB in column 1 is larger and more significant than 
that of PTPB. This indicates that PTOB reports tend to have higher accuracy relative 
to PTPB reports. From an investor perspective, my results suggest that it is on 
average better to assess analyst reports using both attributes because reports with 
relatively pessimistic sentiment and optimistic earnings forecast bias (i.e. PTOB 
reports) are associated with the highest accuracy. The findings also suggest that 
analysts issuing PTPB or OTOB reports may be overly obsessed with one side of the 
firm, while analysts with two-sided arguments take both positive and negative 
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factors into consideration. Overall, the result suggests that an analyst report with a 
two-sided argument providing pessimistic information in the text tends to be more 
credible.  
Among the control variables, market value (logmarkv) is positive and significant, 
which is consistent with the finding of Garciá-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta (2006) 
that big firms have more information available and are more transparent. Book-to-
market ratio (logBTM), loss (loss) and number of days elapsed (dayElap) are 
negatively related to forecast accuracy because risky firms and firms who make a 
loss are more difficult to predict, and it is easier to predict performance the closer it 
gets to the earnings announcement date. These findings are consistent with those 
of Brown (1997) and Clement and Tse (2003). To eliminate reports with extremely 
high or low accuracy that drives the results, I drop reports with top and bottom 1% 
of accuracy. Results still hold if using the whole sample. Robust standard errors 
are clustered on the firm and analyst levels. Industry and year fixed effect are also 
included. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
This study examines the market reaction to the different signals contained in 
analyst reports and investigates which reports are associated with higher forecast 
accuracy. I am the first to examine the different combinations of forecast reports in 
terms of their quantitative and qualitative attributes, and highlight the different 
investor responses when these two signals do not coincide. First, I provided 
evidence that investors react more strongly to reports with consistent signals (OTOB 
and PTPB reports) than conflicting signals (OTPB and PTOB reports). Second, when 
these two attributes do not coincide, investors appear to place greater weight on 
the textual discussions rather than earnings forecast bias. This is consistent with 
Brown et al. (2015) that opinions provided in analyst reports could be more 
valuable than their final outputs. Finally, I examined the forecast accuracy of these 
reports. I find sentiment is a good indicator for report quality. Forecasts with 
relatively pessimistic sentiment have better accuracy than those with optimistic 
sentiment, especially those forecasts with relatively pessimistic sentiment and 
optimistic earnings forecast.  
My study shows the importance of the textual discussion in analyst reports and 
examines the information collaboration between the different signals when 
investors make investment decisions. My findings have implications for investors 
who use analyst reports to help them make investment decisions. The textual 
discussions are a better indicator than earnings forecasts, and therefore investors 
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should not rely too heavily on reports with both optimistic sentiment and earnings 
forecasts.  
I intend to conduct future research in this area by examining the possible reasons 
as to why reports with pessimistic sentiment and optimistic EPS bias are the most 
accurate. There are two potential explanations. The first comes from the argument 
of Bradshaw, Lee, and Peterson (2016) that optimism indicates the difficulty of the 
task. Hence, pessimistic sentiment represents analysts’ confidence in the credibility 
of their forecasts. Alternatively, it might be explained by conflicts of interest. 
O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin (2005) and Kadan et al. (2009) show that affiliated 
analysts are reluctant to reveal negative news or downgrade those firms with 
whom they have investment banking ties. This is also consistent with Huang et al. 
(2014), who suggest that investors view reports containing a pessimistic text as 
more credible. 
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Chapter 4 
Does Management Use the Tone of 10-Q Filings to Respond to 
Investor Sentiment? 
4.1 Introduction 
Managers want to build and preserve an enduring reputation for trustworthiness 
while influencing sentiment-driven investors (Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007)). 
Investor sentiment is investors’ expectations or emotional biases towards a firm, 
which could be rational or irrational (Nofsinger (2005) and Baker and Wurgler 
(2006)). Corporate disclosures are known to reflect corporate managers’ common 
optimism or pessimism (Feldman et al. (2010) and Huang, Teoh, and Zhang 
(2014)). I therefore investigate whether firm-specific investor sentiment influences 
the tone of the 10-Q filings19. Specifically I examine whether firm-specific investor 
sentiment influences: (1) the tone managers use, (2) the readability, and (3) the 
level of uncertainty of the 10-Q fillings.  
Managers face a cost-benefit trade-off when preparing their filings with the 
intention to present their firm in the best possible light. Huang, Teoh, and Zhang 
(2014) find that managers use an abnormal positive tone when they have strong 
incentives to bias investor perception upwards. As a result, investors follow 
managers’ guidance in the short term. Similarly, Schleicher and Walker (2010) find 
                                            
19
 I include only 10-Qs, but not 10-Ks because managers’ preparation times are different between 
10-Qs and 10-Ks. 
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that loss firms report a more positive tone than profit firms. On the other hand, 
Rogers, Buskirk, and Zechman (2011) and Li (2011) find that litigation risk 
increases for firms with more optimistic SEC filings. Reputational cost is also a 
reason not to inflate their firms too much (Rogers and Stocken (2005), Demers and 
Vega (2010) and Davis et al. (2014)). Hence, Baker and Wurgler (2007) call for 
more research on how managers respond strategically to investor sentiment via 
corporate reporting decisions. I examine whether firms with an optimistic or 
pessimistic investor sentiment respond with a specific tone strategy. 
Due to the unavailability of firm-specific investor sentiment, the existing literature 
has tended to use market-level investor sentiment to examine how investor 
sentiment affects the decision-making at the firm level. Bergman and 
Roychowdhury (2008) find that managers increase earnings estimates, via their 
disclosures, during low market-level sentiment periods as a way of attempting to 
adjust market expectations of their firm. However, market-level investor sentiment 
is a confidence index for the whole market and hence does not distinguish 
sentiment across different industries or firms. To the best of my knowledge, I am 
the first to investigate the relationship between firm-specific investor sentiment and 
the tone of the managers’ subsequent disclosures. I employ the methodology of  
Aboody et al. (2016) to calculate firm-specific investor sentiment, which is based 
on each firm’s overnight return. Aboody et al. (2016) argue that retail investors tend 
to place orders outside of normal working hours, to be executed at the start of the 
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next trading day and these retail investors are the most likely investors to be 
influenced by sentiment. 
First, I examine the association between firm-specific investor sentiment and the 
subsequent tone of the firm 10-Q fillings for all S&P 500 firms from 1995 to 2014. 
Second, I also separate firms into pessimistic and optimistic investor sentiment 
groups given the findings of Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) and Hribar and 
McInnis (2012), who document that managers’ strategies differ between high and 
low investor sentiment periods. I find that overall managers use an optimistic 
(pessimistic) tone when investor sentiment is optimistic (pessimistic) during the 
period the filings are prepared, which is consistent with signalling theory. In 
contrast, for firms with extremely optimistic investor sentiment, managers appear to 
respond differently. I observe a negative association between investor sentiment 
and the tone of 10-Qs. It suggests that to avoid future earnings disappointment, 
managers choose a less optimistic tone when investors sentiment is extremely 
optimistic. Turning to firms with extremely pessimistic investor sentiment, 
managers use a more optimistic tone. This indicates that managers are perhaps 
trying to persuade investors to change their sentiment by emphasizing optimistic 
prospects when the market has poor confidence in them, which is consistent with 
impression management theory. Next, I investigate the change of tone and investor 
sentiment,  thereby enabling me to take into account the issue of boilerplate 
disclosure employed by firms (Feldman et al. (2010)). Overall, the change 
specification is consistent with the prior results, although this specification provides 
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higher levels of significance. Specifically, investigating the change in investor 
sentiment and the change in tone in 10-Qs, I find that when a firm’s investor 
sentiment increases from a below average group in the prior quarter to an above 
average group in the current quarter, the manager also increases the optimistic 
tone in the current 10-Q filings. However, when a firm’s investor sentiment 
decreases from an above average group in the prior quarter to a below average 
group in the current quarter, the manager uses more optimistic words in the current 
10-Q filings. Managers for firms with extremely low investor sentiment have a 
greater incentive to regain market confidence. This is consistent with Merkl-Davies 
and Brennan (2007), who find that impression management exists for firms with 
poor performance.  
Prior studies show that managers may manipulate the readability of their 
disclosures to influence investors (Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007)). For example, 
Li (2008) finds that managers have the motivation to deliberately obfuscate readers. 
Therefore, I examine the relationship between readability of the 10-Q filings and 
investor sentiment. I adopt the most commonly used Fog Index to measure 
readability. Specifically, I first examine the association between readability of 10-
Qs and investor sentiment using the whole sample. Then I focus on firms with 
extremely optimistic and pessimistic investor sentiment. Lastly, by using the 
change in readability of investor sentiment, I compare firm investor sentiment 
between high and low investor sentiment groups. 
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Overall, I find that when investor sentiment is pessimistic (optimistic), the firms 
subsequent 10-Q filings are difficult (easy) to understand. This is consistent with 
the obfuscation hypothesis from Courtis (1998), which argues that some managers 
could obfuscate failures by increasing the complexity of the text. Li (2008) finds 
that managers strategically use the opaqueness of filings to hide negative 
information in corporate annual reports. However, when their investor sentiment is 
extremely pessimistic, I find that managers use easy-to-understand sentences to 
communicate with investors. Consistent with Rennekamp (2012), this result 
suggests that when investor sentiment is extremely poor, managers try not to give 
investors the impression that they are obfuscating information, but they try to 
explain the situation in clearer language and convince investors that they have a 
more optimistic outlook. Similar results are found by using the change of tone and 
investor sentiment. 
Lastly, I investigate whether there is an association between the proportion of 
uncertain words used in 10-Qs and investor sentiment, again with the same 
research design as in the previous two questions. Uncertainty sentiment is 
measured using a wordlist of uncertainty from Loughran and McDonald (2011). I 
find that, in general, the proportion of uncertain words is low when investor 
sentiment is high. However, for firms with extremely pessimistic investor sentiment, 
I find that they tend to disclose less uncertainty when their investor sentiment is 
pessimistic. Consistent with Kimbrough and Wang (2014), they are eager to assure 
investors that their firms are less exposed to risks to boost investors’ confidence. 
116 
 
 
 
Next, using the change in uncertain wording and investor sentiment, I compare 
firms from an above average investor sentiment group to those below average. 
Firms from the pessimistic investor sentiment group disclose more (less) uncertain 
words when investor sentiment decreases (increases). This is consistent with 
Simpson (2013), who argues that during a pessimistic period firms are more likely 
to be under greater scrutiny,  and hence, their litigation risks and reputation costs 
increase, which reduces their likelihood of hiding any potential risks. It is the same 
negative relationship between the change of investor sentiment and uncertainty 
when investor sentiment deteriorates (improves) from an above (below) average 
group in the prior quarter to a below (above) average group in the current quarter. 
Taking the results for tone, readability and uncertainty together, it appears that 
managers’ disclosure incentives vary according to different firm-specific investor 
sentiment levels. 
The study makes several contributions. First, to the best of my knowledge, I am the 
first to apply firm-specific investor sentiment empirically. Prior studies could only 
assume the same investor sentiment for all firms in a time period while I adopt a 
finer proxy by using firm-specific investor sentiment. Secondly, to the best of my 
knowledge, none of the existing literature has yet examined the impact of investor 
sentiment on the tone of 10-Q filings. I therefore contribute to the literature by 
examining whether managers strategically adjust the tone of their quarterly reports 
in response to their investor sentiment. Lastly, my study complements the literature 
by investigating the association between firm-specific investor sentiment and the 
117 
 
 
 
proportion of uncertainty as well as readability in 10-Q filings. Managers appear to 
use the combination of these three factors to influence investor belief in a subtle 
way, rather than through earnings management or forecast guidance (Cheng, 
Warfield, and Ye (2011) and Simpson (2013). 
Section 4.2 presents the prior literature and hypotheses development; Section 4.3 
shows sample selection and methodology; Section 4.4 presents the results and 
discussions and Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1 Importance of SEC filing 
Corporate filings reduce information asymmetry and subsequently reduce the cost 
of capital (Diamond (1985), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Muslu et al. 
(2015)). In addition, they increase price efficiency and thus the manager’s 
investment incentives (Fishman and Hagerty (1989)). They are the most widely 
used information source by investors. Hence, market reacts to corporate 10-Q and 
10-K filings (Feldman et al. (2010) and Henry and Leone (2016)). Regulators also 
focus their efforts on improving the efficiency of these filings. Under the FASB's 
Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts (SFAC) No. 8 (Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB), 2010) and IASB's Framework for the Preparation and 
Presentation of Financial Statements (International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC), 1989), a primary objective of financial reporting is to provide 
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useful and understandable information that will aid investors and other financial 
statement users to evaluate a firm. The SEC announced the formation of the 
Investor Advisory Committee (IAC) in 2007 to improve the financial reporting 
environment for the benefit of individual investors.     
4.2.2 Textual analysis of 10-Q reports 
Corporate disclosures reflect managers’ subjective opinions, beliefs, and 
projections (Bochkay and Dimitrov (2014) and Jiang, Lee, and Martin (2016)). 
Textual information contains valuable data which may not be fully captured in the 
quantitative data. Since the increase in computing power over the past half century, 
researchers have attempted to analyse the textual information content embedded 
in financial disclosures (Feldman, Livnat, and Segal (2008), Feldman et al. (2010), 
Li (2008), Li (2010), Loughran and McDonald (2011), Loughran and Mcdonald 
(2014), Kravet and Muslu (2013) and Muslu et al. (2015)).  
A number of disclosure characteristics have been investigated: first, the disclosure 
level (i.e. the quality and the amount of disclosure)  and  its association with a 
firm’s costs of equity (Botosan and Plumlee (2002) and Botosan (1997)) and 
analyst forecast accuracy (Barron, Kile, and O’Keefe (1999) and Lang and 
Lundholm (1996)); second, the sentiment of financial disclosures in terms of tone.  
The tone of financial disclosures has been found to have predictive power of 
market returns, trading volume, financial distress, financial statement irregularities 
and corporate environmental performance (Kerl, Schürg, and Walter (2014), 
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Sprenger et al. (2014), De Franco et al. (2015) and Loughran and McDonald 
(2016)).  
The earlier studies investigating textual disclosures such as those of Bryan (1997), 
Core (2001), and Callahan and Smith (2004) manually code each disclosure and 
consequently their sample size is relatively small and due to manual coding, the 
results lack generalizability.  
Recent literature, harnessing computing power and linguistics software, has 
investigated the textual content of firms 10-K or 10-Q filings (Brown and Tucker 
(2011), Jegadeesh and Wu (2013), Campbell et al. (2014) and Merkley (2014)). 
Schleicher and Walker (2010) focus on firms with large impending year-on-year 
changes in sales and operating profit margins and test their frequency of 
favourable and unfavourable statements in the outlook section of UK annual 
reports. They find that these firms bias the tone upwards. Davis and Tama-Sweet 
(2012) argue that managers will be strategic in their choice of language used in 
earnings press releases and MD&A from 10-K filings while Muslu et al. (2015) find 
that firms make more forward-looking MD&A disclosures when their stock prices 
have lower informational efficiency20. Numerous contextual analysis studies have 
found that the sentiment of financial articles such as earning releases ( Davis et al. 
(2014), Davis, Piger, and Sedor (2011),  Davis, Piger, and Sedor (2012), Henry 
and Leone (2009), Rogers, Van Buskirk, and Zechman (2011), accounting policy 
                                            
20
 Informational efficiency is measured by the strength of the association between current stock 
returns and future earnings. 
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disclosures (Levine and Smith (2011)), audit opinions (Butler, Leone, and 
Willenborg (2004)), financial news (Tetlock, Saar-tsechansky, and Macskassy 
(2008) and Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008)), internet stock message board 
(Antweiler and Frank (2004), Sprenger et al. (2014) and Chen et al. (2014)) have 
incremental predictive ability. However, none of the existing literature has yet 
linked the tone of financial disclosure with investor firm sentiment. Kearney and Liu 
(2014) argue that the relationship between textual sentiment and investor 
behaviour is an important area to investigate.  
4.2.3 Different proxies for market-Level Investor sentiment  
Prior studies use different proxies for capturing investor sentiment. The Investors’ 
Intelligence sentiment index is widely publicized by Investors’ Intelligence. The 
editors of Investors’ Intelligence read reports from over 135 independent advisory 
services and rate the current economic situation to produce the investor sentiment 
score. Markets can be labelled as either ‘bullish’, ‘bearish’ or ‘correction’. Lee, 
Jiang, and Indro (2002) use this sentiment index as a direct measure of investor 
sentiment and find that bullish (bearish) shifts in sentiment lead to downward 
(upward) revisions in the volatility of returns and are associated with higher (lower) 
future excess returns. Brown and Cliff (2004) and Brown et al. (2005) use survey 
data on investor sentiment, providing evidence that sentiment affects asset 
valuation.  
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Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) and Schmeling (2009) apply consumer 
confidence as a proxy for individual investor sentiment, and find that optimistic 
investor sentiment is often followed by low market returns and vice versa. 
Consumer confidence is collected via telephone interviews or surveys each month, 
asking citizens about (1) their own financial situation; (2) their view about the US 
economic situation; and (3) their expectation of the long-term economic 
environment.  
Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), Yu and Yuan (2011), Brown et al. (2012) and 
Livnat and Petrovits (2009) all use Baker and Wurgler (2006) market-wide investor 
sentiment (BW index) to investigate firm performance such as the sensitivity of 
stock prices to earnings surprises. The BW index takes the first principal 
component of six measures of investor sentiment. The six measures are the 
closed-end fund discount, the number and the first-day returns of IPOs, NYSE 
turnover, the equity share in total new issues, and the dividend premium. Arif and 
Lee (2014) use aggregate corporate investment as an alternative measure of 
market-wide investor sentiment. Based on the BW index, Bochkay and Dimitrov 
(2014) and Huang et al. (2015) proposed a new investor index that is aligned with 
the purpose of predicting the aggregate stock market. Using internet search 
volume from Google Trend, Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2015) construct investor 
sentiment from Financial and Economic Attitudes Revealed by Search (FEARS). 
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Prior literature has examined investor reactions to stocks when market-level 
investor sentiment is high and low. Mujtaba Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) 
use market-wide investor sentiment and find that the stock price sensitivity to good 
earnings news is higher during high BW index periods than during periods of low 
BW index, whereas the stock price sensitivity to bad earnings news is higher 
during periods of low sentiment than during periods of high sentiment. Hribar and 
McInnis (2012) and Walther and Willis (2013) focus on analysts’ forecast errors 
and find high market-wide sentiment affects forecast accuracy for those hard-to-
value firms21. The limitation of these studies, however, is that they use one investor 
sentiment to proxy investors’ confidence level for different firms in different 
industries. 
4.2.4 Firm-Specific investor sentiment 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) and Brown et al. (2012) acknowledge the limitation of 
using a market-level index to detect firm-specific strategies. Aboody et al. (2016) 
therefore propose a measure of firm-specific investor sentiment by using the 
stock’s overnight return. Berkman et al. (2009) find that individual investors tend to 
place orders outside of the normal working hours, which creates temporary price 
pressure when the market opens to trades and then reverses during the trading 
day. In theory, individual investors demand for a firm’s share is a natural measure 
of firm-specific investor sentiment, because they are most likely to be influenced by 
                                            
21
 Hard-to-value firms refer to those which are small, young and unprofitable, and whose stocks 
have high volatility or pay no dividends. 
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sentiment. Aboody et al. (2016) argue that overnight returns therefore better reflect 
individual investor demands for stock that are not justified by the available 
information. The reason is that retail investors tend to place orders outside of 
normal working hours, to be executed at the start of the next trading day. Using this 
model, Aboody et al. (2016) find short-term stickiness using this overnight return 
model and present a stronger positive autocorrelation for hard-to-value firms. 
Hence Aboody et al. (2016) model provides strong evidence that average overnight 
returns are a good proxy for investor sentiment at firm level. I employ their method 
of measuring firm-specific investor sentiment. 
4.2.5 Strategic reporting: tone 
Managers decide whether or not to disclose value-relevant information only after 
they have learned the value of the signal and in making their disclosure decision 
they consider the effect of the disclosure on the wealth of current shareholders 
(Walker (1997)). Early studies by Milgrom (1981) and Grossman (1981) argue that 
managerial interests are aligned with current owners so they disclose all 
information except when they receive negative signals. Miller (2002) predicts a 
separating equilibrium: firms with relatively good news disclose while all other firms 
remain silent. However, litigation cost and managers’ reputation also incentivise 
managers to disclose more negative news and not to remain silent (Trueman (1997) 
and Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005)). 
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Recent literature employs impression management theory, which argues that 
managers use their discretion over corporate disclosures opportunistically to 
manipulate the perceptions and decisions of stakeholders (Clatworthy and Jones 
(2003), Yuthas, Rogers, and Dillard (2002) and Clatworthy and Jones (2001)). 
Impression management is also investigated empirically. Rogers and Stocken 
(2005) find that managers not only bias earnings forecasts in a self-serving way, 
but also that they are more likely to bias their forecasts when it is more difficult for 
investors to detect, while Mcnichols (1989) finds only weak evidence of bias in 
management earnings forecasts. With textual analysis of earnings press releases, 
Huang, Teoh, and Zhang (2014) find that managers use strategic tone 
management to mislead investors about firm fundamentals.   
While agency theory focuses on poorly performing firms, signalling theory (Smith 
and Taffler (2000) and Rutherford (2003)) focuses on the behaviour of managers in 
well-performing firms who signal this superiority by greater transparency in their 
disclosure and presentation of information. Bowen, Davis, and Matsumoto (2005) 
and Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) believe that most corporate filings are 
produced with both motivations of managerial opportunism and also the desire to 
provide value-relevant information. Managers may put more weight on one 
incentive over others under different situations. Investor sentiment could be one of 
the factors that drive managers’ reporting strategy.  
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For firms with optimistic investor sentiment, managers want to maintain the 
momentum. Due the their good performance, managers have little incentive to 
withhold positive statements and therefore have a more optimistic tone of 10-Qs 
when investor sentiment is high (Feldman et al. (2010)). For firms with pessimistic 
investor sentiment, the ‘asymmetric loss function’ argument predicts a tendency to 
disclose bad news due to the litigation risks and reputational risks (Verrecchia 
(1983), Jung and Kwon (1988), Rogers and Stocken (2005) and Schleicher and 
Walker (2010)) and thereby a less optimistic tone. This leads to my first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: Firm-specific investor sentiment is positively associated 
with the tone of 10-Q filings. 
H1a is based on signalling theory, which assumes that managers align with the 
interests of current owners in general. Managers’ main incentive may however shift 
in high and low investor sentiment environments, supported by social cognition 
research (Taylor (1991) and Bless et al. (1996)). Bergman and Roychowdhury 
(2008) demonstrates that during low-sentiment periods, managers increase 
forecasts to “walk up” current estimates of future earnings over long horizons and 
during periods of high sentiment, managers reduce their long-horizon forecasting 
activity. This sentiment-induced shift in disclosure costs leads to different 
communication strategies. Seybert and Yang (2012) find that management 
guidance partially corrects the prices for firms which are overvalued. In contrast, 
Hoberg and Lewis (2015) show that fraudulent managers grandstand good 
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performance. Brown et al. (2012) find a positive relationship between the pro forma 
earnings metric and investor sentiment due to the shift in disclosure costs induced 
by investor sentiment and the pro forma disclosure decisions partly reflecting 
managers’ opportunistic motives. Hribar and Quinn (2013) find a negative 
association between insider trading and investor sentiment, especially in difficult-
to-value firms. Simpson (2013) focuses on earnings management via accruals and 
argues that firm’ incentives to manage earnings upwards or downwards vary 
strategically with market sentiment. These studies implicitly or explicitly show that 
managers recognize the different impacts of high and low investor sentiment on 
firms and respond to it differently. Thus, firms’ incentive to manage their tone of 
words in 10-Q fillings could differ, depending on the level of investor sentiment.  
As presented in Figure 2 below, by separating firms into either firms with above 
average (i.e. optimistic) investor sentiment per quarter per industry (“above 
average group” for short) and firms with below average (i.e. pessimistic) investor 
sentiment per quarter per industry (“below average group” for short), I can examine 
whether firms with extremely optimistic or pessimistic investor sentiment have 
different disclosure choices. I hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 1b: For firms with extremely optimistic or pessimistic investor 
sentiment, the association between investor sentiment and the tone of 10-Q 
filings will be different, relative to those firms with an average optimistic or 
pessimistic investor sentiment. 
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4.2.6 Readability 
Impression management could also be applied by the readability of 10-Q filings. 
Clearly written disclosures reduce miscommunication between investors and 
managers by using shorter sentences with less complex words. Moreover, both the 
SEC and popular press have criticized firms for the complexity of their language in 
these filings. In 2012, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) claimed 
that clear communication in the information is most important for users of each 
entity's financial statements (Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
(2012)). Miller (2010) and Lehavy, Li, and Merkley (2011) find that more complex 
Firm A 
Firm B 
……… 
Average investor sentiment 
Firms with extremely pessimistic investor 
sentiment 
Firms with below average 
investor sentiment    
(Below average group) 
Firms with above average 
investor sentiment    
(Above average group) 
Firms with extremely optimistic investor 
sentiment 
Firm X 
Firm Y 
……… 
Figure 2: Categories of firms with different investor sentiment 
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filings are more costly to process for both sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors. 
Early studies based on obfuscation hypothesis show mixed results. Subramanian, 
Insley, and Blackwell (1993)  and Courtis (2004) find a negative relationship 
between the reading difficulty of annual reports and company financial 
performance. Yet Clatworthy and Jones (2001) and Rutherford (2003) find 
readability is not associated with company performance. Document length and 
Gunning (1952) Fog Index are extensively used as proxies for readability (Lehavy, 
Li, and Merkley (2011), Li (2010), Twedt and Rees (2012) and Miller (2010)). You 
and Zhang (2009) use word counts as a proxy for complexity and find that 
investors’ underreaction tends to be stronger for firms with more complex 10-K 
reports. Li (2008) finds that 10-Ks with higher Fog Index values (less readable text) 
and longer document length have lower subsequent earnings. Miller (2010) and 
Lawrence (2013) use the Fog Index to examine the impact of the readability of 10-
Ks on retail investors while De Franco et al. (2015) are interested in the readability 
of analyst reports. They all find a lower Fog Index (i.e. easier to read) leads to 
higher trading activity. Similarly, You and Zhang (2009) document a delayed 
market reaction for complex 10-Ks, using the number of words in 10-Ks.  Lehavy, 
Li, and Merkley (2011) find that 10-Ks with higher Fog Index values are associated 
with larger levels of analyst dispersion.  
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Opaque filings may also arise unwittingly or simply be caused by the complexity of 
companies’ business models or products. Or it may be presented because of 
deliberate intent. Cazier and Pfeiffer (2016) find that disclosure redundancy 
accounts for as much variation in 10-K length as does operating complexity. 
Bloomfield (2002) finds that managers have incentives to obfuscate information 
when firm performance is poor because the market may react with a delayed 
incorporation of the information contained in complicated disclosures. Based on 
management obfuscation hypothesis from Courtis (1998) and Courtis (2004), 
managers may strategically increase the complexity of their filings when they 
perform poorly and make their filings easier to read when they perform well. This 
leads to my following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2a: Firm-specific investor sentiment is positively associated 
with the readability of 10-Q filings. 
Baginski et al. (2011) examine corporate fraud issues and find a positive 
association between the complexity of the Management Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A) of 10-Ks and the probability of conducting fraud. In contrast, investors may 
make more extreme pessimistic predictions when they find filings are more difficult 
to read. Rennekamp (2012) argue that investors who receive more readable 
disclosures revise their valuation judgments to be less extreme. Hence, when firms 
suffer from extremely pessimistic investor sentiment, managers may not risk 
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having a more extreme valuation from investors by producing more obfuscate 
quarterly reports. Hence, I hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 2b: For firms with an extremely pessimistic investor sentiment, 
the association between investor sentiment and the readability of 10-Q 
filings will be different, relative to those firms with an average pessimistic 
investor sentiment. 
4.2.7 Uncertainty 
SEC requires public traded companies to disclose all possible risks. Li (2008) 
captures uncertain sentiment by the count of words ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ in annual 
reports and finds an increase in risk sentiment is associated with lower future 
earnings. Loughran and McDonald (2011) create the financial-specific uncertainty 
list with an emphasis on the general notion of imprecision rather than exclusively 
focusing on risk. Loughran and McDonald (2013) argue that S-1 filings with higher 
proportions of uncertain words make it more difficult for investors to precisely 
assimilate the value-relevant information. Kravet and Muslu (2013) claim that 
textual risk disclosures increase investors’ risk perceptions at the industry level. 
Demers and Vega (2014) find that during the earnings announcement period, 
abnormal returns are negatively related to the textual uncertainty in managerial 
earnings press releases. Campbell et al. (2014) find that risk disclosure in 10-K 
filings increases investors’ assessment of systematic risk. Schleicher and Walker 
(2010) argue that when expected litigation costs are large managers have an 
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incentive to err on the side of caution. Therefore, for firms with pessimistic investor 
sentiment, they are expected to have a high proportion of uncertainty in the 10-Qs 
in general. For firms with optimistic investor sentiment, they are expected to have a 
low amount of uncertainty disclosed. Hence, I hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 3a: Firm-specific investor sentiment is negatively associated 
with the proportion of uncertain words in 10-Q filings. 
However, for firms with extremely pessimistic investor sentiment, managers may 
have the incentive to resist such disclosure. Less uncertainty might weaken the 
adverse sentiment or a small chance of turning things around. Hence, I 
hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 3b: For firms with extremely pessimistic investor sentiment, the 
association between investor sentiment and the proportion of uncertain words 
in 10-Q filings will be different, relative to those firms with an average 
pessimistic investor sentiment. 
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Data sources 
The data generated is based on all S&P500 firms from 1994 to 2014. The tone of 
10-Q filings is obtained from WRDS SEC Analytics Suite, which contains more 
than 11 million records of electronic filings with the SEC since 1994. I include only 
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10-Qs but not 10-Ks because the filings preparation time is different between 10-
Qs and 10-Ks and the accounting information behaves differently between 10-Qs 
and 10-Ks (Das and Shroff (2002) and Li (2010)).  
All scores of sentiment and readability measures are derived from the WRDS SEC 
Analytics Suite. It adopts Loughran and McDonald (2011) wordlist, providing 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) positive, negative and uncertainty word proportion. 
It also includes Gunning Fog Readability Index. It provides cleaned filings, with 
graphics, unwanted XML, tables, exhibits and page numbers are removed.  
Data for firm-specific investor sentiment and other control variables are obtained 
from the quarterly COMPUSTAT files and daily files from CRSP, because investor 
sentiment is calculated with daily open and close share prices. 
Firm-specific investor sentiment is measured by a stock overnight return. This may 
lead to potential bias if there is a sudden stock price change in one day. Therefore, 
following Hansen (2000), I use the ‘fixed regressor bootstrap' to calculate the 
structural break of abnormal returns during -60 and 0 days before the 10-Q filing 
date. This detects a sudden jump or fall of stock price on a particular day and 
resulted in approximately 5% of the observations being dropped. Following 
Simpson (2013) and Luo, Jiang, and Cai (2014), I exclude financial and utility firms 
with SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4900-4999 due to regulation differences and I 
retain observations with a stock price greater than $3 per share and positive book-
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to-market ratio. Industry is defined using a two-digit SIC code.  This data selection 
results in a total sample of 13,791. 
4.4 Methodology  
4.4.1 Measure of firm-specific investor sentiment 
I adopt Aboody et al. (2016) design of firm-specific investor sentiment, which uses 
a stock’s overnight (close-to-open) return in the measurement. The overnight 
return on the shares of firm i  for day d , idCTO  is calculated as below: 
1
1


id
idid
id
Closeprice
ClosepriceOpenprice
CTO  
where idOpenprice  is the opening price for the shares of firm i on day d  and 
1idCloseprice  is the closing price for the shares on day 1d . The overnight return 
for week w , iwCTO  is the average daily return for that week. Then, they rank all 
stocks each week in ascending order according to their average overnight return 
that week and partition the stocks into deciles. Finally, firm-specific investor 
sentiment is calculated as follows22: 
iw
iw
rankCTO
ntimentInvestorSe


1
1
 
                                            
22
 See Aboody et al. (2016) for the details of the derivation of  this formula. 
 
134 
 
 
 
ntimentInvestorSe is bounded  from 0.09 to 0.5, and higher values represent lower or 
more pessimistic investor sentiment. I multiply ntimentInvestorSe  by -1 so that 
higher sentinvestor _  represents high or more optimistic investor sentiment. 
 iwiw ntimentInvestorSesentinvestor _  
I calculate 50_ isentinvestor  and 40_ isentinvestor  , which are investor sentiment 50 
to 57 calendar days before a firm’s filing date and investor sentiment 40 to 47 
calendar days before a firm’s filing date. These are the days I assume managers 
are writing the 10-Q filings. In the main tests, I use 50_ isentinvestor  and 
40_ isentinvestor  is used as a sensitivity test. Following consultation with industry 
practitioners, I am confident that these days seemed appropriate.  
Firms with low investor sentiment may communicate differently with investors 
compared with those with high investor sentiment. Prior literature (Simpson (2013), 
Mujtaba Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012), Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) 
and Baker and Wurgler (2006)) compare market or firms’ different behaviours for 
high and low investor sentiment. Similarly, I construct a dummy variable 
below_averageij that equals to 1 if firm i has below average firm-specific investor 
sentiment (relative to firms from the same industry) for a quarter j (i.e. pessimistic 
firm-specific investor sentiment)23, otherwise 0. 
                                            
23
 Alternatively, I construct below_averageij which is equal to 1 if firm i has below average firm-
specific investor sentiment for quarter j, compared with other S&P500 firms. Results still hold.    
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4.4.2 Measure of tone and uncertainty score 
Tone captures the optimism or relative pessimism of the sentiment in the 10-Q 
filings. Loughran and McDonald (2011) wordlist is used to calculate the tone of 10-
Qs’ since the prior literature shows that it enjoys the highest accuracy for business 
text (García (2013), Kearney and Liu (2014) and Loughran and McDonald (2015)). 
Tone is the difference between the number of positive words minus the number of 
negative words from Loughran and McDonald (2011), scaled by the total number of 
words. Hence, the higher the tone, the more optimistic the tone managers 
disseminate through filings.  
jt
jtjt
jt
TotalWordsNumber
rdsNegativeWoNumberrdsPositiveWoNumber
tone
_
__ 
  
Similarly, the uncertainty score contains the proportion of uncertainty managers 
discussed in 10-Qs. Since the number is relatively small, it is multiplied by 100. 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) uncertain wordlist is adopted, which captures the 
context of imprecision. It contains 285 words, such as approximate, depend, 
fluctuate, uncertain, and variability. It is defined as the number of uncertain words 
divided by the total number of words. 
100
_
_

jt
jt
jt
TotalWordsNumber
rdsUncetainWoNumber
uncertain  
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4.4.3 Measure of readability 
Readability is measured using Gunning (1952) Fog Index. The index indicates the 
number of years of formal education a reader of average intelligence would need to 
read the text once and understand that piece of writing with its word-sentence 
workload. 
Fog=(words_per_sentence+ percent_of_complex_words)×0.4 
The complex words are defined as words with three syllables or more. Texts for a 
wide audience generally need a Fog Index less than 12. Hence, a higher Fog Index 
score represents higher complexity.  
4.4.4 Empirical model for hypothesis 1 
I employ an OLS regression to examine the association between firm-specific 
investor sentiment and the subsequent tone of 10-Q filings in model (3.1). I exclude 
quarter four 24  and use quarter fixed effects to control for the possibility the 
managers’ strategies differ depending on the timing of the quarterly report. I also 
include others’ control variables, which I explain in section 4.5.1. For all models, 
robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Firm fixed effects are also 
included for all models as some firms may have higher or lower investor sentiment 
that is time invariant due to firm characteristics. The expected coefficient 1 is 
positive and significant.   
                                            
24
 As a result, change from quarter three to quarter four (annual report) and change from quarter 
four (annual report) to quarter one in the following year are not included. 
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To test H1b, whether managers have different tone strategies depending on 
whether the firms’ investor sentiment is extremely optimistic or pessimistic investor 
sentiment, I create a sub-sample which only contains those firms with above 
average sentiment per industry per quarter (e.g. optimistic  -“above average group” 
for short). Within this above average sub-sample, I construct a dummy variable 
high , which equals 1 if  investor sentiment is in the top 10% of the above average 
group per industry per quarter (“extremely high group” for short), otherwise 0. 
Using this sub-sample enables me to hold constant the optimism and therefore 
focus on the relative sentiment. I expect the coefficient 3 on the 
sentinvestorhigh _  in model (3.2) to be positive. 
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In a similar manner, I also examine whether managers respond differently when 
faced with extremely pessimistic investor sentiment relative to other firms with 
pessimistic investors. Again, I create a sub-sample but this time only use 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
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observations where the investor sentiment is below average per quarter per 
industry (“below average group” for short). The dummy variable low  equals 1 if 
investor sentiment is in the bottom ten percent of the sub-sample per quarter per 
industry, otherwise 0.  
4.4.4.1 Control Variables 
I control for firm fundamentals and the business environment that could affect the 
tone of 10-Qs identified in the prior textual analysis literature (Bergman and 
Roychowdhury (2008), Li (2008), Li (2010), Feldman et al. (2010), Davis and 
Tama-Sweet (2012), Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) Huang, Teoh, and Zhang (2014) 
and Muslu et al. (2015)). 
Current Performance 
Current earnings, contemporaneous stock return and return on assets are proxies 
for current performance. Current earnings ( itearn ) are the quarterly earnings scaled 
by the book value of assets. The contemporaneous stock returns ( itret ) in the fiscal 
quarter are calculated using CRSP monthly return data. Return on assets for the 
current quarter ( itroa ) is calculated as COMPUSTAT earnings before extraordinary 
items scaled by total assets as of the beginning of the quarter.  
If a firm has high performance this quarter, managers are likely to use a more 
optimistic tone. However, due to litigation concerns, a company may also be 
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cautious and hence may moderate such optimism. Therefore, the relationship 
between tone of 10-Qs and current performance is unclear. 
Size 
Firm size captures the operational and business environment.  I use the natural 
logarithm of the market capitalization of equity at the end of the quarter before the 
10-Q filing date as a proxy for firm size.  
Firms with a high market value may be more cautious in their tone due to the 
higher political and legal costs and hence, I predict a negative correlation for 
market value. 
Book-to-market ratio 
itbtm  is the book value of total assets divided by the market value of equity plus the 
book value of total liabilities. It represents different investment opportunity sets and 
growth potential. 
Growing firms tend to have an optimistic tone in corporate filings (Huang, Teoh, 
and Zhang (2014)) and hence, I predict a negative correlation for book-to-market 
ratio. 
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Accruals 
Accruals allow a company to show assets that do not have a cash value. 
Consistent with Jegadeesh and Wu (2013), they are measured as the earnings 
subtracting cash flow from operations, scaled by the book value of assets.  
Higher accruals do not necessarily mean poor performance and hence, the 
relationship between the tone of 10-Qs and accruals is unclear 
Volatility of operations 
Firms with volatile performance tend to have more uncertainty in their business 
environment. I employ the standard deviation of earnings and standard deviation of 
stock return as proxies for volatility. itearnsd _ is the standard deviation of earnings 
scaled by the book value of assets calculated using data from the last four quarters. 
itretsd _  is the stock return volatility calculated using 12 months of monthly return 
data before the fiscal quarter ending date.  
Operational volatility is expected to be negatively correlated with the tone of 10-Q 
filings since high volatility is viewed as a negative signal. 
Complexity of operations 
Firm complexity could also influence the tone of 10-Qs. I use the number of 
business segments and number of geographic segments as proxies for operational 
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complexity. itBizlog  is the logarithm of 1 plus the number of business segments. 
itGeolog is the logarithm of 1 plus the number of geographic segments. 
Complexity may lead to more volatile performance, but more business segments 
with international trading may also diversify the risk. Therefore, the sign for 
complexity in the regression of the tone of 10-Qs is unclear. 
Firm age 
I define age as the number of years since a firm appears in CRSP. This captures 
the life cycle stage of the company. Due to high growth or uncertainty, younger 
firms may experience a higher tone change in their 10-Qs. Older firms may exhibit 
different quarterly report readability because there is less information asymmetry 
and less information uncertainty for these firms.   
M&A activity 
Companies with current merger and acquisition activities may have incentives to 
disseminate a more positive outlook. Therefore, MA is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if a company has a M&A this quarter and 0 otherwise. 
Special items 
Special items are associated with firm-specific uncertainty when the amount is 
large or they are reported year after year. 
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Leverage 
Leverage controls for increased informational demand when firms are experiencing 
financial distress. itleverage  is expressed as the ratio of total liabilities to total 
assets. 
Turnover 
Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) find that high turnover firms are the ones that attract 
more investor interest, and the management would be likely to be more cautious in 
setting investor expectations. ittover  is the natural logarithm of the number of 
shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding on the filing date. 
Lnestimates 
Chen, Harford, and Lin (2015) find that analysts play an important governance role 
in controlling management behaviour. Hence, the natural logarithm of the number 
of analysts following the company per quarter is included. 
The Crisis dummy 
The financial crisis from 2007 to 2010 could have influenced investor sentiment as 
well as the firm’s tone strategy. Therefore, crisis equals 1 if it is during the crisis 
period, otherwise 0. 
Consistent with the prior literature (Matsumoto, Pronk, and Roelofsen (2011) and 
Huang, Zang, and Zheng (2014)), the models are robust clustered at the firm level 
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and all variables are winsorized at the one percent level, top and bottom, to avoid 
the influences of outliers.  
4.4.5 Empirical model for hypothesis 2 
Filing readability also influences the way investors interpret firm performance. To 
test how managers respond to investor sentiment in terms of the readability of 10-
Qs I run a similar OLS regressions to model (3.1). Model (3.3) tests H2a, which 
explores the association between investor sentiment ( sentinvestor _ ) and the Fog 
Index ( Fog ) using the whole sample. A higher Fog Index reflects a greater difficulty 
in reading the report. The expected coefficient 1 is negative and significant. 
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Model (3.4) tests H2b, which compares firms with extremely pessimistic investor 
sentiment ( low ) to firms with below average investor sentiment in terms of their 
readability in 10-Qs using a sub-sample with the same research design as H1b. I 
expect coefficient 3  on the sentinvestorlow _  to be positive.  
(3.3) 
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I also rerun model (3.4) to examine firms with extremely optimistic investor 
sentiment ( high ) to firms with below average investor sentiment in terms of their 
readability in 10-Qs using a sub-sample above average group.  
4.4.6 Empirical model for hypothesis 3 
The proportion of uncertainty managers disclosed in the 10-Qs also reflects the 
way they communicate with investors. H3a is tested using model (3.5) which 
examines the association between investor sentiment ( sentinvestor _ ) and the 
proportion of uncertain words (Uncertain ) managers use in the 10-Q filings.  
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H3b is tested by model (3.6), which compares firms with extremely pessimistic 
investor sentiment ( low ) to firms with below average investor sentiment in terms of 
the uncertainty proportion disclosed in the 10-Qs. I also rerun model (3.6) to 
examine firms with extremely optimistic investor sentiment ( high ) to firms with 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
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below average investor sentiment in terms of their uncertainty in 10-Qs using a 
sub-sample above average group.  
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4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the 10-Q filings. The number of 
observations is 13,791. The mean and median value of itTone  is slightly negative  
(-0.01) and it is close to a normal distribution. Consistent with Li (2008), the mean 
value for itFog  is 19.37. The guidance Fog Index is 12 for easy understanding and 
hence, the 10-Q filings on average represent complex text. Uncertainty is 
measured as a percentage. On average, the proportion of uncertain words in 10-Q 
filings is 1.34% with a relatively small standard deviation of 0.005.  itTone  is the 
change in the tone of 10-Qs from past filings, scaled for the variability. itTone  has 
a mean of -0.08, which is consistent with Brown and Tucker (2011), who report a 
mean of 0.00 and median of -0.041. This indicates that the overall 10-Q 
modification is slightly negative, but that the 10-Q varies substantially across 
quarters and across firms. itTone  has a large standard deviation of 1.76, which is 
(3.6) 
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consistent with Feldman et al. (2010). itFog  measures the modification of 10-Q 
readability, with a mean of 0.27 and standard deviation of 2.05. This highlights a 
large variation in report readability for different firms and years. A similar pattern is 
observed for itUncertain . Uncertain tone change has a small mean, which is -0.16 
and a standard deviation of 1.29. Firm-specific investor sentiment change also 
follows a similar pattern with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 0.17. The 
standard deviation is high because firm-specific investor sentiment is bounded 
from 0.09 to 0.5 due to its design. To the best of my knowledge, no prior literature 
examines itFog  and itUncertain , but the level of the Fog Index and ucertain 
score is consistent with existing studies (Li (2008), Lehavy, Li, and Merkley (2011) 
and Merkley (2014)). The mean and median of firm-specific investor sentiment is 
the same, indicating an equal amount of negative change and positive change of 
investor sentiment. The statistics of other accounting variables, such a negative 
mean of accruals and a zero median of sue, are consistent with the prior literature 
(Feldman et al. (2010), Li (2010), Brown and Tucker (2011) and Davis and Tama-
Sweet (2012)).  
Panel B of Table 3.1 reports the Pearson correlations. It indicates a significant 
negative correlation between the optimistic tone of 10-Qs and uncertainty tone of 
10-Qs, which highlights that when firms are in a less uncertain situation, they tend 
to report more optimistically. Similarly, I observe a significant negative correlation 
between the optimistic tone of 10-Qs and the Fog index of 10-Qs. This indicates 
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that managers write 10-Qs in a more complex way when they report more 
pessimistically. Firm-specific investor sentiment is positively correlated with the 
optimistic tone of 10-Qs, which indicates that when investor sentiment changes to 
be more optimistic, 10-Q sentiment also becomes more optimistic. Other 
correlations with respect to the accounting variables are consistent with the 
existing literature. For example, there is a positive and significant correlation 
between current earnings ( itearn ) and tone, which indicates an improving 
performance is positively correlated with the optimistic tone in 10-Q filings.  
4.5.2 Tone optimism 
Table 3.2 presents the result of model (3.1), which examines the association 
between investor sentiment ( 50_ itsentinvestor ) and the tone of 10-Qs ( itTone ). In 
Column 1, the sentinvestor _  coefficient is positive and significant (0.001), at the 
ten percent level. This suggests that when investor sentiment is optimistic 
(pessimistic) during the period managers prepare their 10-Qs, managers use an 
optimistic (pessimistic) tone in their 10-Qs. This supports H1a and is consistent 
with signalling theory. This neutral rhetoric is also supported by Rogers, Buskirk, 
and Zechman (2011) argument that overly optimistic or pessimistic language that 
does not truthfully reflect a firm’s performance will increase litigation costs and 
reputational costs. 
148 
 
 
 
Following the findings of Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008) and Hribar and 
McInnis (2012), who document that managers’ strategies differ between high and 
low investor sentiment periods, I separate the sample into two sub-samples: 
investor sentiment above average group and investor sentiment below average 
group. Column 2 of Table 3.2 focuses on above average group which represents 
58% of the overall sample. I examine whether managers respond differently in 
terms of tone strategy if their firms have extremely optimistic investor sentiment. 
high  is a dummy variable which equals  1 if the investor sentiment of a firm is in 
the top 10% of this group, otherwise 0. The coefficient on investor sentiment 
( sentinvestor _ ) in column 2 is positive and a significant coefficient at the ten 
percent level, which indicates a positive association between investor sentiment 
and the tone of 10-Qs. This is supported by Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) 
argument that signalling theory focuses on the behaviour of managers in well-
performing firms. Interestingly, sentinvestorhigh _  has a negative and significant 
correlation at the ten percent level. This shows that managers from extremely 
optimistic investor sentiment firms present a less (more) optimistic tone when they 
observe optimistic (pessimistic) investor sentiment, relative to general optimistic 
investor sentiment firms. This suggests managers’ intention is to walk-down 
investor sentiment when the market is extremely optimistic about them. This 
supports H1b and is consistent with Cheng and Warfield (2005) that some 
managers choose to be conservative to avoid future disappointment. 
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Column 3 turns to the below average group and compares firms with extremely 
pessimistic investor sentiment to other firms in this group. low is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if investor sentiment of a firm is in the bottom ten percent of this group, 
otherwise 0. sentinvestor _  in column 3 is not statistically significant, indicating the 
result from column 1 is mainly driven by the above average group. Importantly, 
sentinvestorlow _  has a negative and significant coefficient of 0.004 at the ten 
percent level. This negative association suggests that when investor sentiment is 
low, for firms with extremely pessimistic investor sentiment, managers choose a 
more optimistic tone to persuade investors to believe in their firms. The results 
from columns 2 and 3 support H1b and are consistent with Cheng, Warfield, and 
Ye (2011), who find that some banking managers are more conservative in 
accounting estimates when capital ratios are high, but they are more likely to 
manage earnings upward in bad times. For all tests in this Chapter, firm and year 
fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level for 
all tests. 
Among the control variables, consistent with Simpson (2013), the coefficient on 
return on assets (roa) is positive and significant at the 5% level in most cases, 
indicating a positive association between current performance and optimistic tone 
in 10-Q filings. The coefficient on book-to-market ratio (btm) and special items (si) 
is negative and significantly different from zero, which is consistent with Huang, 
Teoh, and Zhang (2014). Li (2010) and Christensen et al. (2011) view special items 
as a negative indicator for firm performance. Hence, the tone is higher for growing 
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firms and firms with a low amount of special items. Lastly, older firms and firms 
with low leverage have a more optimistic tone.  
I also examine whether the change in investor sentiment from the prior quarter to 
the current quarter is associated with a change in the tone of the quarterly reports. 
Using change of investor sentiment and change of tone could mitigate the 
boilerplate associated with corporation disclosure (Feldman et al. (2010)). Table 
3.3 uses the change of tone ( sentinvestor _ ) and investor sentiment ( itTone ) 
from the prior quarter instead of the levels. Column 1 compares the tone change 
between the above average group and the below average group. averagebelow _  
equals 1 if a firm’s investor sentiment is below average, compared with other firms 
in the same industry and same year-quarter. The coefficient on sentinvestor _  in 
column 1 is 0.503 and it is significant at the one percent level. In addition, 
averagebelowsentinvestor __   has a negative and significant coefficient of -0.571, 
at the five percent level. This indicates that, relative to the above average group, 
firms with poor investor sentiment tend to increase (decrease) their optimistic tone 
when their investor sentiment decreases (increases). This confirms the finding from 
sentinvestorlow _  in column 3 of Table 3.2. This is also consistent with Schleicher 
and Walker (2010), who find firms with large decreases in performances use more 
positive statements than negative statements in their annual reports.  
In columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.3, I examine managers’ responses, considering their 
firms’ prior investor sentiment. Investor sentiment in the prior quarter could 
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influence managers tone strategy, conditional on investor sentiment in the current 
quarter. Specifically, I focus on those firms where investor sentiment has changed 
from the above (below) average group in quarter t-1 to the below (above) average 
group in quarter t. i.e. Ot-1Pt and P t-1O t firms in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Column 2 of Table 3.3 shows how managers change the tone of 10-Qs when their 
firms’ investor sentiment decreases from the above average group in the prior 
quarter to the below average group in the current quarter. Ot-1Pt is a dummy 
variable which captures these firms. sentinvestor _  is the difference between 
investor sentiment in the current quarter and the prior quarter. The interaction term 
tt POsentinvestor 1_   is negative and significant at the one percent level. It shows 
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……… 
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Figure 3: Different combinations of firm investor sentiment 
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that when a firm’s investor sentiment decreases from the above average group in 
quarter t-1 to the below average group in quarter t, the manager uses more 
optimistic words in the current 10-Q filings. Here, the managers’ main concern 
could be to convince the market with more positive prospects, preventing investors 
from extrapolating the current low investor sentiment into the future, consistent with 
impression management. 
In column 3 of Table 3.3, Pt-1Ot is a dummy variable which equals 1 when the firms’ 
investor sentiment increases from the below average group in the prior quarter to 
the above average group in the current quarter. The interaction term 
tt OPsentinvestor 1_   is positive and significant at the ten percent level. It shows 
that when a firm’s investor sentiment increases from the below average group in 
quarter t-1 to the above average group in quarter t, the manager also increases the 
optimistic tone in the current 10-Q filings. This result suggests that when the firms’ 
investor sentiment increases from the below average group to the above average 
group, impression management makes the same prediction as signalling theory. 
Firms benefit from truthfully revealing their positive aspects. These findings of 
column 2 and 3 in Table 3.3 are consistent with the findings of Clatworthy and 
Jones (2003), who find firms with both improving and declining performance 
emphasize their positive statements in the Chairman’s Statement while distancing 
themselves from negative aspects.  
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4.5.3 Readability 
Table 3.4 presents the results examining the association between investor 
sentiment ( sentinvestor _ ) and readability of 10-Qs ( itFog ), where a high value of 
the Fog Index ( itFog ) indicates low readability. Column 1 uses the whole sample. 
The coefficient on sentinvestor _  is -0.230 and it is significant at the five percent 
level. This shows that when investor sentiment is optimistic, managers prefer to 
report their performance with easy to read filings. When investor sentiment is 
pessimistic, managers use a more complex context in the 10-Q filings. This may 
suggest that managers tend to make their filings easy to understand when having a 
more optimistic tone, but try to leave readers confused and to put them off probing 
further when their disclosure has a more pessimistic tone. This result supports H2a 
and is consistent with Li (2008) that managers may be opportunistically choosing 
the readability of annual reports to hide adverse information from investors.  
Column 2 focuses on the above average group. In terms of the ease of reading, 
there is no association between investor sentiment and readability. This suggests 
that, for firms with optimistic investor sentiment, managers do not have the 
incentive to manipulate 10-Qs readability. Column 3 refers to the below average 
group. The coefficient on sentinvestor _  is -0.627 and it is significant at the one 
percent level. This shows that managers increase (decrease) the readability of 10-
Qs when investor sentiment is optimistic (pessimistic), which may suggest that the 
result in the overall sample is mainly driven by the below average group. The 
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coefficient on sentinvestorlow _  is 0.520, statistically significant at the ten percent 
level, which suggests a difference of 82.9% (0.52/0.627) for firms with extremely 
pessimistic investor sentiment in the below average groups. These results show 
that, when firms have extremely low market confidence, managers make their 
filings easier to read. This is consistent with Rutherford (2003), who finds that 
poorly performing firms do not obfuscate investors by the use of textual complexity.  
When investors find filings difficult to understand, they can make more extreme 
predictions (Rennekamp (2012)). Managers in this below average group maybe 
choose not to risk themselves by having more extreme valuation from investors by 
producing more obfuscate quarterly reports.  
Among the control variables, return on assets (roa), return (ret), and firm age (age) 
are negatively significant. This indicates firms with a high performance and older 
firms use easier to read 10-Q filings on average, which is consistent with Li (2008). 
For older firms, investors are more familiar with and have more precise information 
about the business models of older firms. There is a positive and significant 
coefficient on book-to-market ratio (btm) and special items (si). Growth firms may 
have more complex and uncertain business models and therefore a higher Fog 
Index. Firms with a high number of special items are more likely to experience 
unusual events and therefore use more complex rhetoric. 
Table 3.5 uses the change of readability and investor sentiment instead of the 
levels. Although complex language in filings can be explained by managers 
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deliberately increasing the level of opacity, with the intention to enhance ‘the story’ 
and calm or reduce investor uncertainty, it may also be introduced by different 
people writing different sections of the report, or even different sections of one part 
of the report (Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007)). I try to mitigate the second effect 
by subtracting readability the current quarter from the prior quarter. The coefficient 
on the interaction term averagebelowsentinvestor __   in column 1 is positively 
significant at the ten percent level. This shows that, compared with the above 
average group, managers from the below average group tend to increase 
(decrease) 10-Qs readability when firms’ investor sentiment deteriorates 
(improves). This is consistent with the result in column 3 of Table 3.4, which 
examines manager response in the below average group. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3.5 focuses on firms with an investor sentiment change 
from the above (below) average group in quarter t-1 to the below (above) average 
group in quarter t, using the dummy variable Ot-1Pt and Pt-1Ot. I do not find a 
significant coefficient on the interaction terms Δinvestor_sent*Ot-1Pt and  
Δinvestor_sent*Pt-1Ot, which suggests that extreme investor sentiment does not 
affect the readability of 10-Qs, compared with other firms in the same group.  The 
coefficient on sentinvestor _  is negative and significant at the five percent level in 
both columns. This result suggests that firms make their 10-Qs easier to read 
(more complex to read) when investor sentiment improves (deteriorates), 
independent of which investor sentiment group they belong to.  
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4.5.4 Proportion of uncertainty 
Table 3.6 presents the results of examining the association between investor 
sentiment ( sentinvestor _ ) and the proportion of uncertainty in 10-Qs (Uncertain ). 
Column 1 uses the whole sample and the coefficient on sentinvestor _ is negative 
and significant at the ten percent level. It shows that when investor sentiment is 
optimistic (pessimistic), the proportion of uncertain words in the 10-Qs is low (high). 
This suggests that firms disclose more risky statements when having a pessimistic 
investor sentiment. This supports H3a and is consistent with signalling theory. 
When expected litigation risks and reputational risks are large, managers have an 
incentive to err on the side of caution. Therefore, for firms with pessimistic investor 
sentiment, they have a high proportion of uncertainty in the 10-Qs in general. 
Column 2 uses the above average sub-sample and it presents a negative and 
significant coefficient on sentinvestorhigh _ , which is the same as the result for 
the whole sample. In column 3, the dummy variable low  is negative and significant 
at the one percent level, which suggests that firms with extremely pessimistic 
investor sentiment have a more uncertain situation to disclose on average. 
However, the coefficient on sentinvestorlow _  is positive and significant at the 
one percent level, which suggests that for firms with extremely poor investor 
sentiment, firms with pessimistic investor sentiment disclose less uncertain 
information. This result may highlight that managers’ main concern here is to 
regain market confidence for firms with extremely pessimistic investor sentiment. 
Taking the results of tone and readability together, for firms with extremely poor 
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investor sentiment, I find that their managers respond to investors by using a more 
optimistic tone, less uncertain information and easy to understand language. 
Managers may be responding in this way with the hope of boosting investor 
confidence and turning things around. 
In Table 3.7, column 1 reports the change in uncertain sentiment ( Uncertain ) and 
the change in investor sentiment ( sentinvestor _ ). The interaction term
averagebelowsentinvestor __   is statistically significant with a coefficient of -0.345. 
This indicates that in the below average group, when managers observe the 
deterioration (improvement) of investor sentiment, they increase (decrease) the 
amount of uncertainty being disclosed in the 10-Q filings. More pessimistic investor 
sentiment firms may tend to have more scrutiny, relative to firms from the above 
average group. Their litigation costs would be high if they did not disclose their 
risks. Therefore, managers from the below average group tend to be more cautious 
and disclose more risks to avoid any litigation costs (Trueman (1997) and Baginski, 
Hassell, and Kimbrough (2002)). 
Column 2 of Table 3.7 reports on firms whose investor sentiment deteriorated from 
the above average group in quarter t-1 to the below average group in quarter t. The 
negative and significant coefficient on Δinvestor_sent×Ot-1Pt suggests that more 
risks are disclosed in 10-Qs when investor sentiment decreases. For firms with 
below average investor sentiment, especially those who were in the above average 
group, they may be under greater investor attention in the risk disclosure part. 
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Investors may increase their intensity of scrutinizing their risk disclosure to 
understand the future prospects and associated risks of firms. The coefficient on 
Δinvestor_sent×Pt-1Ot is negative and significant in column 3. This indicates that 
fewer risks are shown when investor sentiment increases. In summary, there is a 
negative association between investor sentiment and the proportion of uncertainty 
in 10-Q filings for most firms, except for firms with extremely pessimistic investor 
sentiment.  
4.5.5 Robustness check for different preparation date  
Although the time period in which managers prepare their 10-Q reports varies from 
firm to firm, most of them prepare their quarter filings 40 days to 60 days in 
advance, as I mentioned in Section 4.4.1. In the main tests, I use 57 to 50 calendar 
days before the filing date to calculate average firm-specific investor sentiment. In 
the robustness check, I use alternative 47 to 40 calendar days before the filing date 
to calculate average firm-specific investor sentiment ( 2_ sentinvestor ) (see Figure 4 
below). itY represents itTone , itFog  and itUncertain  in model (3.7), respectively.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Alternative preparation date of 10-Q filings  
Alternative date: 
Preparation date
it-40
  
Preparation date
it-50
  
0 -50 -40 
10-Q filing date  
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Table 3.8 presents the relationship of the three hypotheses by using 47 to 40 days 
before filing dates to calculate firm-specific investor sentiment. In column 1, 
investor sentiment is still positively associated with the tone of 10-Qs, with a higher 
significance level (1 percent), compared with using investor sentiment 57 to 50 
days before the 10-Q announcement date. In column 2 of Table 3.8, investor 
sentiment is still negatively associated with the tone of 10-Qs, which is consistent 
with using investor sentiment 57 to 50 days before the 10-Q announcement date. 
In column 3 of Table 3.8, I do not observe a significant association between 
investor sentiment and uncertainty. A possible explanation is that firms in the 
optimistic and pessimistic investor sentiment groups behave differently in terms of 
uncertainty. Perhaps their effects moderate each other, resulting in the 
insignificance here. 
Next, I rerun model (3.7), regressing the change in investor sentiment 
( 402_  itsentinvestor ) on the change tone ( itTone ), fog index ( itFog ) and 
uncertainty ( itUncertain ), instead of the levels. The results are shown in Table 3.9 
and all results hold as in the main test. This shows that the results are not sensitive 
to the alternative investor sentiment date.  
(3.7) 
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Last, the robustness check is related to the standardisation of the control variables. 
The prior literature uses a mix of changes of control variables (Brown and Tucker 
(2011)) and levels of control variables (Demers and Vega (2010)). I use changes in 
control variables as a robustness check in model (3.8).  
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Table 3.10 presents the results. Again, all results are consistent with the main test. 
In column 1 of testing hypothesis one, sentinvestor _  is still positive and 
statistically significant while interaction term averagebelowsentinvestor __   is still 
negative and significant. For control variables, the change of current performance 
(Δearn) is positively significant and so is the change of market value (Δlogmarkv). 
The change of volatility of return (Δsd_ret) is negatively related to optimistic tone. 
Adjusted R2 increases from 4.5% to 4.8%. Columns 2 and 3 follow the same 
pattern. Therefore, my results are not affected by different standardisations of 
control variables. Although I have consulted industry practitioners about the 
preparation time, the caveat here is that I cannot rule out that some managers 
prepared the 10-Qs outside my test period. However, I have tried to mitigate this 
issue with alternative windows. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This study examines how managers respond to investor sentiment by using (1) the 
optimism of the tone, (2) the readability of the 10-Q filings and (3) the level of 
inclusion of uncertain words, segregated by the level and its change in the firm-
specific investor sentiment. 
In general, I find that firm-specific investor sentiment is positively associated with 
the tone and readability of 10-Q filings while negatively associated with the 
proportion of uncertain words of the 10-Q filings. Managers use different strategies 
to communicate with investors through their 10-Q filings for different firm-specific 
investor sentiment levels and directions. Especially, for firms with extremely high 
investor sentiment, managers tend to walk-down the tone to avoid future 
disappointment. I do not find a significant difference in terms of readability for firms 
with extremely optimistic investor sentiment but these firms have a low proportion 
of uncertain words in their 10-Qs. For firms with extremely pessimistic investor 
sentiment, I find that managers tend to use more optimistic and easy to understand 
language, and minimize their proportion of uncertainty in their 10-Q filings. This 
suggests that managers may try to boost investor confidence by using less 
uncertain words when the firms have extremely low investor sentiment.  
The caveat in this chapter is the time period when managers prepare their 10-Q 
filings. Although I have consulted industry practitioners and used alternative 
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preparation time, I cannot rule out some managers preparing the 10-Qs outside my 
test period. 
Investor sentiment reflects investors’ expectations or emotional biases towards a 
firm, which could either be rational or irrational. Classical financial theory believes 
that investor sentiment has no influence on stock prices. However, there is an 
extensive behaviour finance literature which examines the impact of investor 
sentiment on stock prices and how it influences both firms and investors’ decisions. 
Recent work by Baker and Wurgler (2007) call for more research on how 
managers respond strategically to investor sentiment via corporate reporting 
decisions. To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to investigate how 
investor sentiment potentially influences the way managers prepare their 10-Q 
filings.  
SEC regulations postulating that the quarterly reports need to be truthful and they 
need to contain all the material information about the firm. However, the SEC 
cannot postulate what the tone and readability of the quarterly reports need to be 
or how certain or uncertain the wording of the reports needs to be. So the mangers 
can and do use the tone, readability and/or uncertainty of the reports to potentially 
influence their investors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that after the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, managers began to shift from traditional earnings management 
or forecast guidance to subtler ways to affect investors’ impressions of firm 
performance and outlook. Consequently, my study produces the first evidence for 
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market participants who need to understand the factors that influence managers’ 
narrative disclosures and thereby debiasing corporate disclosures. Second, this 
shift of reporting strategy could be viewed as a function of regulatory responses. 
Therefore, my study should be of interest to standard setters and regulators. Is it 
possible to regulate textual disclosures? Some statements may induce a wrong 
impression or distorted perceptions of firm prospects (Huang (2005)). Given it has 
the potential to impair the quality of financial reporting and to result in capital 
misallocations, do regulators pay enough attention to the more subtle aspects of 
financial reporting? Lastly, auditor could also extend their work to the narrative 
disclosures instead of just scrutinizing the quantitative characteristics. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
5.1 General 
Broadly speaking, this thesis expands the literature in three main areas. First, it 
extends the literature related to the conflicts of interest faced by sell-side analysts, 
highlighting that job concerns appear to influence the way banking analysts provide 
forecasts. Secondly, it examines analyst reports when the quantitative and 
qualitative signals are conflicting, and shows market participants that textual 
analysis of analyst reports could be more credible than a quantitative measure. 
Lastly, it complements the research on investor sentiment in relation to the 
disclosure decisions of individual firms by highlighting  that managers’ different 
strategies of communicating with investors through 10-Qs is dependent on firm-
specific investor sentiment. 
Chapter 2 investigates the source of forecast distortion of sell-side analysts from a 
new angle. Unlike non-banking analysts, banking analysts have more incentive to 
curry favour with the management team they cover for due to their career concerns. 
I find that banking analysts exhibit a walk-down forecast bias pattern to other 
investment banks, compared with forecasting non-banks. This pattern of earnings 
bias enables banking analysts to move up to better ranked brokerage houses. 
Moreover, the Global Settlement is used as an exogenous shock and I show that 
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banking analysts have stronger incentives to walk down their forecasts after the 
Settlement due to their career concerns. 
Chapter 3 examines the power of consistent and conflicting signals in analyst 
reports. I find that the market reacts strongly when the tone of analyst reports is 
consistent with earnings forecasts bias. Interestingly, when the tone of reports 
does not coincide with earnings forecasts, investors place greater weight on the 
textual information rather than on their final output figures. Although forecasts with 
consistent signals (OTOB and PTPB) have a stronger market reaction, they are not 
necessarily the most credible forecasts. I find that sentiment is priced and it is a 
good indicator of the quality of analyst reports. Reports with relatively pessimistic 
sentiment enjoy higher report quality than those which are relatively more 
optimistic.  
Chapter 4 examines the influence of firm-specific investor sentiment on managers 
when they prepare their 10-Q filings. Instead of using earnings management or 
even fraud, firms could use more subtle forms to influence investors’ impressions 
of firm performance and prospects, namely the tone in corporate disclosures. In 
general, investor sentiment is positively associated with the tone of optimism and 
readability in 10-Qs, but negatively associated with the proportion of uncertain 
words in 10-Qs. However, managers’ priorities appear to vary when they 
experience extremely high or low firm-specific investor sentiment. For firms with 
extremely high investor sentiment, managers choose to use a less optimistic tone 
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when investor sentiment increases. This helps firms to smooth investor expectation, 
thereby avoiding any future disappointment. However, for firms with extremely low 
investor sentiment, managers tend to use more optimistic and easy to understand 
language, and minimize their proportion of uncertainty in their 10-Q filings when 
investor sentiment is low. This is different from firms with high investor sentiment 
because their priority is to convey a more positive impression to stakeholders. 
Therefore, the tone strategy used by managers is associated with different levels of 
firm-specific investor sentiment. 
5.2 Implications 
My study has implications for regulators related to the findings that banking 
analysts appear to bias their forecasts for career concerns. Hence, this conflicts of 
interest faced by banking analysts could contribute to the poor information 
environment but prior regulations such as the Global Settlement do not take these 
into consideration. Second, my study has implications for investors who use 
analyst reports in their investing decisions. Investors should be aware of these 
conflicts of interest in the research coverage for banking stocks. Third, by 
measuring the tone of analyst reports or corporate disclosures, my study could also 
be of interest to retail investors as well as institutional investors such as fund 
managers for trading strategy design. Lastly, my study has implications both for 
investors and regulators in assessing different signalling strategies used in 
corporate disclosure and improving the quality of corporate filings. 
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5.3 Limitations 
For the career concerns analysis in Chapter 2, I assume that analysts experience 
favourable job separation when they move to better-ranked brokerage houses and 
vice versa. Due to data availability, however, I do not know the actual positon they 
hold in the new brokerage houses. Although this is consistent with Hong and Kubik 
(2003), it limits my analysis.  
Second, for any dictionary-based content analysis, it is always difficult to ascertain 
whether the tone is appropriately captured. Although Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) is the most popular dictionary in accounting and finance studies, it may still 
be argued as lack of authority.  
Lastly, due to the lack of firm-specific investor sentiment, prior literature uses 
market-wide investor sentiment for the empirical tests of sentiment on decisions 
and prices at the individual firm level. I adopt the firm-specific investor sentiment 
from Aboody et al. (2016), which is a novel measurement but to-date lacks 
sufficient empirical tests.  
5.4 Future Research 
The findings of Chapter 2 show that analysts covering the banking industry have 
different incentives compared with other analysts. That is to say, the incentives of 
analysts’ behaviour may shift according to different situations. Apart from industry 
difference, reputational cost may also influence analysts’ behaviour. In future 
research, I therefore intend to examine whether the increase in reputation is 
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associated with a positive or negative influence on their performance. In addition, 
future research questions could include: Do investors recognize this source of bias 
when incorporate analyst earnings forecasts in the market prices? Do bias 
incentives from revolving doors generalize to investment recommendations? 
Chapter 3 focuses on the textual discussions and earnings forecast bias of analyst 
reports. If the data is available, I intend to examine why reports with pessimistic 
sentiment tend to be more accurate. This could be associated with analyst 
affiliation (O’Brien, McNichols, and Lin (2005) and Kadan et al. (2009)). In addition, 
a trading strategy could also be designed since the four combinations of reports 
have different accuracy and predictive power. In addition, other quantitative outputs 
such as target price and recommendation level could be included.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the content analysis of corporate disclosures. I therefore 
intend to examine whether the tone of the 10-Qs influences investor sentiment ex-
post. I could therefore examine whether the response firm managers wanted have 
been achieved, via event study focusing on investor reactions shortly after the 
release of 10-Q filings. With the development of computer power, it is also possible 
to analyse sentiment automatically. Then the relationship between price movement 
or volatility and sentiment of all related disclosures could be examined. Trading 
strategy based on real time sentiment could also be designed. It would be also 
desirable to conduct a textual analysis of non-English narratives. A proper 
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dictionary needs to be compiled so that similar tests could be conducted. Investor 
reactions of sentiment from different cultural backgrounds could also be compared. 
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Appendix I: Variable Definitions 
Rel_DFBijt = The difference between the forecast error for analyst i for firm j at time t 
and the average forecast error of analysts from top brokerage houses 
following firm j at time t, scaled by the mean absolute forecast error of top 
analysts for firm j at time t. Forecast error is estimated value for analyst i 
minus actual value of firm j at time t. 
Abs_DFBijt = The absolute forecast bias for firm j at time t is based on the signed 
forecast error as a percentage of share price 
EMPLOYER = An indicator variable which takes the value of one if the forecast is for a 
firm with a sell-side equity department (investment bank) and zero 
otherwise. 
Earn_Stdjt = Standard deviation of firm j’s prior 5 years earning in year t. 
Ln(MVjt) = Natural log of the firm j’s market value at the end of year t. 
Ln(BTMjt) = Natural log of the ratio of book value of equity to market value of firm j at 
the end of year t. 
Ln(Followjt) = Analysts following, measured as the natural log of analysts following firm 
j in year t. 
F_Horizonijt = The measure of the time from the forecast date to the end of the fiscal 
period, calculated as the forecast horizon (days from the forecast date to 
the fiscal year-end) for analyst i following firm j in year t. When scaling I 
minus the average forecast horizon for analysts from top brokerage 
houses who follow firm j in year t, with this difference scaled by the 
average forecast horizons for analysts from top brokerage houses 
following firm j in year t. 
dayElapijt = The measure of the days elapsed since the last forecast by an analyst 
following firm j in year t. When scaling I calculate it as the days between 
analysts i’s forecast of firm j’s earnings in year t and the most recent 
preceding forecast of firm j’s earnings by  analysts from top brokerage 
houses, minus the average number of days between two adjacent 
forecasts of firm j’s earnings by any two analysts in year t, with this 
difference scaled by the average days between two adjacent forecasts of 
firm j’s earnings in year t. 
frijt =  The measure of analyst i’s forecast frequency for firm j, calculated as the 
number of firm j forecasts made by analyst i following firm j in year t. 
When scaling I minus the average number of firm j forecasts for analysts 
from top brokerage houses following firm j in year t, with this difference 
scaled by the average number of firm j forecasts issued by analysts from 
top brokerage houses following firm j in year t. 
Firm_Expijt = The measure of analyst i’s firm-specific experience, calculated as the 
number of years of firm-specific experience for analyst i following firm j in 
year t.  When scaling I minus the average number of years of firm-
specific experience for analysts from top brokerage houses following firm 
j in year i, with this difference scaled by the average years of firm 
experience for analysts from top brokerage houses following firm j in year 
t. 
Gen_Expijt = The measure of analyst i's general experience, calculated as the number 
of years of experience for analyst i following firm j in year t. When scaling 
I minus the average number of years of experience for analysts from top 
191 
 
 
 
brokerage houses following firm j in year t, with this difference scaled by 
the range of years of experience for analysts from top brokerage houses 
following firm j in year t. 
Num_Coijt = The measure of the number of companies analyst i follows in year t, 
calculated as the number of companies followed by analyst i following 
firm j in year t. When scaling I minus the average number of companies 
followed by analysts from top brokerage houses who follow firm j in year 
t, with this difference scaled by the average number of companies 
followed by analysts  from top brokerage houses following firm j in year t. 
Num_Indijt = The measure of number of industries analyst i follows in year t, 
calculated as the number of two-digit SICs followed by analyst i following 
firm j in year t. When scaling I minus the average number of two-digit 
SICs followed by analysts from top brokerage houses who follow firm j in 
year t, with this difference scaled by the average number of two-digit 
SICs followed by analysts from top brokerage houses following firm j in 
year t. 
Num_Anaijt = The measure of the analyst’s brokerage size, calculated as the number 
of analysts employed by the brokerage house employing analyst i 
following firm j in year t. When scaling I minus the average number of 
analysts employed by brokerage houses for analysts following firm j in 
year t, with this difference scaled by the average brokerage house size 
for analysts following firm j in year t. 
Qspreadjt = The measure of a firms bid-ask spread is the average quoted spread of 
firm j in effect for transactions during the year ending at t. 
jspreadjt = firm j’s average percentage spread (i.e. quote spread divided by the mid-
point price) calculated from daily values over year t 
Turnoverjt = The measure of a firm’s turnover is the number of shares traded in firm j, 
divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of the preceding 
year, time t–1.  
Totalriskjt = The measure of total risk is estimated as the standard deviation of firm j 
of monthly returns (computed on a daily basis).  
zscorejt = A proxy for insolvency risk of firm j at the end of year t. A function of net 
income, total equity and standard deviation of ROA. See Anolli, et al., 
2014, Boyd et al., 1993; Laeven and Levine, 2009. By construction 
higher values of the Z-score imply lower levels of risk.  
ROAjt = The measure of return on asset for firm j in year t is the net accounting 
income after taxes divided by total assets. 
accuracyijt = Forecast accuracy. Absolute value of Rel_DFBijt. 
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Figure 1 
Marginal effects of last forecast bias 
Figure 1 shows marginal effects of a unit change in bias for movement upwards or downwards in bank reputation calculated 
from a probit regression. It separates the effect based on whether analysts forecast earnings of employers or non-employers. 
Employer is any financial institution with a sell-side equity department where non-employer is any financial institution with no 
sell-side equity department. 
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Table 1.1 
Descriptive statistics on analyst and firm characteristics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for analysts forecast observations from 1999-2006. Analysts and forecast characteristics are derived 
from detailed I/B/E/S data. My sample is analysts that cover both banks and non-banks. I restrict the sample to forecasts issued no earlier 
than 1 year and no later than 30 days before the fiscal-year end. And include the last and first forecast issued by the analysts for a particular 
firm in each sample year. The firm characteristics are Earn_Std, earnings dispersion; MV, the market capitalization; BTM, the book to market 
and Follow, the number of analysts covering the firm. The analyst characteristics are F_Horizon, the number of days from the forecast date 
to the fiscal year-end; dayElap, the number of days since any analyst’s prior forecast; fr, forecast frequency; Firm_Exp, the analyst’s years of 
experience forecasting a particular firm’s earnings; Gen_Exp, the analyst’s overall years of forecasting experience;  Num_Co, the number of 
companies the analyst follows in each year; Num_Ind, the number of two-digit SIC industries the analyst follows in each year, and Num_Ana, 
the number of analysts in the analyst’s brokerage house each year. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for raw (unscaled) forecast and 
analyst characteristics. Panel B reports the descriptive statistic for forecast and analyst characteristics, including relative forecast (Rel_DFB), 
that are scaled to range from 0 to 1 for each firm-year. Panel C reports correlations among scaled characteristics. 
Panel A: Distribution of raw unscaled forecast and analyst characteristics 
 Full Sample Employer 
  
Non Employer 
Variable n Mean S.D. 25
th
 Q Median 75
th
 Q n Mean S.D. n Mean S.D. 
Abs_DFB(first forecast) 3778 0.23 1.42 -0.23 -0.02 0.29 1956 0.32 1.60 1876 0.16 1.28 
Abs_DFB(last forecast) 3832 0.05 0.59 -0.09 -0.01 0.04 1956 0.03 0.34 1876 -0.01 0.4 
Earn_Std 3832 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.1 1956 0.04     0.07 1876 0.08 0.05 
MV 3832 29104.77 36537.10 7944.98 16074.45 36017.57 1956 38255.28 43019.42 1876 19859.05 25385.64 
BTM 3832 0.45 0.21 0.32 0.44 0.55 1956 0.45 0.18 1876 0.45 0.24 
Follow 3832 24.39 6.28 21.00 25.00 28.00 1956 25.12 6.69 1876 23.63 5.73 
F_Horizon 3832 288.54 74.75 264.00 300.00 358.00 1956 289.77 75.32 1876 287.26 74.15 
dayElap 3832 5.65 11.31 0.00 1.00 6.00 1956 5.63 11.95 1876 5.67 10.6 
fr 3832 4.17 2.08 3.00 4.00 5.00 1956 4.28 2.10 1876 4.05 2.05 
Firm_Exp 3832 4.50 3.83 2.00 3.00 6.00 1956 4.4 3.75 1876 4.61 3.92 
Gen_Exp 3832 8.09 5.10 4.00 7.00 11.00 1956 7.86 4.79 1876 8.33 5.38 
Num_Co 3832 21.27 12.84 13.00 18.00 25.00 1956 20.38 11.07 1876 22.19 14.4 
Num_Ind 3832 2.29 1.74 1.00 2.00 3.00 1956 2.04 1.45 1876 2.55 1.96 
Num_Ana 3832 42.17 28.21 20.00 35.00 57.00 1956 41.63 28.07 1876 42.74 28.36 
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Panel B: Distribution of scaled forecast and analyst characteristics (n=3652) 
Variable Mean S.D. 25th Q Median 75th Q 
Rel_DFB (first forecast) -0.07 1.99 -0.50 0.00 0.37 
Rel_DFB (last forecast) 0.06 4.19 -1.00 -0.20 0.60 
Ln(MV) 9.70 1.13 8.95 9.67 10.49 
Ln(BTM) -0.84 0.77 -1.13 -0.80 -0.58 
Ln(Follow) 3.15 0.31 3.04 3.22 3.33 
F_Horizon 0.02 0.29 -0.13 0.04 0.18 
dayElap 1.71 15.89 -1.00 -0.82 0.50 
fr 71.22 30.25 50.11 67.10 88.18 
Firm_Exp 0.08 0.99 -0.60 -0.20 0.37 
Gen_Exp 0.08 0.80 -0.49 -0.13 0.47 
Num_Co 0.27 0.83 -0.20 0.08 0.49 
Num_Ind 0.44 0.99 -0.14 0.00 0.78 
Num_Ana -0.75 0.16 -0.89 -0.79 -0.64 
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Panel C: Correlations among scaled forecast, firm characteristics and analysts characteristics  
Below the diagonal I present correlations for the last forecast bias (Rel_DFB) and above the diagonal I present the correlations for the first forecast 
bias (Rel_DFB) all variables are adjusted for firm-year effects where necessary. The p-values are reported below the correlations in parentheses. All 
variable definitions are as reported in the Appendix I above. 
 
 
Rel_DFB EMPLOYER Earn_Std Ln(MV) Ln(BTM) Ln(Follow) F_Horizon dayElap fr Firm_Exp Gen_Exp Num_Co Num_Ind Num_Ana 
Rel_DFB  
 
0.004 0.103 -0.020 -0.045 0.038 0.110 0.028 0.062 0.015 0.009 0.010 -0.016 0.005 
  
(0.007) (<0.001) (0.276) (0.012) (0.035) (<0.001) (0.125) (<0.001) (0.392) (0.631) (0.569) (0.377) (0.785) 
EMPLOYER -0.035  -0.067 0.223 0.060 0.085 0.014 -0.002 -0.065 0.024 -0.046 -0.044 0.041 -0.016 
 (0.047)  (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.413) (0.902) (<0.001) (0.142) (0.005) (0.007) (0.020) (0.324) 
Earn_Std 0.081 -0.057  -0.163 -0.244 0.041 0.050 0.000 0.089 -0.001 -0.003 -0.013 -0.011 0.139 
 
(<0.001) (0.001)  (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.021) (0.005) (0.984) (<0.001) (0.956) (0.876) (0.456) (0.522) (<0.001) 
Ln(MV) -0.027 0.285 -0.160 
 
-0.025 0.545 0.067 -0.021 -0.046 -0.100 -0.146 -0.015 0.012 -0.001 
 
(0.117) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.155) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.238) (0.011) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.419) (0.486) (0.946) 
Ln(BTM) -0.047 0.095 -0.186 -0.034 
 
0.116 -0.026 -0.014 -0.146 -0.001 -0.038 0.020 0.018 -0.126 
 
(0.006) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.051) 
 
(<0.001) (0.145) (0.428) (<0.001) (0.964) (0.032) (0.268) (0.309) (<0.001) 
Ln(Follow) 0.031 0.217 0.030 0.553 0.108 
 
0.012 -0.017 -0.009 -0.084 -0.129 -0.032 -0.020 0.012 
 
(0.072) (<0.001) (0.075) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(0.497) (0.333) (0.620) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.072) (0.271) (0.495) 
F_Horizon 0.086 0.059 0.066 0.084 -0.015 0.018 
 
-0.090 0.583 0.029 0.031 0.011 0.113 -0.025 
 
(<0.001) (0.001) 0.0001 (<0.001) (0.377) (0.294) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.106) (0.085) (0.530) (<0.001) (0.169) 
dayElap 0.029 0.023 -0.004 -0.020 -0.012 -0.021 -0.093 
 
-0.078 0.072 0.081 0.028 0.026 -0.034 
 
(0.099) (0.192) (0.808) (0.248) (0.494) (0.232) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.112) (0.154) (0.055) 
fr 0.067 -0.053 0.078 -0.049 -0.139 0.010 0.559 -0.075 
 
0.065 0.074 0.059 0.029 0.007 
 
(<0.001) (0.003) (<0.001) (0.005) (<0.001) (0.579) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) (0.107) (0.688) 
Firm_Exp 0.016 0.011 -0.012 -0.119 0.000 -0.106 0.011 0.076 0.065 
 
0.606 0.174 0.029 0.002 
 
(0.354) (0.537) (0.490) (<0.001) (0.986) (<0.001) (0.531) (<0.001) (<0.001)  0.000 (<0.001) (0.104) (0.904) 
Gen_Exp 0.013 -0.054 -0.016 -0.161 -0.036 -0.146 0.024 0.085 0.082 0.603 
 
0.276 0.051 0.069 
 
(0.453) (0.002) (0.341) (<0.001) (0.036) (<0.001) (0.156) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (0.004) 0.0001 
Num_Co 0.017 -0.031 -0.025 -0.031 0.023 -0.053 0.001 0.035 0.057 0.173 0.293 
 
0.403 -0.026 
 
(0.315) (0.074) (0.152) (0.076) (0.187) (0.002) (0.942) (0.043) (0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) (0.149) 
Num_Ind -0.019 0.040 -0.004 0.009 0.014 -0.042 0.106 0.030 0.013 0.031 0.060 0.401 
 
-0.095 
 
(0.274) (0.022) (0.838) (0.601) (0.402) (0.014) (<0.001) (0.085) (0.456) (0.072) 0.0004 (<0.001) 
 
(<0.001) 
Num_Ana 0.002 -0.018 0.150 -0.001 -0.116 0.000 -0.025 -0.034 -0.002 0.000 0.060 -0.018 -0.095 
 
 
(0.932) (0.294) (<0.001) (0.953) (<0.001) (0.988) (0.151) (0.050) (0.899) (0.997) (<0.001) (0.281) (<0.001) 
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Table 1.2 
Comparing forecast bias of bank-analysts first and last yearly earnings forecast 
DFBijt=α+1EMPLOYER+2Earn_Std+3Ln(MVijt)+4Ln(BTMijt)+5Ln(Followijt)+6F_Horizonijt+7dayElapijt+
8frijt+9Firm_Expit+10Gen_Expijt+11Num_Coijt+12Num_Indijt+13Num_Anaijt+14Year_F.E+ijt 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Dependent 
Variable 
Rel_DFB  Abs_DFB 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
First Forecast  
 
Last Forecast   First Forecast  Last Forecast  
Constant -0.308  -4.321**  -1.879***  0.008 
 (-0.61)  (-2.21)  (-5.05)  (0.02) 
EMPLOYER 0.177** 
 
-0.369*  0.127***  -0.186*** 
 
(2.57) 
 
(-1.72)  (2.76)  (-2.78) 
Earn_Std -0.005 
 
17.704***  8.698***  2.277*** 
 
(-0.00) 
 
(3.07)  (7.40)  (6.10) 
Ln(MV) -0.011 
 
-0.314**  -0.051  0.300** 
 
(-0.26) 
 
(-2.41)  (-1.64)  (2.10) 
Ln(BTM) 0.050 
 
-0.581**  0.317***  -0.619*** 
 
(0.83) 
 
(-2.03)  (5.41)  (-3.98) 
Ln(Follow) 0.182 
 
1.898***  0.182  1.898*** 
 
(1.33) 
 
(3.39)  (1.33)  (3.39) 
F_Horizon 0.731*** 
 
0.809**  0.000  0.002*** 
 
(4.47) 
 
(2.45)  (1.14)  (2.58) 
dayElap 0.000 
 
0.031  -0.002  0.004 
 
(0.20) 
 
(1.32)  (-0.95)  (1.64) 
fr -0.001 
 
-0.011  0.060***  0.037 
 
(-0.77) 
 
(-1.00)  (3.97)  (1.18) 
Firm_Exp -0.015 
 
0.158  0.034***  -0.007 
 
(-0.44) 
 
(0.88)  (3.93)  (-0.58) 
Gen_Exp 0.017 
 
-0.106  -0.010*  0.016 
 
(0.43) 
 
(-0.52)  (-1.90)  (1.25) 
Num_Co 0.004 
 
0.385  0.001  -0.017*** 
 
(0.09) 
 
(1.59)  (0.44)  (-3.80) 
Num_Ind 0.036 
 
-0.504***  -0.054***  0.139*** 
 
(1.13) 
 
(-2.93)  (-2.79)  (3.19) 
Num_Ana 0.055 
 
-1.237  0.055  -1.237 
 
(0.25) 
 
(-1.59)  (0.25)  (-1.59) 
Year_F.E            Yes 
 
   Yes            Yes            Yes 
Observations      3652 
 
   3225           3778            3832 
Adjusted R2           0.90% 
 
1.00%  20.2%  8.9% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results using two alternative measures of forecast bias; 
relative and absolute, for the period 1999-2006. First forecast is the initial forecast analyst i issued for firm j in 
year t and last forecast is the last forecast revision analyst i issued for firm j in year t. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are clustered by analyst. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,**,and***represent 
significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are as reported in the 
Appendix I.  
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Panel B: Banks Only Sample 
Dependent 
Variable 
Rel_DFB  Abs_DFB 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 First Forecast  Last Forecast   First Forecast   Last Forecast 
Constant -0.453  -3.046  -2.235***  -0.104 
 
(-0.82)  (-1.57)  (-5.54)  (-0.20) 
EMPLOYER 0.182**  -0.430**  0.141***  -0.272*** 
 
(2.51)  (-2.06)  (3.03)  (-3.32) 
Earn_Std -0.080  15.009**  9.125***  0.430 
 
(-0.07)  (2.39)  (7.19)  (0.87) 
Ln(MV) -0.016  -0.402***  -0.041  0.305* 
 
(-0.34)  (-2.99)  (-1.27)  (1.88) 
Ln(BTM) 0.006  -0.758**  0.323***  -0.654*** 
 
(0.08)  (-2.18)  (4.74)  (-3.99) 
Ln(Follow) 0.206  2.089***  0.206  2.089*** 
 
(1.36)  (3.24)  (1.36)  (3.24) 
F_Horizon 0.788***  0.950***  0.000  0.003** 
 
(4.41)  (2.70)  (0.87)  (2.56) 
dayElap 0.000  0.046*  -0.001  0.005* 
 
(0.17)  (1.90)  (-0.55)  (1.75) 
fr -0.001  -0.023*  0.059***  0.030 
 
(-0.59)  (-1.93)  (3.75)  (0.89) 
Firm_Exp -0.035  0.107  0.027***  -0.008 
 
(-1.04)  (0.57)  (2.98)  (-0.66) 
Gen_Exp -0.000  -0.123  -0.008  0.019 
 
(-0.01)  (-0.59)  (-1.47)  (1.30) 
Num_Co 0.019  0.308  0.001  -0.018*** 
 
(0.43)  (1.29)  (0.62)  (-3.64) 
Num_Ind 0.056  -0.601***  -0.083***  0.207*** 
 
(1.54)  (-3.53)  (-3.96)  (3.16) 
Num_Ana 0.000  -0.935  0.000  -0.935 
 
(0.00)  (-1.30)  (0.00)  (-1.30) 
Year_F.E       Yes    Yes           Yes       Yes 
Observations 3327    2956           3427           3488 
Adjusted R2 1.0%    2.7%  21.8%  9.8% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results using two alternative measures of forecast bias; 
relative and absolute for the banking only sample 1999-2006. First forecast is the initial forecast analyst i issued 
for firm j in year t and last forecast is the last forecast revision analyst i issued for firm j in year t. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by analyst. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*,**,and***represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are 
as reported in the Appendix I.  
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Table 1.3:  
Propensity Score Matching Results 
Panel A: Effects of propensity score matching: Full sample (Rel_DFB) 
 Unmatched Matched 
 
Employer Non-Employer %Bias t-test Employer Non-Employer %Bias t-test 
Variable Mean Mean   Mean Mean   
First Forecast 
Market 
Value 38657 17919 63.9 20.70*** 25182 24876 0.9 0.33 
BTM 0.4695 0.4756 -2.6 -0.85 0.4630 0.4489 6.1 1.83* 
Follow 25.082 23.091 32.3 10.50*** 24.227 24.007 3.6 1.05 
Firm_Exp 4.5212 4.5613 -1.1 -0.35 4.4771 4.4211 1.5 0.45 
Qspread 0.1523 0.1625 -4.7 -1.52 0.1587 0.1529 2.6 0.77 
Turnover 1.3313 1.5254 -18.3 -5.96*** 1.3808 1.3774 0.3 0.10 
Total Risk 0.0701 0.0780 -20.2 -6.59*** 0.0734 0.0695 9.8 3.18*** 
Zscore 382.89 317.11 12.4 4.02*** 358.68 356.05 0.5 0.15 
Last Forecast 
Market 
Value 39946 17951 69.1 19.52*** 22628 23441 -2.6 -1.02 
BTM 0.4472 0.4338 8.0 2.28** .43958 0.4276 7.1 1.77* 
Follow 26.342 23.601 49.8 14.14*** 25.142 24.973 3.1 0.83 
Firm_Exp 4.5570 4.6996 -3.8 -1.07 4.4663 4.5394 -1.9 -0.48 
Qspread 0.1679 0.1715 -1.6 -0.45 .16879 0.1818 -5.6 -1.32 
Turnover 1.1692 1.3459 -21.2 -6.03*** 1.2762 1.2627 1.6 0.43 
Total Risk 0.0706 0.0770 -16.6 -4.71*** .07522 0.0729 5.9 1.53 
Zscore 394.35 312.90 18.5 5.26*** 359.35 348.91 2.4 0.53 
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Panel B: Effects of propensity score matching: Bank only sample (Rel_DFB) 
 Unmatched Matched 
 
Employer Non-Employer %Bias t-test Employer Non-Employer %Bias t-test 
Variable Mean Mean   Mean Mean   
First Forecast 
Market Value 39111 17936 65.8 19.24*** 21960 21800 0.5 0.24 
BTM 0.4696 0.4700 -0.2 -0.06 0.4574 0.4678 -4.6 -1.30 
Follow 25.395 23.672 29.7 8.96*** 24.411 23.923 8.4 2.41** 
Firm_Exp 4.6106 4.2758 9.2 2.78*** 4.4831 4.5482 -1.8 -0.50 
Qspread 0.1492 0.1668 -8.0 -2.45** 0.1567 0.1482 3.9 1.15 
Turnover 1.2877 1.5092 -21.1 -6.49*** 1.3507 1.3681 -1.7 -0.51 
Total Risk 0.0685 0.0773 -22.8 -6.99*** 0.0725 0.0702 5.9 1.85* 
Zscore 394.42 352.5 7.5 2.26** 379.96 347.14 5.9 1.66* 
ROA 0.0219 0.0279 -14.1 -4.26*** 0.0243 0.0249 -1.3 -0.38 
Last Forecast 
Market Value 39952 18244 68.3 17.68*** 19987 21241 -3.9 -1.90* 
BTM 0.4485 0.4226 16.4 4.38*** 0.4397 0.4303 5.9 1.37 
Follow 26.496 24.121 45.4 12.10*** 25.229 24.893 6.4 1.64 
Firm_Exp 4.6331 4.3905 6.6 1.76* 4.5241 4.5751 -1.4 -0.32 
Qspread 0.1634 0.1720 -3.7 -1.00 0.1570 0.1764 -8.4 -2.00** 
Turnover 1.1309 1.3356 -24.9 -6.74*** 1.2285 1.2636 -4.3 -1.06 
Total Risk 0.0696 0.0765 -17.6 -4.75*** 0.0741 0.0739 0.5 0.12 
Zscore 404.85 346.45 12.8 3.41*** 369.41 371.78 -0.5 -0.11 
ROA 0.0204 0.0270 -17.0 -4.52*** 0.0218 0.0239 -5.2 -1.22 
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Panel C: Full Sample 
DFBijt=α+1EMPLOYER+2Earn_Std+3Ln(MVijt)+4Ln(BTMijt)+5Ln(Followijt)+6F_Horizonijt+7dayElapijt+
8frijt+9Firm_Expit+10Gen_Expijt+11Num_Coijt+12Num_Indijt+13Num_Anaijt+14Year_F.E+ijt 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Rel_DFB  Abs_DFB 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
First Forecast  
 
Last Forecast   First Forecast   Last Forecast 
Constant 0.251  -0.963  -2.242***  -0.314 
 (0.39)  (-0.31)  (-4.60)  (-0.16) 
EMPLOYER 0.204** 
 
-0.752**  0.213***  -0.386** 
 
(2.47) 
 
(-2.07)  (3.68)  (-2.04) 
Earn_Std 0.705 
 
16.439*  8.375***  6.439* 
 
(0.50) 
 
(1.96)  (4.34)  (1.72) 
Ln(MV) 0.019 
 
-0.478**  0.004  -0.420** 
 
(0.30) 
 
(-2.39)  (0.08)  (-2.43) 
Ln(BTM) 0.018 
 
-0.457  0.344***  -0.057 
 
(0.23) 
 
(-0.79)  (4.50)  (-0.21) 
Ln(Follow) -0.060 
 
1.102  0.469***  1.106* 
 
(-0.32) 
 
(1.14)  (2.87)  (1.96) 
F_Horizon 1.071*** 
 
0.616**  0.000  0.329* 
 
(5.50) 
 
(2.28)  (0.83)  (1.77) 
dayElap 0.007 
 
0.052**  -0.003  0.019 
 
(0.90) 
 
(2.16)  (-0.98)  (0.76) 
fr -0.002 
 
0.016  0.064***  0.004 
 
(-0.75) 
 
(1.44)  (3.40)  (0.52) 
Firm_Exp -0.039 
 
0.267  0.029***  0.124 
 
(-0.88) 
 
(1.39)  (2.60)  (1.23) 
Gen_Exp 0.061 
 
-0.445**  -0.001  -0.256* 
 
(1.07) 
 
(-2.13)  (-0.13)  (-1.74) 
Num_Co -0.062 
 
-0.244  -0.000  -0.047 
 
(-0.62) 
 
(-0.97)  (-0.02)  (-0.25) 
Num_Ind 0.060 
 
-0.310*  -0.072***  0.032 
 
(1.10) 
 
(-1.66)  (-2.84)  (0.22) 
Num_Ana 0.189 
 
-0.546  -0.001  0.436 
 
(0.71) 
 
(-0.71)  (-0.61)  (0.78) 
Year_F.E           Yes 
 
      Yes           Yes       Yes 
Observations     2335 
 
     1920          2424          1980 
Adjusted R2 1.90% 
 
    2.70%  20.3%  1.80% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results using two measure of forecast bias, relative and 
absolute, for the years 1999-2006. First forecast is the initial forecast analyst i issued for firm j in year t and last 
forecast is the last forecast revision analyst i issued for firm j in year t. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
are clustered by analyst. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,**,and***represent significance level of 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are as reported in the Appendix I. 
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Panel D: Banking Only Sample 
Dependent 
Variable 
Rel_DFB  Abs_DFB 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
First Forecast  
 
Last 
Forecast 
 First Forecast   
Last 
Forecast 
Constant -0.100  0.530  -3.503***  -0.181 
 (-0.15)  (0.24)  (-7.00)  (-0.10) 
EMPLOYER 0.209***  -0.760**  0.210***  -0.419* 
 
(2.60)  (-2.41)  (3.43)  (-1.80) 
Earn_Std -1.278  27.602*  8.778***  12.297*** 
 
(-0.96)  (1.85)  (3.58)  (2.82) 
Ln(MV) -0.036  -0.587**  0.102*  -0.658*** 
 
(-0.64)  (-2.53)  (1.74)  (-3.94) 
Ln(BTM) -0.145*  -1.377**  0.286***  -0.314 
 
(-1.69)  (-2.17)  (3.38)  (-1.08) 
Ln(Follow) 0.274  1.119  0.564***  1.336** 
 
(1.54)  (1.38)  (4.02)  (2.41) 
F_Horizon 1.059***  0.900***  0.000  0.362* 
 
(5.13)  (3.10)  (0.01)  (1.87) 
dayElap 0.010  0.040  -0.000  0.071*** 
 
(1.21)  (1.63)  (-0.04)  (2.64) 
fr -0.003  -0.001  0.064***  -0.003 
 
(-1.23)  (-0.11)  (2.77)  (-0.36) 
Firm_Exp -0.123***  0.001  0.020  -0.105 
 
(-2.89)  (0.01)  (1.64)  (-0.71) 
Gen_Exp 0.069  -0.679**  -0.017*  -0.084 
 
(1.21)  (-2.01)  (-1.87)  (-0.52) 
Num_Co -0.040  0.030  0.005*  0.223 
 
(-0.48)  (0.13)  (1.68)  (0.93) 
Num_Ind 0.070  -0.535**  -0.101***  -0.191 
 
(1.30)  (-2.20)  (-3.27)  (-1.30) 
Num_Ana 0.344  -0.944  -0.001  -0.818 
 
(1.23)  (-1.27)  (-0.55)  (-1.18) 
Year_F.E Yes     Yes            Yes  Yes 
Observations 2118     1792           2188  1858 
Adjusted R2 2.1%  5.4%  22.0%  4.4% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results using two forecast bias measures: relative and 
absolute for a sub-sample of banks for the years 1999-2006. First forecast is the initial forecast analyst i issued 
for firm j in year t and last forecast is the last forecast revision analyst i issued for firm j in year t. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by analyst. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
*,**,and***represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are 
as reported in the Appendix I. 
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Table 1.4: 
Non-Linear Variables: Full Sample 
 Relative Forecast Bias  Absolute Forecast Bias 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent 
Variable 
First Forecast 
Rel_DFB  
Last Forecast 
Rel_DFB  
First Forecast 
Abs_DFB  
Last Forecast 
Abs_DFB 
Constant 0.278  2.119***  0.139  0.263*** 
 (1.03)  (3.58)  (0.79)  (3.76) 
EMPLOYER 0.214***  -0.296**   0.103**   -0.029*   
 
(3.04)  (-2.01)  (2.10)  (-1.68) 
Earn_Std_Q1 0.058  -0.534**   -0.299***  -0.126*** 
 
(0.50)   (-2.33)  (-3.66)  (-3.07) 
Earn_Std_Q2 0.156*  -0.540**   -0.447***  -0.160*** 
 
(1.69)  (-2.46)  (-5.05)  (-4.29) 
Earn_Std_Q3 -0.127  -0.278  -0.395***  -0.163*** 
 
(-1.31)  (-1.09)  (-4.43)  (-4.25) 
Earn_Std_Q4 -0.200*  -0.384  -0.225**   -0.192*** 
 
(-1.82)  (-1.64)  (-2.19)  (-4.98) 
Ln(MV)_Q1 -0.119  0.029  -0.025  -0.023 
 
(-0.94)  (0.10)  (-0.27)  (-0.58) 
Ln(MV)_Q2 0.005  0.551*    -0.085  -0.025 
 
(0.04)  (1.91)  (-1.01)  (-0.73) 
Ln(MV)_Q3 -0.002  0.657**   -0.237***  -0.008 
 
(-0.02)   (2.43)  (-3.19)  (-0.21) 
Ln(MV)_Q4 -0.093   -0.195  -0.087  0.063*   
 
(-0.73)   (-0.69)  (-1.03)  (1.74) 
Ln(BTM)_Q1 0.028  0.073  -0.105  0.046**  
 
(0.25)   (0.30)  (-1.44)  (2.11) 
Ln(BTM)_Q2 0.004  -0.155  -0.087  0.013 
 
(0.03)  (-0.64)  (-1.10)  (0.54) 
Ln(BTM)_Q3 0.163  -0.350  -0.066  0.025 
 
(1.49)  (-1.51)  (-0.81)  (0.72) 
Ln(BTM)_Q4 -0.025  -0.158  0.001  0.056*   
 
(-0.28)  (-0.54)  (0.01)  (1.88) 
Ln(Follow)_Q1 -0.023  -0.468*    -0.124  -0.131*** 
 
(-0.17)  (-1.65)  (-1.35)  (-3.50) 
Ln(Follow)_Q2 0.127  -0.584**   -0.005  -0.100*** 
 
(1.03)  (-2.08)  (-0.06)  (-2.82) 
Ln(Follow)_Q3 -0.007  -0.058  0.247***  -0.038 
 
(-0.05)  (-0.22)  (3.21)  (-1.31) 
Ln(Follow)_Q4 0.139  -0.229  0.540***  -0.014 
 
(1.01)  (-0.81)  (6.73)  (-0.42) 
F_Horizon_Q1 -0.683***  -0.901***  -0.551***  -0.168*** 
 
(-4.85)  (-2.70)  (-7.31)  (-4.66) 
F_Horizon_Q2 -0.329***  -0.786***  -0.183***  -0.157*** 
 
(-3.04)  (-2.68)  (-2.68)  (-4.54) 
F_Horizon_Q3 -0.112  -0.483*    -0.052  -0.146*** 
 
(-1.00)  (-1.69)  (-0.84)  (-4.82) 
F_Horizon_Q4 -0.148  -0.621**   0.064  -0.108*** 
 
(-1.30)  (-2.25)  (0.91)  (-3.63) 
dayElap_Q1 0.039  -0.478**   0.022  -0.004 
 
(0.39)  (-2.34)  (0.41)  (-0.18) 
dayElap_Q2 -0.167  -0.485  0.340  -0.189*   
 
(-0.73)  (-0.76)  (1.36)  (-1.93) 
dayElap_Q3 -0.107  -0.574**   -0.030  -0.014 
 
(-0.96)  (-2.14)  (-0.45)  (-0.52) 
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dayElap_Q4 0.060  -0.471**   0.050  -0.032 
 
(0.52)  (-1.99)  (0.78)  (-1.29) 
fr_Q1 0.234*    0.184  0.724***  0.107*** 
 
(1.65)  (0.55)  (7.68)  (2.95) 
fr_Q2 0.157  -0.140  0.827***  0.064**  
 
(1.36)  (-0.57)  (9.95)  (2.15) 
fr_Q3 0.209*    0.091  0.204***  0.031 
 
(1.74)  (0.32)  (3.41)  (1.15) 
fr_Q4 0.311**   0.353  0.140***  0.068**  
 
(2.42)  (1.22)  (2.69)  (2.27) 
Firm_Exp_Q1 0.016  -0.049  -0.235***  -0.031 
 
(0.13)  (-0.17)  (-3.03)  (-1.06) 
Firm_Exp_Q2 0.108  -0.357  -0.102  -0.053*   
 
(0.91)  (-1.48)  (-1.35)  (-1.82) 
Firm_Exp_Q3 0.051  0.035  -0.154**   -0.017 
 
(0.47)  (0.15)  (-1.97)  (-0.59) 
Firm_Exp_Q4 -0.139  0.143  -0.175**   -0.074*** 
 
(-1.30)  (0.61)  (-2.42)  (-3.03) 
Gen_Exp_Q1 -0.172  0.145  -0.001  -0.006 
 
(-1.40)  (0.53)  (-0.01)  (-0.20) 
Gen_Exp_Q2 -0.092  -0.090  0.117  0.008 
 
(-0.80)  (-0.37)  (1.59)  (0.29) 
Gen_Exp_Q3 0.032  0.004  -0.007  -0.013 
 
(0.31)  (0.02)  (-0.10)  (-0.51) 
Gen_Exp_Q4 -0.058  0.271  -0.009  -0.004 
 
(-0.64)  (1.26)  (-0.12)  (-0.16) 
Num_Co_Q1 0.021  0.150  0.056  -0.022 
 
(0.18)  (0.57)  (0.72)  (-0.83) 
Num_Co_Q2 0.002  -0.421  0.133*    0.026 
 
(0.02)  (-1.62)  (1.73)  (0.94) 
Num_Co_Q3 -0.063  -0.265  0.141*    0.019 
 
(-0.54)  (-1.12)  (1.87)  (0.71) 
Num_Co_Q4 -0.177  -0.041  0.018  -0.016 
 
(-1.52)  (-0.17)  (0.28)  (-0.69) 
Num_Ind_Q1 -0.214*    0.333  -0.121  -0.018 
 
(-1.92)  (1.34)  (-1.58)  (-0.70) 
Num_Ind_Q2 -0.219*    0.307  0.031  -0.051*   
 
(-1.89)  (1.16)  (0.40)  (-1.91) 
Num_Ind_Q3 0.124  0.563*  -0.099  -0.029 
 
(1.07)  (1.86)  (-1.16)  (-0.96) 
Num_Ind_Q4 -0.063  0.289  -0.039  -0.053**  
 
(-0.58)  (1.15)  (-0.50)  (-1.97) 
Num_Ana_Q1 -0.035  0.060  0.141*    0.002 
 
(-0.34)  (0.27)  (1.82)  (0.10) 
Num_Ana_Q2 -0.013  0.106  0.040  0.009 
 
(-0.13)  (0.46)  (0.58)  (0.33) 
Num_Ana_Q3 -0.002  -0.068  0.017  -0.002 
 
(-0.02)  (-0.32)  (0.25)  (-0.06) 
Num_Ana_Q4 -0.075  -0.119  -0.076  -0.009 
 
(-0.75)  (-0.59)  (-1.15)  (-0.38) 
Year_F.E Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 3652  3225  3778  3832 
Adjusted R
2
 2.0%  1.90%  23.0%  9.4% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results using two forecast bias measures: relative and absolute 
for a sub-sample of banks for the years 1999-2006. All independent variables (except dummy variable EMPLOYER) are 
in quintile (i.e. non-linear independent variables). First forecast is the initial forecast analyst i issued for firm j in year t 
and last forecast is the last forecast revision analyst i issued for firm j in year t. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
are clustered by analyst. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *,**,and***represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are as reported in the Appendix I.  
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Table 1.5 
Panel A: Comparing forecast bias of analysts who follow investment 
banks and non-banks before and after the Global Settlement 
Rel_DFBijt =  𝛼  + 1EMPLOYER + 2Earn_Std+ 3Ln(MVijt) +4Ln(BTMijt) +5Ln(Followijt) + 
6F_Horizonijt +7dayElapijt +8frijt +9Firm_Expit + 10Gen_Expijt + 11Num_Coijt + 
12Num_Indijt  + 13Num_Anaijt + 14Year F.E + ijt  
  Before Global Settlement   After Global Settlement 
 
First Forecast 
 
Last Forecast 
 
First Forecast 
 
Last Forecast 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Constant -0.063    -1.126 0.122    -1.954    
 
(-0.08)     (-0.66)  (0.11)     (-0.74)    
EMPLOYER 0.050     -0.092  0.236*    -0.554*   
 
(0.46)     (-0.40)  (1.87)     (-1.68)    
Earn_Std 0.094     4.223  -0.219     7.416*   
 
(0.07)     (0.86)  (-0.07)     (1.70)    
Ln(MV) -0.028     0.051  -0.031     -0.272    
 
(-0.49)     (0.36)  (-0.43)     (-1.13)    
Ln(BTM) -0.015     -0.177  -0.076     -0.296    
 
(-0.17)     (-0.51)  (-0.49)     (-0.74)    
Ln(Follow) 0.287     0.133  0.002     0.988    
 
(1.42)     (0.22)  (0.01)     (1.17)    
F_Horizon 1.384***  0.041  0.787**   0.376    
 
(5.76)     (0.14)  (2.39)     (1.23)    
dayElap 0.020***  0.046  -0.015     0.062    
 
(2.85)     (1.51)  (-1.38)     (1.45)    
fr -0.008***  0.011  -0.004     -0.005    
 
(-2.97)     (1.20)  (-1.02)     (-0.31)    
Firm_Exp -0.086     0.095  0.022     0.168    
 
(-1.21)     (0.62)  (0.30)     (0.56)    
Gen_Exp 0.208**   0.074  0.011     -0.134    
 
(2.27)     (0.36)  (0.13)     (-0.50)    
Num_co -0.022     -0.120  0.012     0.553    
 
(-0.27)     (-0.62)  (0.08)     (1.54)    
Num_ind 0.018     -0.258  0.004     -0.590**  
 
(0.28)     (-1.53)  (0.04)     (-2.01)    
Num_ana 0.312     -0.353  -0.422     0.634    
  (0.95)     (-0.56)  (-0.86)     (0.43)    
Year F.E. YES  YES       YES        YES 
N 926  1125        1494          981 
Adjusted R2 3.8%  0.03%        0.01%  0.01% 
This table compares analyst bias before and after the Global Settlement in year 2003 using 
analyst constant sample from year 1999 to 2006. Before the settlement represents years 1999 
to 2003 while after the settlement represents years 2004 to 2006. First forecast is the initial 
forecast analyst i issued for firm j in year t and last forecast is the last forecast revision analyst i 
issued for firm j in year t. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm and 
analyst pair. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All variable definitions are as reported in the Appendix I. 
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Panel B: Sub-sample of firms that experienced no decrease in analyst 
coverage following the Global Settlement 
  Before Global Settlement   After Global Settlement 
 
First Forecast 
 
Last Forecast 
 
First Forecast 
 
Last Forecast 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
Constant 0.040    
 
-1.165 
 
-0.004    
 
-2.137    
 
(0.05)    
 
(-0.66) 
 
(-0.00)    
 
(-0.76)    
EMPLOYER 0.063    
 
-0.080 
 
0.234*   
 
-0.560*   
 
(0.56)    
 
(-0.34) 
 
(1.85)    
 
(-1.68)    
Earn_Std -0.945    
 
4.462 
 
-1.165    
 
17.349*   
 
(-0.75)    
 
(0.89) 
 
(-0.37)    
 
(1.70)    
Ln(MV) -0.072    
 
0.040 
 
-0.038    
 
-0.274    
 
(-1.26)    
 
(0.26) 
 
(-0.53)    
 
(-1.11)    
Ln(BTM) -0.069    
 
-0.181 
 
-0.116    
 
-0.305    
 
(-0.77)    
 
(-0.51) 
 
(-0.75)    
 
(-0.75)    
Ln(Follow) 0.429**  
 
0.155 
 
0.082    
 
1.046    
 
(2.08)    
 
(0.24) 
 
(0.30)    
 
(1.18)    
F_Horizon 1.455*** 
 
0.025 
 
0.822**  
 
0.386    
 
(6.01)    
 
(0.08) 
 
(2.51)    
 
(1.19)    
dayElap 0.019**  
 
0.046 
 
-0.017    
 
0.062    
 
(2.29)    
 
(1.51) 
 
(-1.56)    
 
(1.45)    
fr -0.009*** 
 
0.011 
 
-0.005    
 
-0.005    
 
(-3.12)    
 
(1.19) 
 
(-1.26)    
 
(-0.31)    
Firm_Exp -0.084    
 
0.112 
 
0.010    
 
0.167    
 
(-1.15)    
 
(0.72) 
 
(0.14)    
 
(0.55)    
Gen_Exp 0.205**  
 
0.061 
 
0.016    
 
-0.132    
 
(2.16)    
 
(0.30) 
 
(0.18)    
 
(-0.49)    
Num_co 0.003    
 
-0.135 
 
0.013    
 
0.561    
 
(0.03)    
 
(-0.68) 
 
(0.09)    
 
(1.54)    
Num_ind -0.013    
 
-0.250 
 
0.004    
 
-0.599**  
 
(-0.19)    
 
(-1.46) 
 
(0.04)    
 
(-2.01)    
Num_ana 0.372    
 
-0.371 
 
-0.473    
 
0.604    
  (1.12)      (-0.58)   (-0.97)      (0.40)    
Year F.E. YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
N 895 
 
1102 
 
1482 
 
975 
Adjusted R
2
 0.41%   0.02%   0.00%   0.01% 
This table compares analyst bias before and after the Global Settlement in year 2003 using 
analyst constant sample and excluding any firms that experienced a drop in analysts following 
after Settlement. Before the settlement represents years 1999 to 2003 while after the settlement 
represents years 2004 to 2006. First forecast is the initial forecast analyst i issued for firm j in 
year t and last forecast is the last forecast revision analyst i issued for firm j in year t. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm and analyst pair. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. All variable definitions are as reported in the Appendix I. 
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Table 1.6 
Comparing microstructure properties of investment banks versus non-bank firms 
     NYSESample,1999-2006              NASDAQSample,1999-2006     
     Means   Medians       Means   Medians  
Variable N  Bank   Control  
 Prop'al 
difference  Bank   Control  
 Prop'al 
difference  N    Bank   Control  
 Prop'al 
difference  Bank   Control  
 Prop'al 
difference 
markv 110 38.00  
    
40.00  0.76%   18.00  20.00  0.09%   32    11.00    10.00  -0.86%     6.40      5.90 -1.19% 
price 110 50.508 52.862 4.63% 46.62 49.12 4.04% 
 
32 44.91 44.64 3.86% 45.51 43.61 3.82% 
volume 110 829.88 707.82 -10.82% 522.29 341.67 -15.85% 
 
32 1100.00 239.47 -104.25%*** 642.96 184.51 -103.76%*** 
std 110 30.79% 27.31% -9.01% 26.66% 23.35% -8.69% 
 
32 60.04% 26.44% -72.34%*** 42.28% 21.65% -73.4%*** 
Qspread 110 18.81% 19.69% 27.89% 8.82% 5.33% -11.46%* 
 
32 4.51% 4.24% -35.04% 2.06% 2.64% 29.00% 
jspread 110 0.47% 0.39% -20.30% 0.24% 0.11% -18.55% 
 
32 0.12% 0.13% 51.33% 0.04% 0.07% 47.06% 
tover 105 1.37 1.13 -9.58%* 1.07 0.92 -9.56%**  32 7.48 1.27 -110.77%*** 4.56 1.11 -123.81%*** 
This table summarizes and compares the microstructure of investment banks and non-investment banks. ‘‘Prop’al difference’’ is computed as the 
control firm’s value less the bank’s value, divided by the average of the two firms’ values. Other variables are defined in the Appendix I.*, **, and *** 
represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 1.7 
Comparing analyst forecast accuracy of bank-analysts first and last 
yearly earnings forecast 
Dependent Variable Forecast Accuracy 
 (1)  (2) 
 
First Forecast   Last Forecast  
Constant -0.316  0.061 
 (-1.40)     (0.400) 
EMPLOYER 0.232***  -0.038 
 
(4.69)  (-1.18)    
Earn_Std -0.144***  -0.080*   
 
(-2.88)     (-1.86) 
Ln(MV) 0.027  -0.012 
 
(1.08)  (-0.88)    
Ln(BTM) 0.056  -0.026 
 
(1.57)  (-0.63)    
Ln(Follow) -0.194**   0.176*** 
 
(-2.07)     (2.68) 
F_Horizon -1.251***  -0.292*** 
 
(-17.21)     (-7.44)    
dayElap -0.026**   -0.049**  
 
(-2.42)     (-2.00)    
fr 0.002***  -0.003*** 
 
(4.73)  (-5.88)    
Firm_Exp -0.013  -0.009 
 
(-0.39)     (-0.41)    
Gen_Exp 0.053  0.047*   
 
(1.37)  (1.73) 
Num_Co -0.003  0.019 
 
(-0.09)     (0.75) 
Num_Ind 0.024  -0.099*** 
 
(0.67)  (-2.67)    
Num_Ana 0.021  0.031 
 
(0.86)  (1.49) 
Year_F.E Yes             Yes 
Observations 3778         3832 
Adjusted R2             10.1%             8.1% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results of regressing forecast 
accuracy on EMPLOYER, for the period 1999-2006. Accuracy is the absolute value of 
forecast bias (Rel_DFB). First forecast is the initial forecast analyst i issued for firm j in 
year t and last forecast is the last forecast revision analyst i issued for firm j in year t. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by analyst. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. *,**,and***represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are as reported in the Appendix I. 
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Table 1.8 
Brokerage House Status and Job Movement 
Panel A: Percentage of analysts who in different status brokerage houses 
each year 
The table presents the percentage of all analysts in I/B/E/S who are categorized as 
working for high-status, median-status and low-status brokerage houses.  
Brokerage House 
Status 
High-status 
Brokerage House 
Median-status 
Brokerage House 
Low-status 
Brokerage House 
Year Analyst% Analyst% Analyst% 
1999 27.33% 48.17% 24.49% 
2000 26.44% 51.57% 21.99% 
2001 30.62% 45.26% 24.13% 
2002 33.12% 43.88% 23.01% 
2003 33.31% 45.12% 21.57% 
2004 35.02% 43.28% 21.70% 
2005 33.95% 45.15% 20.90% 
2006 32.51% 47.58% 19.91% 
Overall(1998-
2006) 31.53% 46.25% 22.21% 
 
 
Panel B: Summary statistics of analyst job movement 
This table presents the averaged percentage of all analyst and analysts who forecast 
potential employers in the I/B/E/S database who move between brokerage houses 
each year during 1999-2006 and the percentage who experience various types of job 
separations in a year averaged over year 1999-2006. 
  All Analysts   
Analysts 
forecasting 
Employers 
% of Analysts Who Change Houses each Year:  6.05% 
 
6.93% 
 
  
Averaged % of Analysts move up each year 49.39% 
 
51.35% 
Averaged % of Analysts move down each year 30.17% 
 
29.73% 
Averaged % of Analysts stay high each year 11.32% 
 
12.61% 
Averaged % of Analysts stay low each year 9.14% 
 
4.50% 
    % of Analysts move from High-Status House 16.32% 
 
16.41% 
% of Analysts move from Low-Status House 24.61% 
 
15.90% 
% of Analysts move from Mid-Status House 59.07%   67.69% 
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Panel C: The effect of relative forecast bias on job separations of bank 
analysts and non-bank analysts 
Move_statust+1 = 1 BIASijt + 2EMPLOYER + 3 BIASijt * EMPLOYER + 4Gen_Expijt + 
5Num_Coijt + 6Accuracy +7Status F.E. + 8Year F.E + ijt  
Dependent Variable= 
Move_status Relative Forecast Bias 
Variable  First Forecast Last Forecast 
  
Coefficient Odds 
Ratio or 
Ratios of 
odds 
ratios 
Coefficient Odds Ratio or 
Ratios of odds 
ratios 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rel_BIAS  0.000    1.000    -0.000    1.000    
 
 (0.26)       (-0.29)     
EMPLOYER  0.915    2.496    1.366**  3.921*   
 
 (1.45)     (2.20)     
Rel_BIAS*EMPLOYER  -0.003    0.997    -0.339**  0.712*   
 
 (-0.05)     (-2.30)     
Gen_Exp  -0.029    0.971    -0.043**  0.957*   
 
 (-1.37)     (-1.97)     
Num_Co  0.040**  1.041*   0.033*   1.033    
 
 (2.35)        (1.87)     
Accuracy  -0.024    0.976    -0.127    0.881    
  (-0.09)     (-0.49)     
Status F.E.  Yes  Yes  
Year F.E.  Yes  Yes  
N  568  512  
Pesudo-R2  28.40%  27.60%  
This table present estimations from the ordinal logit regression to examine if past forecast 
optimism from bank and non-bank analysts have different effect on the likelihood of analyst 
moves to a higher or lower status brokerage house during 1999 to 2006. The sample contains 
only those analysts from medium or low status houses. The dependent variable move-status 
equals the value 1 if the analyst in time t moves up one hierarchy of brokerage house status 
and the value of 2 if the move up represents a move of two hierarches. If the analyst moves 
side-ways then it takes the value of zero. If, however, the analysts moves down one hierarchy 
then it takes the value of -1. Similar with Hong and Kubik (2003), I measure the forecast bias for 
each firm the analyst forecasts in year t minus the average bias of analysts from the high-status 
house who follow the firms, which I then average across the stocks that the analysts covers 
which provides me with a bias measure for analysts i in year t. The Rel_BIAS variable is the 
average of this relative forecast bias in year t and the two previous years. Analysts who have 
less than three prior years of experience are therefore excluded. Accuracy is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if the analyst is ranked in the top 10% in terms of their average 3 year 
forecast accuracy and zero otherwise. All other variables are as defined in the Appendix I. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm and analyst pair. *, **, and *** 
represent significance level of 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively (two-tailed).  
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Panel D: The effect of absolute forecast bias on job separations of bank 
analysts and non-bank analysts 
  
Dependent Variable= 
Move_status  Absolute Forecast Bias 
Variable     First Forecast   Last Forecast 
  
Coefficient Odds 
Ratio or 
Ratios of 
odds 
ratios 
Coefficient Odds Ratio or 
Ratios of odds 
ratios 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Abs_BIAS  -0.094    0.911    0.038    1.039    
 
 (-1.13)     (0.15)     
EMPLOYER  0.810    2.248    1.345**  3.839*   
 
 (1.24)     (2.32)     
Abs_BIAS*EMPLOYER  0.138    1.148    -2.532*   0.0795*   
 
 (0.31)      (-1.89)     
Gen_Exp  -0.028    0.972    -0.045**  0.956*   
 
 (-1.33)       (-2.02)     
Num_Co  0.040**  1.040*   0.034*   1.034    
 
 (2.35)     (1.95)     
Accuracy  0.112    1.118    0.055    1.057    
  (0.49)     (0.26)     
Status F.E.  YES  YES  
Year F.E.  YES  YES  
N  568  516  
Pesudo-R2  28.2%  27.4%  
This table present estimations from the ordinal logit regression to examine if past forecast 
optimism from bank and non-bank analysts have different effect on the likelihood of analyst 
moves to a higher or lower status brokerage house during 1999 to 2006. The sample contains 
only those analysts from medium or low status houses. The dependent variable move-status 
equals the value 1 if the analyst in time t moves up one hierarchy of brokerage house status 
and the value of 2 if the move up represents a move of two hierarches. If the analyst moves 
side-ways then it takes the value of zero. If, however, the analysts moves down one hierarchy 
then it takes the value of -1. Similar with Hong and Kubik (2003), I measure the forecast bias for 
each firm the analyst forecasts in year t, which I then average across the stocks that the 
analysts covers which provides me with a bias measure for analysts i in year t. The Abs_BIAS 
variable is the average this forecast bias in year t and the two previous years. Analysts who 
have less than three prior years of experience are therefore excluded. Accuracy is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if the analyst is ranked in the top 10% in terms of their average 3 
year forecast accuracy and zero otherwise. All other variables are as defined in the Appendix I. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm and analyst pair. *, **, and *** 
represent significance level of 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Appendix II: Variable Definitions 
Name  Description 
CARijt = Cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return over the five- day 
window centred on the forecast report date (-2 day to +2 day). 
absoluteCARijt = Absolute value of CARijt. 
PTPB = Analyst i provides pessimistic sentiment in the textual discussion 
and pessimistic earnings forecasts for firm j in year t. 
OTPB = Analyst i provides optimistic sentiment in the textual discussion 
but pessimistic earnings forecasts for firm j in year t. 
OTOB = Analyst i provides optimistic sentiment in the textual discussion 
and optimistic earnings forecasts for firm j in year t. 
PTOB = Analyst i provides pessimistic sentiment in the textual discussion 
and optimistic earnings forecasts for firm j in year t. 
accuracyijt  The maximum absolute forecast errors for analysts following firm 
j in year t minus the absolute forecast errors for analyst i following 
firm j in year t, scaled by the difference between the maximum 
and minimum absolute forecast errors for analysts following firm j 
in year t. 
car_priorjt = Cumulative market adjusted (value weighted) ten-day abnormal 
returns ending three days before the current report date. 
ef_revijt = Earnings forecast of current report minus the last earnings 
forecast issued by the same analyst for firm j in year t. 
logmarkvjt = Natural log of the firm j’s market value at the end of year t . 
logBTMjt = Natural log of the ratio of book value of equity to market value of 
firm j at the end of year t. 
std_consensusjt = Standard deviation of firm j’s prior 5 years earning in year t. 
logFollowjt = Analysts following, measured as the natural log of analysts 
following firm j in year t. 
Gen_Expijt = The measure of analyst i's general experience, calculated as the 
number of years of experience for analyst i following firm j in year 
t. When scaling we minus the average number of years of 
experience for analysts from top brokerage houses following firm 
j in year t, with this difference scaled by the range of years of 
experience for analysts from top brokerage houses following firm 
j in year t. 
Firm_Expijt = The measure of analyst i’s firm-specific experience, calculated as 
the number of years of firm-specific experience for analyst i 
following firm j in year t.  When scaling we minus the average 
number of years of firm-specific experience for analysts from top 
brokerage houses following firm j in year i, with this difference 
scaled by the average years of firm-specific experience for 
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analysts from top brokerage houses following firm j in year t. 
Num_Anaijt = The measure of the analyst’s brokerage size, calculated as the 
number of analysts employed by the brokerage house employing 
analyst i following firm j in year t. When scaling we minus the 
average number of analysts employed by brokerage houses for 
analysts following firm j in year t, with this difference scaled by 
the average brokerage house size for analysts following firm j in 
year t. 
dayElapijt = The measure of the days elapsed since the last forecast by an 
analyst following firm j in year t. When scaling we calculate it as 
the days between analysts i’s forecast of firm j’s earnings in year t 
and the most recent preceding forecast of firm j’s earnings by  
analysts from top brokerage houses, minus the average number 
of days between two adjacent forecasts of firm j’s earnings by 
any two analysts in year t, with this difference scaled by the 
average days between two adjacent forecasts of firm j’s earnings 
in year t. 
Num_Indijt = The measure of number of industries analyst i follows in year t, 
calculated as the number of two-digit SICs followed by analyst i 
following firm j in year t. When scaling we minus the average 
number of two-digit SICs followed by analysts from top brokerage 
houses who follow firm j in year t, with this difference scaled by 
the average number of two-digit SICs followed by analysts from 
top brokerage houses following firm j in year t. 
Num_Coijt = The measure of the number of companies analyst i follows in 
year t, calculated as the number of companies followed by 
analyst i following firm j in year t. When scaling we minus the 
average number of companies followed by analysts from top 
brokerage houses who follow firm j in year t, with this difference 
scaled by the average number of companies followed by analysts  
from top brokerage houses following firm j in year t. 
fhijt  
= 
The measure of the time from the forecast date to the end of the 
fiscal period, calculated as the forecast horizon (days from the 
forecast date to the fiscal year-end) for analyst i following firm j in 
year t. When scaling we minus the average forecast horizon for 
analysts from top brokerage houses who follow firm j in year t, 
with this difference scaled by the average forecast horizons for 
analysts from top brokerage houses following firm j in year t. 
frijt =  The measure of analyst i’s forecast frequency for firm j, 
calculated as the number of firm j forecasts made by analyst i 
following firm j in year t. When scaling we minus the average 
number of firm j forecasts for analysts from top brokerage houses 
following firm j in year t, with this difference scaled by the average 
number of firm j forecasts issued by analysts from top brokerage 
houses following firm j in year t. 
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Table 2.1 
Sample Selection 
  Dropped No. Obs. Total No. Obs. 
Total number of analyst reports analysed 
 
118,527 
Less 
  Number of analyst following <3 50 118,477 
Stock price <3 644 117,833 
Equity value<=0 2,643 115,190 
Different analysts forecasting the same firm on the same date 
or cumulative abnormal return around analyst report date 
missing 22 115,168 
Missing values from control variables, especially earnings 
forecast revisions because first reports have no earnings 
forecast revisions. 31,386 83,782 
Financial crisis period 2007-2011 63,048 20,734 
This table describes the sample selection process for the sample used in Chapter 3. 118,527 
analyst reports are collected from Investext. After data cleaning and data selection, 20,734 
analyst reports are used in the tests. 
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Table 2.2 
 Descriptive statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for all variables from 1999-2014. CARijt is cumulative 
market adjusted (value weighted) abnormal return two days before and two days after analyst 
report issue date. absoluteCARijt is the absolute value of CARijt. PTPB denotes reports with 
pessimistic sentiment and pessimistic earnings forecast bias. OTPB denotes reports with 
optimistic sentiment but pessimistic earnings forecast bias. OTOB denotes reports with optimistic 
sentiment and optimistic earnings forecast bias. PTOB denotes reports with pessimistic 
sentiment but optimistic earnings forecast bias. car_priorijt is cumulative market adjusted (value 
weighted) ten-day abnormal returns ending three days before the current report date. ef_revijt is 
the current report’s earnings forecast minus the last earnings forecast issued by analyst i in year 
t. All other variable definitions are as reported in the Appendix II. Panel A reports the descriptive 
statistics and Panel B reports correlations matrix. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (n=20734) 
Variable  Mean S.D. 25th Percentile Median 75th Percentile 
CARijt  0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.00 0.03 
absoluteCARijt  0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.05 
PTPB  0.36 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 
OTPB  0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 
OTOB  0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PTOB  0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 
car_priorijt  -0.00 0.06 -0.03 0.00 0.03 
ef_revijt  -0.01 0.18 -0.03 0.00 0.03 
logmarkvjt  9.43 1.21 8.60 9.36 10.18 
logBTMjt  -1.04 0.77 -1.48 -0.99 -0.54 
std_consensusjt  0.08 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.12 
logFollowjt  3.13 0.47 2.89 3.18 3.47 
Gen_Expijt  9.69 6.11 5.00 9.00 13.00 
Firm_Expijt  5.82 4.84 2.00 4.00 8.00 
Num_Anaijt  86.94 52.91 43.00 88.00 125.00 
dayElapijt  3.32 3.75 0.00 1.00 6.00 
Num_Indijt  3.26 2.09 2.00 3.00 4.00 
Num_Coijt  17.69 7.97 13.00 16.00 21.00 
fhijt  167.19 87.11 98.00 174.00 234.00 
frijt  6.72 3.59 4.00 6.00 8.00 
accuracyijt  0.65 0.33 0.40 0.74 0.94 
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Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
 
CAR PP OP OO PO accuracy car_prior ef_rev logmarkv logBTM std logFollow Gen_Exp Firm_Exp Num_Ana dayElap Num_Ind Num_Co fh 
PP -0.067 
                  
 
(0.000) 
                  OP 0.030 -0.418 
                 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
                 OO 0.047 -0.359 -0.269 
                
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
                PO 0.002 -0.392 -0.293 -0.252 
               
 
(0.818) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
               accuracy 0.006 -0.054 -0.038 0.025 0.078 
              
 
(0.432) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
              car_prior -0.010 -0.055 0.021 0.039 0.005 -0.004 
             
 
(0.147) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.451) (0.548) 
             ef_rev 0.107 -0.077 -0.034 0.072 0.057 -0.008 0.067 
            
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.283) (0.000) 
            logmarkv 0.010 -0.060 -0.008 0.042 0.039 -0.012 0.024 0.036 
           
 
(0.152) (0.000) (0.226) (0.000) (0.000) (0.074) (0.001) (0.000) 
           logBTM -0.060 0.016 0.040 -0.011 -0.050 0.004 -0.063 -0.061 -0.220 
          
 
(0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.121) (0.000) (0.553) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          std -0.012 -0.025 0.053 0.001 -0.026 0.010 -0.012 0.003 0.057 0.365 
         
 
(0.077) (0.000) (0.000) (0.935) (0.000) (0.163) (0.075) (0.677) (0.000) (0.000) 
         logFollow -0.022 -0.053 0.017 0.039 0.008 -0.004 -0.025 -0.001 0.496 -0.036 0.197 
        
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.279) (0.604) (0.000) (0.943) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
        Gen_Exp -0.002 -0.005 0.010 0.016 -0.019 0.015 0.003 -0.001 0.067 0.045 0.104 0.030 
       
 
(0.798) (0.442) (0.169) (0.019) (0.006) (0.033) (0.698) (0.913) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
       Firm_Exp -0.009 -0.011 0.016 0.012 -0.015 0.011 -0.004 -0.013 0.099 0.061 0.107 0.064 0.675 
      
 
(0.181) (0.118) (0.021) (0.082) (0.027) (0.125) (0.601) (0.059) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      Num_Ana 0.006 0.056 -0.027 -0.042 0.002 0.010 -0.005 -0.017 -0.073 0.026 -0.050 -0.133 -0.071 -0.020 
     
 
(0.366) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.764) (0.166) (0.449) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) 
     dayElap 0.014 -0.005 0.006 0.002 -0.003 -0.032 0.035 0.007 -0.064 -0.039 -0.127 -0.178 0.073 0.037 0.040 
    
 
(0.045) (0.513) (0.402) (0.766) (0.698) (0.000) (0.000) (0.289) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
    Num_Ind -0.006 0.013 -0.003 -0.002 -0.009 0.007 -0.009 -0.003 -0.098 -0.081 -0.115 -0.155 0.131 0.072 -0.042 0.032 
   
 
(0.361) (0.072) (0.641) (0.767) (0.182) (0.339) (0.212) (0.654) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
   Num_Co -0.007 -0.010 0.021 0.001 -0.011 0.004 -0.004 0.006 -0.013 0.079 0.121 0.001 0.258 0.182 0.034 -0.007 0.377 
  
 
(0.314) (0.169) (0.003) (0.944) (0.111) (0.588) (0.554) (0.429) (0.065) (0.000) (0.000) (0.873) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.335) (0.000) 
  fh 0.024 0.011 0.037 0.007 -0.059 -0.443 0.002 0.010 -0.010 0.017 0.017 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.049 0.006 0.016 
 
 
(0.001) (0.112) (0.000) (0.299) (0.000) (0.000) (0.731) (0.144) (0.147) (0.013) (0.014) (0.711) (0.703) (0.779) (0.671) (0.000) (0.414) (0.019) 
 fr -0.011 -0.056 0.050 0.033 -0.018 -0.045 -0.005 0.000 0.067 0.172 0.367 0.252 0.066 0.086 -0.016 -0.070 -0.098 0.057 0.083 
 
(0.124) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.433) (0.969) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.000) (0.000 (0.000) (0.000) 
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Table 2.3 
Panel A: Market reaction to earnings forecast bias and textual discussions 
      (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
  AbsoluteCAR   CAR   CAR     CAR    CAR    CAR 
constant 0.124*** 
 
-0.001    
 
-0.003    
 
0.002    
 
-0.007    
 
0.003    
 
(22.86)    
 
(-0.19)    
 
(-0.31)    
 
(0.28)    
 
(-0.84)    
 
(0.42)    
mix -0.001**  
 
0.002*** 
        
 
(-1.99)    
 
(4.18)    
        OTPB 
    
0.005*** 
   
0.009*** 
 
-0.001    
     
(3.98)    
   
(8.00)    
 
(-0.99)    
PTOB 
      
-0.005*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
-0.006*** 
       
(-3.98)    
 
(3.82)    
 
(-5.06)    
PTPB 
    
-0.004*** 
 
-0.009*** 
   
-0.010*** 
     
(-3.82)    
 
(-8.00)    
   
(-8.94)    
OTOB 
    
0.006*** 
 
0.001    
 
0.010*** 
  
     
(5.06)    
 
(0.99)    
 
(8.94)    
  accuracy 0.001**  
 
0.001*** 
 
0.002**  
 
0.002**  
 
0.002**  
 
0.002**  
 
(2.02)    
 
(2.70)    
 
(2.18)    
 
(2.18)    
 
(2.18)    
 
(2.18)    
CAR_prior -0.033*** 
 
-0.012    
 
-0.026**  
 
-0.026**  
 
-0.026**  
 
-0.026**  
 
(-4.19)    
 
(-1.47)    
 
(-2.39)    
 
(-2.39)    
 
(-2.39)    
 
(-2.39)    
ef_rev -0.001    
 
0.001**  
 
0.034*** 
 
0.034*** 
 
0.034*** 
 
0.034*** 
 
(-1.27)    
 
(2.35)    
 
(7.97)    
 
(7.97)    
 
(7.97)    
 
(7.97)    
logmarkv -0.008*** 
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
(-18.50)    
 
(0.54)    
 
(0.98)    
 
(0.98)    
 
(0.98)    
 
(0.98)    
logBTM -0.001    
 
-0.005*** 
 
-0.005*** 
 
-0.005*** 
 
-0.005*** 
 
-0.005*** 
 
(-1.39)    
 
(-7.51)    
 
(-6.87)    
 
(-6.87)    
 
(-6.87)    
 
(-6.87)    
std_consensus 0.041*** 
 
-0.001    
 
0.002    
 
0.002    
 
0.002    
 
0.002    
 
(7.29)    
 
(-0.22)    
 
(0.22)    
 
(0.22)    
 
(0.22)    
 
(0.22)    
logFollow 0.004*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
(4.37)    
 
(-3.76)    
 
(-3.22)    
 
(-3.22)    
 
(-3.22)    
 
(-3.22)    
Gen_Exp 0.000    
 
0.000*   
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
(0.58)    
 
(1.71)    
 
(0.99)    
 
(0.99)    
 
(0.99)    
 
(0.99)    
Firm_Exp -0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
(-1.45)    
 
(-1.56)    
 
(-1.23)    
 
(-1.23)    
 
(-1.23)    
 
(-1.23)    
Num_Ana 0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
(1.34)    
 
(0.56)    
 
(0.87)    
 
(0.87)    
 
(0.87)    
 
(0.87)    
dayElap -0.001*** 
 
0.000    
 
0.000*   
 
0.000*   
 
0.000*   
 
0.000*   
 
(-16.16)    
 
(1.11)    
 
(1.74)    
 
(1.74)    
 
(1.74)    
 
(1.74)    
Num_Ind 0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
(1.46)    
 
(-0.61)    
 
(-0.78)    
 
(-0.78)    
 
(-0.78)    
 
(-0.78)    
Num_Co -0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
(-1.54)    
 
(-0.27)    
 
(-0.30)    
 
(-0.30)    
 
(-0.30)    
 
(-0.30)    
fh 0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 
 
(3.29)    
 
(4.99)    
 
(4.24)    
 
(4.24)    
 
(4.24)    
 
(4.24)    
fr -0.000*** 
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
  (-3.32)      (-0.88)     (-0.83)     (-0.83)     (-0.83)     (-0.83)    
Year F.E Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry F.E Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
N 20734 
 
20734 
 
20734  
 
20734    
 
20734    
 
20734    
Adjusted R2 14.90%    0.80%    2.20%     2.20%     2.20%     2.20% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results of the market reaction to different types of analyst 
reports for the years 1999-2014, excluding financial crisis in 2007-2009. Columns 1 and 2 use mix dummy as an 
independent variable, which equals to 1 if PTOB or OTPB reports; and equal to 0 if OTPB and PTPB reports. Columns 3, 
4, 5 and 6 use PTOB, OTPB, PTPB and OTOB as benchmark respectively. CARijt is cumulative market adjusted (value 
weighted) abnormal return two days before and two days after analyst report issue date. AbsoluteCAR is the absolute 
value of CAR. Column 1 use AbsoluteCAR as independent variable and all other columns use CARijt as independent 
variable. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm and analyst. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable 
definitions are as reported in the Appendix II.  
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Panel B: Positive and Negative market reactions to earnings forecast bias and textual discussions 
  Benchmark: PTOB   Benchmark: OTPB   Benchmark: PTPB   Benchmark: OTOB 
 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
 
pos_CAR 
 
neg_CAR 
 
pos_CAR 
 
neg_CAR 
 
pos_CAR 
 
neg_CAR 
 
pos_CAR 
 
neg_CAR 
constant 0.075*** 
 
-0.075*** 
 
0.077*** 
 
-0.075*** 
 
0.075*** 
 
-0.077*** 
 
0.077*** 
 
-0.074*** 
 
(16.60)    
 
(-16.70)    
 
(17.10)    
 
(-16.74)    
 
(16.63)    
 
(-17.30)    
 
(17.05)    
 
(-16.50)    
OTPB 0.002*** 
 
0.000    
     
0.002*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
-0.000    
 
-0.001    
 
(3.05)    
 
(0.29)    
     
(3.81)    
 
(4.28)    
 
(-0.29)    
 
(-0.91)    
PTOB 
    
-0.002*** 
 
-0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.002*** 
 
-0.002*** 
 
-0.001    
     
(-3.05)    
 
(-0.29)    
 
(0.44)    
 
(3.81)    
 
(-3.30)    
 
(-1.16)    
PTPB -0.000    
 
-0.002*** 
 
-0.002*** 
 
-0.002*** 
     
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
(-0.44)    
 
(-3.81)    
 
(-3.81)    
 
(-4.28)    
     
(-4.06)    
 
(-4.84)    
OTOB 0.002*** 
 
0.001    
 
0.000    
 
0.001    
 
0.003*** 
 
0.003*** 
    
 
(3.30)    
 
(1.16)    
 
(0.29)    
 
(0.91)    
 
(4.06)    
 
(4.84)    
    accuracy 0.001**  
 
-0.000    
 
0.001**  
 
-0.000    
 
0.001**  
 
-0.000    
 
0.001**  
 
-0.000    
 
(2.21)    
 
(-0.58)    
 
(2.21)    
 
(-0.58)    
 
(2.21)    
 
(-0.58)    
 
(2.21)    
 
(-0.58)    
CAR_prior -0.029*** 
 
-0.001    
 
-0.029*** 
 
-0.001    
 
-0.029*** 
 
-0.001    
 
-0.029*** 
 
-0.001    
 
(-4.78)    
 
(-0.11)    
 
(-4.78)    
 
(-0.11)    
 
(-4.78)    
 
(-0.11)    
 
(-4.78)    
 
(-0.11)    
ef_rev 0.003**  
 
0.007*** 
 
0.003**  
 
0.007*** 
 
0.003**  
 
0.007*** 
 
0.003**  
 
0.007*** 
 
(2.24)    
 
(4.75)    
 
(2.24)    
 
(4.75)    
 
(2.24)    
 
(4.75)    
 
(2.24)    
 
(4.75)    
logmarkv -0.004*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
(-12.50)    
 
(13.87)    
 
(-12.50)    
 
(13.87)    
 
(-12.50)    
 
(13.87)    
 
(-12.50)    
 
(13.87)    
logBTM -0.002*** 
 
-0.000    
 
-0.002*** 
 
-0.000    
 
-0.002*** 
 
-0.000    
 
-0.002*** 
 
-0.000    
 
(-3.86)    
 
(-0.03)    
 
(-3.86)    
 
(-0.03)    
 
(-3.86)    
 
(-0.03)    
 
(-3.86)    
 
(-0.03)    
std_consensus 0.018*** 
 
-0.027*** 
 
0.018*** 
 
-0.027*** 
 
0.018*** 
 
-0.027*** 
 
0.018*** 
 
-0.027*** 
 
(4.24)    
 
(-6.25)    
 
(4.24)    
 
(-6.25)    
 
(4.24)    
 
(-6.25)    
 
(4.24)    
 
(-6.25)    
logFollow 0.001    
 
-0.003*** 
 
0.001    
 
-0.003*** 
 
0.001    
 
-0.003*** 
 
0.001    
 
-0.003*** 
 
(1.10)    
 
(-4.35)    
 
(1.10)    
 
(-4.35)    
 
(1.10)    
 
(-4.35)    
 
(1.10)    
 
(-4.35)    
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Gen_Exp 0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
(1.04)    
 
(0.01)    
 
(1.04)    
 
(0.01)    
 
(1.04)    
 
(0.01)    
 
(1.04)    
 
(0.01)    
Firm_Exp -0.000*   
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000*   
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000*   
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000*   
 
-0.000    
 
(-1.71)    
 
(-0.17)    
 
(-1.71)    
 
(-0.17)    
 
(-1.71)    
 
(-0.17)    
 
(-1.71)    
 
(-0.17)    
Num_Ana 0.000*   
 
0.000    
 
0.000*   
 
0.000    
 
0.000*   
 
0.000    
 
0.000*   
 
0.000    
 
(1.77)    
 
(0.08)    
 
(1.77)    
 
(0.08)    
 
(1.77)    
 
(0.08)    
 
(1.77)    
 
(0.08)    
dayElap -0.001*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
(-10.42)    
 
(13.42)    
 
(-10.42)    
 
(13.42)    
 
(-10.42)    
 
(13.42)    
 
(-10.42)    
 
(13.42)    
Num_Ind 0.000    
 
-0.000*   
 
0.000    
 
-0.000*   
 
0.000    
 
-0.000*   
 
0.000    
 
-0.000*   
 
(0.35)    
 
(-1.94)    
 
(0.35)    
 
(-1.94)    
 
(0.35)    
 
(-1.94)    
 
(0.35)    
 
(-1.94)    
Num_Co -0.000    
 
0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
0.000    
 
(-0.31)    
 
(1.14)    
 
(-0.31)    
 
(1.14)    
 
(-0.31)    
 
(1.14)    
 
(-0.31)    
 
(1.14)    
fh 0.000*** 
 
0.000    
 
0.000*** 
 
0.000    
 
0.000*** 
 
0.000    
 
0.000*** 
 
0.000    
 
(4.08)    
 
(0.30)    
 
(4.08)    
 
(0.30)    
 
(4.08)    
 
(0.30)    
 
(4.08)    
 
(0.30)    
fr -0.000*** 
 
0.000    
 
-0.000*** 
 
0.000    
 
-0.000*** 
 
0.000    
 
-0.000*** 
 
0.000    
  (-2.94)      (1.50)      (-2.94)      (1.50)      (-2.94)      (1.50)      (-2.94)      (1.50)    
Year F.E Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry F.E Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
N 10838 
 
9896 
 
10838 
 
9896 
 
10838 
 
9896 
 
10838 
 
9896 
Adjusted R2 13.10%   15.20%   13.10%   15.20%   13.10%   15.20%   13.10%   15.20% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results of the positive and negative market reaction to different types of analyst reports for the years 1999-
2014, excluding financial crisis in 2007-2009. Columns 1,3, 5 and 7 use non-negative CAR (pos_CAR) as dependent variables while columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 use 
negative CAR (neg_CAR) as dependent variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm and analyst. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are as reported in the Appendix II.
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Table 2.4 
 Panel A: Investor reaction to analyst reports with optimistic earnings forecast bias or 
optimistic sentiment  
  Same Sentiment   Same Bias 
 
OTOB vs. OTPB 
 
OTOB vs. PTOB 
  (1)         (2)      (3)        (4) 
 
CAR   AbsoluteCAR     CAR   AbsoluteCAR 
constant 0.028*** 
 
0.110*** 
 
0.007    
 
0.106*** 
 
(2.63)    
 
(13.56)    
 
(0.56)    
 
(13.11)    
OTOB 0.002    
 
-0.001    
 
0.007*** 
 
0.001    
 
(1.46)    
 
(-1.33)    
 
(5.63)    
 
(1.16)    
accuracy 0.003**  
 
0.002**  
 
0.005*** 
 
0.001    
 
(2.42)    
 
(2.15)    
 
(5.15)    
 
(0.95)    
CAR_prior -0.014    
 
-0.028**  
 
-0.043*** 
 
-0.055*** 
 
(-0.86)    
 
(-2.37)    
 
(-2.65)    
 
(-4.74)    
ef_rev 0.026*** 
 
-0.006    
 
0.043*** 
 
-0.004    
 
(4.37)    
 
(-1.37)    
 
(4.90)    
 
(-0.70)    
logmarkv -0.001    
 
-0.007*** 
 
0.001    
 
-0.006*** 
 
(-1.33)    
 
(-12.67)    
 
(1.18)    
 
(-11.52)    
logBTM -0.004*** 
 
-0.001    
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.001    
 
(-4.01)    
 
(-1.25)    
 
(-3.25)    
 
(-1.56)    
std_consensus 0.022**  
 
0.036*** 
 
-0.010    
 
0.022*** 
 
(1.99)    
 
(4.47)    
 
(-1.05)    
 
(3.00)    
logFollow -0.003*   
 
0.008*** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
0.006*** 
 
(-1.73)    
 
(5.32)    
 
(-3.51)    
 
(3.98)    
Gen_Exp 0.000**  
 
-0.000    
 
0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
(2.06)    
 
(-0.12)    
 
(0.71)    
 
(-0.23)    
Firm_Exp -0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
(-0.98)    
 
(-1.22)    
 
(-0.69)    
 
(-0.38)    
Num_Ana 0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
(1.33)    
 
(0.88)    
 
(1.07)    
 
(0.31)    
dayElap -0.000    
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.000    
 
-0.001*** 
 
(-1.35)    
 
(-10.76)    
 
(-0.58)    
 
(-11.06)    
Num_Ind -0.001    
 
0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
(-1.64)    
 
(1.43)    
 
(-0.26)    
 
(-0.13)    
Num_Co -0.000*   
 
-0.000*** 
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
(-1.89)    
 
(-2.71)    
 
(-0.61)    
 
(-0.52)    
fh 0.000**  
 
0.000*** 
 
-0.000    
 
0.000*** 
 
(2.42)    
 
(3.03)    
 
(-0.34)    
 
(2.70)    
fr -0.000*   
 
-0.000*** 
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000*** 
  (-1.75)     (-3.01)     (-0.81)     (-2.93)    
Year F.E Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry F.E Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
N 8843 
 
8843 
 
8386 
 
8386 
Adjusted R2 1.40% 
 
13.90% 
 
2.40% 
 
14.70% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results of regressing cumulative abnormal return on OTOB, 
OTPB and PTOB reports for the years 1999-2014, excluding financial crisis in 2007-2009. Columns 1 and 2 compare 
the market reaction to OTOB and OTPB reports while column 3 and 4 compare the market reaction to OTOB and PTOB 
reports. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm and analyst. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable 
definitions are as reported in the Appendix II. 
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Panel B: Positive and Negative market reactions to analyst reports with optimistic earnings 
forecast bias or optimistic sentiment 
  Same Sentiment   Same Bias 
 
OTOB vs. OTPB 
 
OTOB vs. PTOB 
 
(1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
 
pos_CAR 
 
neg_CAR 
 
pos_CAR 
 
neg_CAR 
constant 0.079*** 
 
-0.092*** 
 
0.113*** 
 
-0.096*** 
 
(11.48)    
 
(-8.25)    
 
(11.38)    
 
(-7.82)    
OTOB 0.000    
 
0.002    
 
0.003*** 
 
0.002    
 
(0.38)    
 
(1.38)    
 
(3.13)    
 
(1.39)    
accuracy 0.001**  
 
-0.000    
 
0.003*** 
 
0.002    
 
(2.13)    
 
(-0.29)    
 
(2.85)    
 
(1.42)    
CAR_prior -0.013**  
 
0.012    
 
-0.057*** 
 
0.053*** 
 
(-2.19)    
 
(0.75)    
 
(-4.05)    
 
(2.75)    
ef_rev 0.003    
 
0.022*** 
 
0.015**  
 
0.027*** 
 
(1.32)    
 
(3.07)    
 
(2.04)    
 
(3.26)    
logmarkv -0.004*** 
 
0.006*** 
 
-0.006*** 
 
0.007*** 
 
(-9.65)    
 
(8.03)    
 
(-8.80)    
 
(7.92)    
logBTM -0.001    
 
-0.001    
 
-0.001    
 
0.001    
 
(-1.36)    
 
(-0.49)    
 
(-0.87)    
 
(1.10)    
std_consensus 0.012**  
 
-0.031*** 
 
0.012    
 
-0.037*** 
 
(2.02)    
 
(-2.63)    
 
(1.23)    
 
(-3.45)    
logFollow 0.002*   
 
-0.010*** 
 
0.002    
 
-0.010*** 
 
(1.68)    
 
(-4.69)    
 
(1.28)    
 
(-4.41)    
Gen_Exp 0.000    
 
0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
(0.99)    
 
(0.67)    
 
(-0.32)    
 
(-0.07)    
Firm_Exp -0.000    
 
0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
0.000    
 
(-1.06)    
 
(0.42)    
 
(-0.38)    
 
(0.15)    
Num_Ana 0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
(1.38)    
 
(0.17)    
 
(0.83)    
 
(0.46)    
dayElap -0.001*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
(-7.97)    
 
(7.47)    
 
(-8.29)    
 
(7.11)    
Num_Ind 0.000    
 
-0.001*   
 
-0.000    
 
0.000    
 
(0.16)    
 
(-1.93)    
 
(-0.13)    
 
(0.08)    
Num_Co -0.000    
 
0.000**  
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
(-0.66)    
 
(2.04)    
 
(0.09)    
 
(0.56)    
fh 0.000*** 
 
-0.000    
 
0.000**  
 
-0.000    
 
(2.94)    
 
(-0.45)    
 
(2.09)    
 
(-1.35)    
fr -0.000*** 
 
0.000    
 
-0.000*   
 
0.000**  
 
(-2.69)    
 
(1.13)    
 
(-1.74)    
 
(2.49)    
Year F.E Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry F.E Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
N 4910    
 
3933 
 
4589 
 
3797   
Adjusted R2 12.40%   14.40%   15.60%   15.10% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results of regressing positive or negative abnormal return on 
OTOB, OTPB and PTOB reports for the years 1999-2014, excluding financial crisis in 2007-2009. Columns 1 and 3 use 
non-negative CAR (pos_CAR) as dependent variables while columns 2 and 4 use negative CAR (neg_CAR) as 
dependent variables. Columns 1 and 2 hold constant optimistic sentiment while columns 3 and 4 hold constant 
optimistic earnings forecast bias. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm and analyst. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively 
(two-tailed). All variable definitions are as reported in the Appendix II. 
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Table 2.5 
 Investor reaction to analyst reports with pessimistic earnings forecast bias or pessimistic 
sentiment  
  Same Sentiment   Same Bias 
  PTPB vs PTOB   PTPB vs OTPB 
     (1)      (2)      (3)      (4) 
 
   CAR 
 
AbsoluteCAR 
 
   CAR 
 
AbsoluteCAR 
constant -0.022**  
 
0.135*** 
 
-0.000    
 
0.137*** 
 
(-2.04)    
 
(17.14)    
 
(-0.04)    
 
(18.12)    
PTPB -0.004*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
-0.009*** 
 
0.001    
 
(-3.31)    
 
(2.74)    
 
(-7.74)    
 
(0.87)    
accuracy 0.001    
 
0.000    
 
-0.001    
 
0.001    
 
(1.04)    
 
(0.35)    
 
(-1.44)    
 
(1.15)    
CAR_prior -0.037**  
 
-0.035*** 
 
-0.022    
 
-0.021*   
 
(-2.47)    
 
(-3.10)    
 
(-1.53)    
 
(-1.92)    
ef_rev 0.039*** 
 
-0.009**  
 
0.030*** 
 
-0.008**  
 
(7.08)    
 
(-2.16)    
 
(6.49)    
 
(-2.33)    
logmarkv 0.002**  
 
-0.008*** 
 
0.000    
 
-0.008*** 
 
(2.22)    
 
(-14.99)    
 
(0.16)    
 
(-16.32)    
logBTM -0.006*** 
 
-0.000    
 
-0.006*** 
 
-0.000    
 
(-5.49)    
 
(-0.32)    
 
(-5.76)    
 
(-0.34)    
std_consensus -0.015    
 
0.041*** 
 
0.009    
 
0.047*** 
 
(-1.40)    
 
(5.36)    
 
(0.86)    
 
(6.06)    
logFollow -0.005*** 
 
0.005*** 
 
-0.003    
 
0.007*** 
 
(-2.76)    
 
(3.61)    
 
(-1.49)    
 
(4.76)    
Gen_Exp -0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
(-0.21)    
 
(0.84)    
 
(0.79)    
 
(0.85)    
Firm_Exp -0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
(-0.78)    
 
(-1.02)    
 
(-1.01)    
 
(-1.62)    
Num_Ana 0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
(0.09)    
 
(0.79)    
 
(0.45)    
 
(0.93)    
dayElap 0.000*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
0.000**  
 
-0.001*** 
 
(3.15)    
 
(-11.14)    
 
(2.40)    
 
(-11.37)    
Num_Ind 0.000    
 
0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
0.000    
 
(0.07)    
 
(0.09)    
 
(-0.85)    
 
(1.22)    
Num_Co 0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
0.000    
 
-0.000*   
 
(0.88)    
 
(-0.33)    
 
(0.04)    
 
(-1.70)    
fh 0.000*** 
 
0.000    
 
0.000*** 
 
0.000**  
 
(3.59)    
 
(1.61)    
 
(5.24)    
 
(2.44)    
fr 0.000    
 
-0.000*   
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000**  
  (0.45)     (-1.95)     (-0.07)     (-2.30)    
Year F.E Yes 
 
   Yes 
 
Yes 
 
   Yes 
Industry F.E Yes 
 
   Yes 
 
Yes 
 
   Yes 
N 11891 
 
  11891 
 
12348 
 
  12348 
Adjusted R2 2.50% 
 
 15.10% 
 
2.40% 
 
  14.40% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results of regressing cumulative abnormal return on PTPB, 
PTOB and OTPB reports for the years 1999-2014, excluding financial crisis in 2007-2009. Columns 1 and 2 compare 
the market reaction to PTPB and PTOB reports while columns 3 and 4 compare the market reaction to PTPB and OTPB 
reports. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm and analyst. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses.  *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively (two-tailed). All variable 
definitions are as reported in the Appendix II. 
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Panel B: Positive and Negative market reactions to analyst reports with pessimistic 
earnings forecast bias or pessimistic sentiment 
  Same Sentiment   Same Bias 
 
PTPB vs PTOB 
 
PTPB vs OTPB 
 
(1)   (2) 
 
(3)   (4) 
 
pos_CAR 
 
neg_CAR 
 
pos_CAR 
 
neg_CAR 
constant 0.070*** 
 
-0.082*** 
 
0.127*** 
 
-0.147*** 
 
(11.48)    
 
(-15.47)    
 
(14.18)    
 
(-12.44)    
PTPB -0.0003    
 
-0.002*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
(-0.52)    
 
(-3.67)    
 
(-2.89)    
 
(-3.73)    
accuracy 0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
0.000    
 
-0.001    
 
(0.96)    
 
(-0.35)    
 
(0.24)    
 
(-0.97)    
CAR_prior -0.016*** 
 
-0.001    
 
-0.038**  
 
0.004    
 
(-3.31)    
 
(-0.24)    
 
(-2.54)    
 
(0.25)    
ef_rev 0.004*   
 
0.006*** 
 
0.006    
 
0.020*** 
 
(1.79)    
 
(3.67)    
 
(1.43)    
 
(3.74)    
logmarkv -0.003*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
-0.008*** 
 
0.009*** 
 
(-9.66)    
 
(13.77)    
 
(-12.08)    (11.80)    
logBTM -0.002*** 
 
0.000    
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.002**  
 
(-3.32)    
 
(0.77)    
 
(-3.36)    
 
(-2.33)    
std_consensus 0.018*** 
 
-0.025*** 
 
0.051*** 
 
-0.043*** 
 
(3.27)    
 
(-4.84)    
 
(5.28)    
 
(-3.47)    
logFollow 0.001    
 
-0.003*** 
 
0.006*** 
 
-0.007*** 
 
(1.47)    
 
(-3.81)    
 
(3.50)    
 
(-3.34)    
Gen_Exp 0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
(0.66)    
 
(-0.96)    
 
(0.31)    
 
(-0.76)    
Firm_Exp -0.000    
 
0.000    
 
-0.000**  
 
0.000    
 
(-1.46)    
 
(0.35)    
 
(-2.03)    
 
(0.49)    
Num_Ana 0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
0.000    
 
(1.25)    
 
(0.13)    
 
(1.53)    
 
(0.17)    
dayElap -0.001*** 
 
0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
(-6.80)    
 
(10.92)    
 
(-6.83)    
 
(9.36)    
Num_Ind 0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
0.000    
 
-0.001    
 
(0.29)    
 
(-0.31)    
 
(0.35)    
 
(-1.44)    
Num_Co 0.000    
 
0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
0.000    
 
(0.19)    
 
(0.36)    
 
(-0.87)    
 
(1.36)    
fh 0.000*** 
 
0.000    
 
0.000*** 
 
0.000    
 
(2.68)    
 
(0.40)    
 
(3.70)    
 
(0.57)    
fr -0.000*   
 
0.000    
 
-0.000**  
 
0.000    
 
(-1.68)     (1.49)     (-2.33)     (1.13)    
Year F.E Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry F.E Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
N 5928 
 
5963 
 
6249 
 
6099 
Adjusted R2 14.00% 
 
15.90% 
 
14.50% 
 
15.80% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results of regressing positive or negative abnormal return on 
PTPB, PTOB and OTPB reports for the years 1999-2014, excluding financial crisis in 2007-2009. Columns 1 and 3 use 
non-negative CAR (pos_CAR) as dependent variables while columns 2 and 4 use negative CAR (neg_CAR) as 
dependent variables. Columns 1 and 2 hold constant pessimistic sentiment while columns 3 and 4 hold constant 
pessimitic earnings forecast bias. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm and analyst. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively 
(two-tailed). All variable definitions are as reported in the Appendix II. 
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Table 2.6 
Forecast accuracy and four combinations of reports 
Accuracy (1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
constant 0.568*** 
 
0.577*** 
 
0.583*** 
 
0.588*** 
 
(10.63)    
 
(10.80)    
 
(10.91)    
 
(11.02)    
OP 0.009    
   
-0.006    
 
-0.011*   
 
(1.45)    
   
(-1.09)    
 
(-1.68)    
PO 0.020*** 
 
0.011*   
 
0.005    
 
 
 
(3.08)    
 
(1.68)    
 
(0.71)    
 
 
PP 0.016**  
 
0.006    
   
-0.005    
 
(2.40)    
 
(1.09)    
   
(-0.71)    
OO 
  
-0.009    
 
-0.016**  
 
-0.020*** 
   
(-1.45)    
 
(-2.40)    
 
(-3.08)    
roa -0.011    
 
-0.011    
 
-0.011    
 
-0.011    
 
(-0.25)    
 
(-0.25)    
 
(-0.25)    
 
(-0.25)    
logmarkv 0.007*** 
 
0.007*** 
 
0.007*** 
 
0.007*** 
 
(2.70)    
 
(2.70)    
 
(2.70)    
 
(2.70)    
logBTM -0.009**  
 
-0.009**  
 
-0.009**  
 
-0.009**  
 
(-2.04)    
 
(-2.04)    
 
(-2.04)    
 
(-2.04)    
loss -0.019*   
 
-0.019*   
 
-0.019*   
 
-0.019*   
 
(-1.67)    
 
(-1.67)    
 
(-1.67)    
 
(-1.67)    
std_consensus 0.078    
 
0.078    
 
0.078    
 
0.078    
 
(1.64)    
 
(1.64)    
 
(1.64)    
 
(1.64)    
logFollow 0.012    
 
0.012    
 
0.012    
 
0.012    
 
(1.64)    
 
(1.64)    
 
(1.64)    
 
(1.64)    
Gen_Exp -0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
(-0.02)    
 
(-0.02)    
 
(-0.02)    
 
(-0.02)    
Firm_Exp -0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
(-0.34)    
 
(-0.34)    
 
(-0.34)    
 
(-0.34)    
Num_Ana -0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
(-1.50)    
 
(-1.50)    
 
(-1.50)    
 
(-1.50)    
dayElap -0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
(-5.13)    
 
(-5.13)    
 
(-5.13)    
 
(-5.13)    
Num_Ind -0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
(-0.31)    
 
(-0.31)    
 
(-0.31)    
 
(-0.31)    
Num_Co -0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
-0.000    
 
(-0.12)    
 
(-0.12)    
 
(-0.12)    
 
(-0.12)    
fh -0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** 
 
(-58.56)    
 
(-58.56)    
 
(-58.56)    
 
(-58.56)    
fr -0.002**  
 
-0.002**  
 
-0.002**  
 
-0.002**  
  (-2.48)     (-2.48)     (-2.48)     (-2.48)    
Year F.E Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry F.E Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
N 16082 
 
16082 
 
16082 
 
16082 
Adjusted R2 21.30% 
 
21.30% 
 
21.30% 
 
21.30% 
This table reports the ordinary least squares estimation results of the above regressions for the years 1999-2014, 
excluding financial crisis in 2007-2009. Columns 1, 2,3 and 4 use OTOB, OTPB, PTPB and PTOB as benchmark 
respectively. accuracyijt is analyst forecast accuracy. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm 
and analyst. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively (two-tailed). All variable definitions are as reported in the Appendix II. 
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Table 3.1 
This table provides pooled descriptive statistics for the sample of all firm-quarters over the time period 1994 to 2014. Tone, Fog and 
Uncertain are the optimism tone, readability and proportion of uncertain words in 10-Qs. High fog index means low readability. 
investor_sent is firm-specific investor sentiment when managers prepare 10-Q filings, 50 to 57 calendar days before firm’s filing 
date. roa is return on assets by firm i in quarter t. sue is standardized earnings surprise by firm i in quarter t. accruals is the 
earnings of firm i in quarter t subtract cash flow from operations, scaled by the book value of assets. earn is earnings of quarter t 
scaled by the book value of assets. sd_earn is the standard deviation of earnings scaled by book value of assets calculated using 
data from the last four quarters. ret is the contemporaneous stock returns by firm i in quarter t. sd_ret is the stock return volatility 
calculated using 12 months of monthly return data before the fiscal quarter ending date. logestimates is natural logarithm of number 
of analysts following firm i in quarter t. btm is the book value of total assets divided by the market value of equity plus the book 
value of total liabilities. tover is natural logarithm of the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares outstanding on 
the filing date. logmarkv is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of equity at the end of the quarter before the 10-Q filing 
date as a proxy for company size. logGeo is the logarithm of 1 plus the number of geographic segment. logBiz is the logarithm of 1 
plus the number of business segment. MA is a dummy variable that equal to 1 if a company has M&A this quarter and 0 otherwise. 
si is special item. age is the number of years since a firm appears in CRSP. leverage is expressed in percent as the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets. ΔTone, ΔFog, ΔUncertain, Δinvestor_sent and Δinvestor_sent2 represent change in optimistic tone, 
readability, uncertain in 10-Qs and change in firm-specific investor sentiment 50 and 40 days before filing dates. They are 
subtracted from each signal the mean signal in 10-Qs made within the preceding four quarters and divide by the standard deviation 
of the signal in the past 10-Q filings made within the preceding four quarters. Δinvestor_sent is the difference between 
investor_sent at quarter t and investor_sent at quarter t-1. Δinvestor_sent2 is the difference between investor_sent2 at quarter t 
and investor_sent2 at quarter t-1, where investor_sent2 is firm-specific investor sentiment 40 to 47 calendar days before firm’s filing 
date, when managers prepare 10-Q filings. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics and Panel B reports correlations matrix. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description N Mean S.D. 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Tone Tone of 10-Qs 13791 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
Fog Fog Index of 10Qs 13791 19.37 1.71 18.46 19.43 20.30 
Uncertain 
Propotion of uncertain words in 
10Qs 
13791 1.34 0.50 1.02 1.31 1.65 
investor_sent investor sentiment 13791 -0.17 0.12 -0.25 -0.20 -0.11 
roa Return on asset  0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 
sue Unexpected earnings 13791 -0.13 0.18 -0.23 0.00 0.00 
accruals Accruals 13791 -0.02 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 
earn Current performance 13791 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 
sd_earn Volatility of current performace 13791 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 
ret Return 13791 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
sd_ret Volatility of return 13791 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.12 
lnestimates 
Natural log of number of 
analysts follow 
13791 3.62 0.70 3.22 3.74 4.13 
btm Book-to-Market 13791 0.40 0.27 0.22 0.34 0.52 
tover turn over ratio 13791 13.09 0.74 12.59 13.09 13.59 
logmarkv 
Natural log of market value of 
equity 
13791 8.84 1.29 8.00 8.78 9.66 
logGeo 
Natural log of number of 
geographic segments 
13791 1.37 0.47 1.10 1.39 1.61 
logBiz 
Natual log of number of 
buisness sections 
13791 1.25 0.50 0.69 1.39 1.61 
MA Dummy of M&A activitiy 13791 0.02 0.13 - - - 
si Special item 13791 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
age Firm age 13791 34.95 18.22 18.00 35.00 51.00 
leverage Leverage 13791 0.24 0.12 0.15 0.22 0.30 
ΔTone 
Change of 10-Qs optimistic 
tone 
7970 -0.08 1.76 -0.77 -0.07 0.72 
ΔFog Change of 10-Qs Fog index 7970 0.27 2.05 -0.69 -0.08 0.81 
ΔUncertain 
Change of 10-Qs uncertain 
tone 
7970 -0.16 1.29 -0.77 -0.18 0.46 
Δinvestor_sent 
Change of average investor 
sentiment 57 to 50 calendar 
days before filing date 
7970 0.00 0.17 -0.08 0.00 0.08 
Δinvestor_sent2 
Change of average investor 
sentiment 47 to 40 calendar 
days before filing date 
7970 0.00 0.19 -0.07 0.00 0.11 
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Panel B: Correlation Matrix (p-value in parentheses) 
 
Tone Fog Uncertain investor_sent ΔTone ΔFog ΔUncertain Δinvestor_sent roa sue accruals earn sd_earn 
Fog -0.310 1 
           
 
(<0.001) 
                          Uncertain -0.459 0.268 1 
          
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) 
                         investor_sent 0.027 -0.006 -0.025 1 
         
 
(0.001) (0.468) (0.003) 
                        ΔTone 0.353 -0.062 -0.102 0.001 1 
        
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.893) 
                       ΔFog -0.064 0.369 -0.009 -0.008 -0.077 1 
       
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.316) (0.351) (<0.001) 
                      ΔUncertain -0.100 -0.034 0.394 -0.007 -0.134 -0.054 1 
      
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.436) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
                     Δinvestor_sent -0.013 -0.001 -0.007 0.681 -0.004 0.023 -0.005 1 
     
 
(0.254) (0.936) (0.491) (<0.001) (0.727) (0.050) (0.632) 
                    roa 0.100 -0.070 -0.015 0.017 0.069 -0.016 -0.007 0.009 1 
    
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.078) (0.040) (<0.001) (0.071) (0.424) (0.411) 
                   sue 0.193 -0.172 -0.247 0.011 0.001 0.026 0.042 -0.008 -0.039 1 
   
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.172) (0.929) (0.004) (<0.001) (0.464) (<0.001) 
                  accruals 0.105 -0.072 -0.092 0.016 0.052 -0.057 0.008 -0.015 0.409 0.042 1 
  
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.060) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.361) (0.168) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
                 earn 0.084 -0.046 -0.027 0.011 0.055 -0.014 -0.011 0.006 0.775 -0.029 0.623 1 
 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.002) (0.164) (<0.001) (0.121) (0.221) (0.592) (<0.001) (0.001 (<0.001) 
                sd_earn -0.120 0.035 0.100 -0.025 -0.024 0.019 0.027 0.006 -0.131 0.011 -0.221 -0.133 1 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.003) (0.007) (0.0351 (0.003) (0.563) (<0.001) (0.199) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
 ret -0.0121 -0.0001 0.0047 -0.0174 -0.0101 0.0020 -0.0030  0.0047 -0.0167 -0.0098 -0.0309 -0.0233 0.0128 
 
(0.156) (0.994) (0.579) (0.041) (0.273) (0.824) (0.744) (0.679) (0.049) (0.251) (<0.001) (0.006) (0.134) 
              sd_ret -0.1575 0.0805 0.2149 -0.0467 -0.0408 0.0456 0.0396  -0.0003 -0.1466 0.0430 -0.1559 -0.1350 0.2389 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.978) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
              lnestimates -0.2258 0.1930 0.2904 0.0188 -0.0315 0.0108 -0.0120  -0.0009 0.0847 -0.4082 -0.0966 0.0537 -0.0116 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.027) (<0.001) (0.241) (0.1944) (0.937) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.172) 
              btm -0.1056 0.0677 -0.0181 -0.0052 -0.0245 0.0232 -0.0190  0.0148 -0.2788 -0.1254 -0.0755 -0.1846 0.0417 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.033) (0.539) (0.008) (0.012) (0.039) (0.192) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
              tover -0.2634 0.2735 0.4469 -0.0036 -0.0344 0.0175 0.0115  -0.0035 -0.0611 -0.3271 -0.1116 -0.0567 0.1498 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.672) (<0.001) (0.057) (0.214) (0.755) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
              logmarkv -0.1623 0.1001 0.1093 0.0207 -0.0264 -0.0212 -0.0136  0.0034 0.1818 -0.1636 0.0097 0.1362 -0.1024 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.015) (0.004) (0.022) (0.142) (0.761) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.257) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
              logGeo -0.1747 0.0747 0.1494 -0.0065 0.0007 -0.0132 0.0111  0.0147 0.0101 -0.1306 0.0289 0.0132 0.0252 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.443) (0.936) (0.154) (0.231) (0.194) (0.236) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.120) (0.003) 
              logBiz -0.1131 0.0797 -0.0243 -0.0076 0.0131 -0.0242 -0.0347  0.0220 -0.0335 -0.1001 0.0565 -0.0159 -0.0631 
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(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.004) (0.373) (0.156) (0.009) (<0.001) (0.052) (0.0001 (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.063) (<0.001) 
              MA 0.0555 -0.0363 -0.0296 0.0155 -0.0323 0.0277 0.0239  0.0032 0.0332 0.1003 0.0408 0.0212 0.0264 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (0.001) (0.069) (0.001) (0.003) (0.010) (0.775) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.013) (0.002) 
              si 0.0816 -0.0382 -0.0478 0.0136 0.0508 -0.0391 -0.0031  -0.0143 0.4967 -0.0042 0.7116 0.7473 -0.2736 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.111) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.734) (0.208) (<0.001) (0.618) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
              age -0.0035 -0.0313 -0.1870 -0.0044 0.0401 -0.0441 -0.0530  0.0135 -0.0275 -0.0351 0.1290 0.0031 -0.1112 
 
(0.680) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.603) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.233) (0.0012 (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.718) (<0.001) 
              leverage 0.0684 -0.0530 -0.0747 -0.0097 0.0273 0.0076 -0.0113  0.0014 0.0270 0.0252 0.1147 0.0213 -0.0150 
 
(<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.252) (0.003) (0.412) (0.221) (0.898) (0.002) (0.003) (<0.001) (0.012) (0.077) 
 
 
ret sd_ret lnestimates btm tover logmarkv logGeo logBiz MA si age leverage 
sd_ret 0.0223  1 
          
 
(0.009) 
                        lnestimates -0.0066  -0.0520 1 
         
 
(0.437) (<0.001) 
                       btm 0.0223  0.1128 -0.1495 1 
        
 
(0.009) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
                      tover 0.0035  0.4478 0.3643 0.0998 1 
       
 
(0.679) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
                     logmarkv -0.0092  -0.2896 0.6157 -0.3406 -0.0676 1 
      
 
(0.282) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
                    logGeo 0.0033  0.0225 0.1479 -0.0408 0.1172 0.1755 1 
     
 
(0.701) (0.008) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
                   logBiz 0.0001  -0.1388 0.0070 0.1187 -0.1042 0.2125 0.2156 1 
    
 
(0.987) (<0.001) (0.413) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
                  MA -0.0064  0.0626 -0.0391 -0.0946 -0.0122 -0.0164 -0.0361 -0.0752  1 
   
 
(0.454) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.152) (0.054) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
                 si -0.0223  -0.0979 -0.0236 -0.0264 -0.0717 0.0323 -0.0135 0.0282  -0.0155 1 
  
 
(0.009) (<0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.114) (0.001) (0.067) 
                age -0.0016  -0.2722 -0.1030 0.1353 -0.2650 0.1879 0.1743 0.4226  -0.0899 0.0404 1 
 
 
(0.854) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
               leverage 0.0121  -0.0508 -0.0867 -0.2104 -0.0934 -0.0039 -0.0215 0.0343  0.0258 -0.0064 0.1138 1 
 
(0.154) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) (0.649) (0.012) (<0.001) (0.002) (0.453) (<0.001) 
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Table 3.2 
Tone in 10-Qs and Firm-specific Investor Sentiment 
Dependent Variable Tone 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Overall 
 
High 
 
Low 
constant -0.003    
 
-0.013**  
 
0.003    
 
(-0.61)    
 
(-2.40)    
 
(0.59)    
investor_sent 0.001* 
 
0.003*   
 
0.001    
 
(1.64)    
 
(1.76)    
 
(1.38)    
high 
  
-0.001*   
  
   
(-1.69)    
  high*investor_sent 
  
-0.004*   
  
   
(-1.71)    
  low 
    
-0.001    
     
(-1.54)    
low*investor_sent 
    
-0.004*   
     
(-1.91)    
roa 0.013**  
 
-0.006    
 
0.038*** 
 
(2.38)    
 
(-0.91)    
 
(4.59)    
sue -0.000    
 
-0.001    
 
0.000    
 
(-0.46)    
 
(-0.77)    
 
(0.18)    
accruals 0.004    
 
0.003    
 
0.005*   
 
(1.55)    
 
(1.32)    
 
(1.80)    
earn 0.001    
 
0.016**  
 
-0.007    
 
(0.36)    
 
(2.15)    
 
(-1.55)    
sd_earn -0.005    
 
-0.005    
 
-0.009    
 
(-0.98)    
 
(-0.96)    
 
(-1.51)    
ret 0.002    
 
-0.001    
 
0.002    
 
(1.34)    
 
(-0.42)    
 
(1.11)    
sd_ret -0.003    
 
-0.004    
 
-0.002    
 
(-1.13)    
 
(-1.32)    
 
(-0.59)    
logestimates -0.000    
 
-0.001**  
 
-0.000    
 
(-1.42)    
 
(-2.11)    
 
(-0.69)    
btm -0.003*** 
 
-0.003*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
(-3.55)    
 
(-3.47)    
 
(-3.56)    
tover 0.000    
 
0.001*   
 
-0.000    
 
(0.38)    
 
(1.81)    
 
(-0.58)    
logmarkv 0.000    
 
0.001**  
 
-0.000    
 
(0.99)    
 
(2.24)    
 
(-0.03)    
logGeo -0.001    
 
0.000    
 
-0.001    
 
(-0.50)    
 
(0.15)    
 
(-1.12)    
logBiz -0.001*   
 
-0.001    
 
-0.001    
 
(-1.94)    
 
(-1.16)    
 
(-0.80)    
MA 0.001*   
 
0.001**  
 
0.000    
 
(1.90)    
 
(2.47)    
 
(0.58)    
si -0.005*   
 
-0.011*** 
 
-0.010*** 
 
(-1.71)    
 
(-8.67)    
 
(-6.93)    
crisis -0.011*** 
 
0.003    
 
-0.001    
 
(-9.20)    
 
(0.78)    
 
(-0.25)    
age 0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 
 
(8.04)    
 
(6.84)    
 
(6.40)    
leverage -0.004*   
 
-0.003*   
 
-0.005*   
  (-1.76)     (-1.77)     (-1.84)    
Quarter FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Firm FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 13791 
 
8091 
 
5700 
Adjusted R
2
 17.70% 
 
17.70% 
 
18.40% 
The table reports the regression of investor sentiment on the tone of subsequent 10-Qs from 1994 to 2014. Tone represents the optimistic tone in 
10-Qs. Column 1 uses whole sample, columns 2 and 3 use investor sentiment at top 50% and bottom 50%, respectively. investor_sent is firm-
specific investor sentiment when managers prepare 10-Q filings, 50 to 57 calendar days before firm’s filing date. high and low are dummy variables. 
high equals to 1 if investor sentiment is on the top 5% per quarter per industry, otherwise 0. low equals to 1 if investor sentiment is on the bottom 
5%, otherwise 0. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent 
significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All other variable definitions are as reported in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.3 
Change of Tone in 10-Qs and Firm-specific Investor Sentiment 
Dependent Variable  Δtone 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
high vs. low 
 
high to low 
 
low to high 
constant 3.379 
 
-1.083    
 
-0.220    
 
(1.34) 
 
(-0.94)    
 
(-0.24)    
Δinvestor_sent 0.503*** 
 
0.221    
 
-0.021    
 
(2.77)    
 
(1.25)    
 
(-0.19)    
below_average 0.070    
     (1.47)    
    Δinvestor_sent*below_average -0.571**  
     
(-2.24)    
    Ot-1P t   
0.065    
  
   
(0.88)    
  Δinvestor_sent*Ot-1Pt  
 
-0.801**  
     
(-2.03)    
  P t-1O t     
0.050    
     
(0.68)    
Δinvestor_sent*Pt-1Ot  
   
0.543*   
     
(1.73)    
roa 5.539**  
 
4.099    
 
4.541**  
 
(2.49)    
 
(1.42)    
 
(2.15)    
sue 0.071    
 
0.010    
 
0.034    
 
(0.42)    
 
(0.09)    
 
(0.39)    
accruals 0.777    
 
0.578    
 
0.500    
 
(1.20)    
 
(0.77)    
 
(0.87)    
earn -1.831    
 
-1.263    
 
-1.397    
 
(-1.21)    
 
(-0.70)    
 
(-0.97)    
sd_earn 1.078    
 
1.294    
 
1.230**  
 
(1.54)    
 
(0.84)    
 
(1.99)    
ret 0.312    
 
-0.108    
 
0.303    
 
(0.52)    
 
(-0.14)    
 
(0.57)    
sd_ret -0.022    
 
-0.201    
 
-0.229    
 
(-0.03)    
 
(-0.26)    
 
(-0.42)    
logestimates -0.024    
 
-0.052    
 
-0.043    
 
(-0.35)    
 
(-0.68)    
 
(-0.67)    
btm -0.674*** 
 
-0.407**  
 
-0.432*** 
 
(-4.02)    
 
(-2.20)    
 
(-3.31)    
tover -0.245*** 
 
-0.228*** 
 
-0.218*** 
 
(-3.24)    
 
(-2.88)    
 
(-3.37)    
logmarkv -0.043    
 
-0.021    
 
-0.023    
 
(-0.70)    
 
(-0.30)    
 
(-0.40)    
logGeo -0.004    
 
-0.106    
 
-0.046    
 
(-0.03)    
 
(-0.79)    
 
(-0.44)    
logBiz 0.049    
 
0.132    
 
0.086    
 
(0.44)    
 
(1.05)    
 
(0.87)    
MA -0.322    
 
-0.335    
 
-0.298    
 
(-1.52)    
 
(-1.47)    
 
(-1.59)    
si 0.448    
 
0.951    
 
0.896    
 
(0.47)    
 
(0.87)    
 
(0.92)    
age -0.029*** 
 
-0.033*** 
 
-0.021*** 
 
(-7.84)    
 
(-6.63)    
 
(-6.86)    
leverage 0.151    
 
0.138    
 
0.083    
  (0.38)      (0.31)      (0.24)    
Quarter /Year/ Firm FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 7970 
 
7970 
 
7970 
Adjusted R
2
 4.50% 
 
3.80% 
 
4.70% 
The table reports the regression of the change of tone on the change of investor sentiment. ΔTone is the change of tone in the current 10-Qs, subtracted by the prior 
quarter. Δinvestor_sent is the change of investor sentiment at current quarter and last quarter.  below_average equals to 1 if a firm has below average firm-specific 
investor sentiment for quarter j (i.e. pessimistic firm-specific investor sentiment compare with peers in the same quarter), otherwise 0. Ot-1P t is a dummy variable, which 
equals to 1 if investor sentiment was in high investor sentiment group at quarter t-1 and is in low investor sentiment group at quarter t, otherwise 0. Pt-1O t is a dummy 
variable, which equals to 1 if investor sentiment  was in low investor sentiment group at quarter t-1 and is in high investor sentiment group at quarter t. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. All other variable definitions are as reported in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.4 
Readability in 10-Qs and Firm-specific Investor Sentiment 
Dependent Variable Fog 
     (1)     (2)       (3) 
  Overall     High        Low 
constant 16.775*** 
 
17.583*** 
 
16.909*** 
 
(17.18)    
 
(18.16)    
 
(15.01)    
investor_sent -0.230**  
 
-0.144    
 
-0.627*** 
 
(-2.17)    
 
(-0.39)    
 
(-2.66)    
high 
  
0.089    
  
   
(1.31)    
  high*investor_sent 
  
0.247    
  
   
(0.52)    
  low 
    
0.121    
     
(1.42)    
low*investor_sent 
    
0.520*   
     
(1.75)    
roa -1.736**  
 
-4.231*** 
 
-2.508**  
 
(-2.12)    
 
(-3.12)    
 
(-2.19)    
sue 0.425*** 
 
0.234    
 
0.358**  
 
(2.86)    
 
(1.59)    
 
(2.37)    
accruals 0.430    
 
-0.201    
 
0.987**  
 
(0.92)    
 
(-0.45)    
 
(2.10)    
earn 0.766    
 
2.352*** 
 
0.126    
 
(1.29)    
 
(3.56)    
 
(0.33)    
sd_earn 0.016    
 
1.300    
 
-0.560    
 
(0.02)    
 
(1.29)    
 
(-0.48)    
ret -0.874**  
 
-0.495    
 
-0.889**  
 
(-2.43)    
 
(-1.50)    
 
(-2.34)    
sd_ret 0.006    
 
0.074    
 
-0.471    
 
(0.01)    
 
(0.17)    
 
(-0.99)    
logestimates 0.017    
 
-0.012    
 
-0.028    
 
(0.22)    
 
(-0.18)    
 
(-0.45)    
btm 0.375**  
 
0.353**  
 
0.200    
 
(2.33)    
 
(2.15)    
 
(1.25)    
tover 0.137**  
 
0.079    
 
0.153**  
 
(2.34)    
 
(1.38)    
 
(2.52)    
logmarkv -0.002    
 
0.028    
 
-0.054    
 
(-0.03)    
 
(0.45)    
 
(-0.80)    
logGeo -0.172    
 
-0.233*   
 
-0.183    
 
(-1.18)    
 
(-1.69)    
 
(-1.19)    
logBiz 0.090    
 
0.136    
 
0.147    
 
(0.67)    
 
(1.17)    
 
(1.16)    
MA 0.113    
 
0.147    
 
0.188    
 
(0.73)    
 
(1.06)    
 
(1.18)    
si -0.681    
 
2.442*** 
 
2.631*** 
 
(-1.40)    
 
(10.45)    
 
(9.59)    
crisis 2.550*** 
 
-1.374*   
 
-1.208**  
 
(9.44)    
 
(-1.95)    
 
(-2.42)    
age -0.027*** 
 
-0.034*** 
 
-0.022*** 
 
(-7.67)    
 
(-10.08)    
 
(-4.83)    
leverage 0.168    
 
0.428    
 
0.175    
  (0.35)      (0.94)      (0.40)    
Quarter FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Firm FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 13791 
 
8091 
 
5700 
Adjusted R
2
 16.00% 
 
23.20% 
 
20.00% 
The table reports the regression of Fog index on investor sentiment from 1994 to 2014. Fog represents the Fog index 10-Qs. 
Column 1 uses all sample, columns 2 and 3 use investor sentiment at top 50% and bottom 50%, respectively.  investor_sent is firm-
specific investor sentiment 50 to 57 calendar days before firm’s filing date, when managers prepare 10-Q filings. high and low are 
dummy variables. high equals to 1 if investor sentiment is on the top 5%, otherwise 0. low equals to 1 if investor sentiment is on the 
bottom 5%, otherwise 0. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All other variable definitions are as reported in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.5 
Change of Readability in 10-Qs and Firm-specific Investor Sentiment 
Dependent Variable  ΔFog 
 
  (1) 
 
   (2) 
 
  (3) 
 
high vs. low 
 
high to low 
 
low to high 
constant 3.856 
 
3.957*** 
 
4.001*** 
 
(1.25) 
 
(2.62)    
 
(2.67)    
Δinvestor_sent -1.365*** 
 
-0.455**  
 
-0.425**  
 
(-2.59)    
 
(-2.21)    
 
(-2.14)    
below_average -0.037 
     (-0.26)    
    Δinvestor_sent*below_average 1.534*   
    
 
(1.75)    
    O t-1P t 
  
0.012    
  
   
(0.08)    
  Δinvestor_sent*Ot-1Pt 
  
-0.008    
  
 
  
(-0.01)    
  P t-1O t 
    
0.096    
     
(1.10)    
Δinvestor_sent*Pt-1Ot 
    
0.510    
 
    
(1.15)    
roa 6.351 
 
-0.129    
 
-0.794    
 
(1.07)    
 
(-0.06)    
 
(-0.36)    
sue 0.358 
 
-0.012    
 
0.088    
 
(1.16)    
 
(-0.05)    
 
(0.35)    
accruals 2.38 
 
-0.133    
 
0.736    
 
(0.94)    
 
(-0.14)    
 
(0.77)    
earn -0.814 
 
0.682    
 
1.021    
 
(-0.38)    
 
(0.83)    
 
(1.23)    
sd_earn -3.706 
 
-0.876    
 
0.765    
 
(-1.00)    
 
(-0.35)    
 
(0.30)    
ret -6.593**  
 
-1.708    
 
-1.092    
 
(-2.12)    
 
(-1.63)    
 
(-1.12)    
sd_ret -0.808 
 
-0.462    
 
-0.041    
 
(-0.43)    
 
(-0.46)    
 
(-0.04)    
logestimates 0.001 
 
0.081    
 
0.071    
 
(0.01)    
 
(0.75)    
 
(0.63)    
btm 0.847**  
 
0.730**  
 
0.783*** 
 
(2.01)    
 
(2.54)    
 
(2.61)    
tover 0.01 
 
-0.060    
 
-0.083    
 
(0.05)    
 
(-0.59)    
 
(-0.82)    
logmarkv 0.113 
 
0.070    
 
0.110    
 
(0.79)    
 
(0.80)    
 
(1.26)    
logGeo -0.51 
 
0.201    
 
0.143    
 
(-0.88)    
 
(1.09)    
 
(0.79)    
logBiz 0.007 
 
0.110    
 
0.115    
 
(0.02)    
 
(0.70)    
 
(0.74)    
MA 0.914 
 
0.304    
 
0.286    
 
(0.90)    
 
(1.15)    
 
(1.10)    
si -4.788 
 
-1.787*   
 
-2.491**  
 
(-1.45)    
 
(-1.65)    
 
(-2.10)    
age -0.026*** 
 
-0.049*** 
 
-0.049*** 
 
(-9.83)    
 
(-12.10)    
 
(-11.66)    
leverage -0.094 
 
0.603    
 
0.486    
  (-0.34)     (1.08)     (0.94)    
Quarter /Year/ Firm FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 7970 
 
7970 
 
7970 
Adjusted R
2
 3.20%  7.20%  7.00% 
The table reports the regression of the change of readability on the change of investor sentiment. ΔFog is the Fog index in the current 10-Qs, subtracted by the prior 
quarters and divide by the standard deviation of the tone in the past 10-Q filings made within the preceding four quarters. Δinvestor_sent is the change of investor 
sentiment at current quarter and last quarter.  below_average equals to 1 if a company has below average firm-specific investor sentiment for quarter j (i.e. pessimistic 
firm-specific investor sentiment compare with peers in the same quarter), otherwise 0. Ot-1P t is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if investor sentiment was in high 
investor sentiment group at quarter t-1 and is in low investor sentiment group at quarter t, otherwise 0. Pt-1O t is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if investor sentiment  
was in low investor sentiment group at quarter t-1 and is in high investor sentiment group at quarter t. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by firm. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All other variable definitions are as reported in Table 
3.1. 
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Table 3.6 
Uncertainty in 10-Qs and Firm-specific Investor Sentiment 
  Uncertain 
  (1)   (2)   (3) 
 
Overall   High   Low 
constant 0.677**  
 
0.912*** 
 
0.437    
 
(2.32)    
 
(3.02)    
 
(1.44)    
investor_sent -0.054*   
 
0.127    
 
-0.066*  
 
(-1.84)    
 
(1.46)    
 
(-1.65)    
high 
  
-0.035*   
  
   
(-1.84)    
  high*investor_sent 
  
-0.210*   
  
   
(-1.70)    
  low 
    
0.184*** 
     
(3.34)    
low*investor_sent 
    
0.464*** 
     
(3.73)    
roa -0.022    
 
0.268    
 
-0.039    
 
(-0.05)    
 
(0.51)    
 
(-0.12)    
sue 0.075    
 
0.090    
 
0.080    
 
(1.12)    
 
(1.25)    
 
(1.37)    
accruals -0.186    
 
-0.130    
 
-0.232    
 
(-1.36)    
 
(-0.93)    
 
(-1.44)    
earn 0.054    
 
-0.088    
 
0.009    
 
(0.19)    
 
(-0.22)    
 
(0.06)    
sd_earn 0.144    
 
0.021    
 
-0.319    
 
(0.45)    
 
(0.06)    
 
(-0.96)    
ret 0.006    
 
-0.083    
 
-0.069    
 
(0.06)    
 
(-0.52)    
 
(-0.61)    
sd_ret -0.013    
 
0.089    
 
0.014    
 
(-0.09)    
 
(0.61)    
 
(0.08)    
logestimates 0.014    
 
0.033*   
 
0.001    
 
(0.86)    
 
(1.72)    
 
(0.05)    
btm 0.019    
 
0.002    
 
0.006    
 
(0.50)    
 
(0.03)    
 
(0.13)    
tover -0.004    
 
-0.013    
 
0.020    
 
(-0.21)    
 
(-0.67)    
 
(0.93)    
logmarkv 0.030    
 
0.014    
 
0.029    
 
(1.60)    
 
(0.72)    
 
(1.33)    
logGeo 0.070*   
 
0.063    
 
0.082*   
 
(1.75)    
 
(1.51)    
 
(1.92)    
logBiz 0.017    
 
0.022    
 
0.022    
 
(0.56)    
 
(0.68)    
 
(0.70)    
MA -0.020    
 
-0.008    
 
-0.004    
 
(-0.64)    
 
(-0.21)    
 
(-0.10)    
si 0.048    
 
-0.446*   
 
0.210    
 
(0.25)    
 
(-1.91)    
 
(1.21)    
crisis 0.967*** 
 
0.853*** 
 
0.698*** 
 
(16.46)    
 
(15.37)    
 
(16.18)    
age -0.013*** 
 
-0.014*** 
 
-0.015*** 
 
(-14.62)    
 
(-16.12)    
 
(-16.81)    
leverage -0.130    
 
-0.154    
 
-0.120    
  (-1.05)     (-1.20)     (-1.09)    
Quarter FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Firm FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 13791 
 
8091 
 
5700 
Adjusted R
2
 34.30% 
 
35.70% 
 
32.40% 
The table reports the regression of tone on investor sentiment from 1994 to 2014. Uncertain represents the proportion of uncertain words in 10-Qs. 
Column 1 uses all sample, columns 2 and 3 use investor sentiment at top 50% and bottom 50%, respectively.  investor_sent is firm-specific investor 
sentiment 50 to 57 calendar days before firm’s filing date, when managers prepare 10-Q filings. high and low are dummy variables. high equals to 1 
if investor sentiment is on the top 5%, otherwise 0. low equals to 1 if investor sentiment is on the bottom 5%, otherwise 0. Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are clustered by firm. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. All other variable definitions are as reported in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.7 
Change of Uncertainty in 10-Qs and Firm-specific Investor Sentiment 
Dependent Variable  ΔUncertain 
 
       (1) 
 
       (2) 
 
       (3) 
 
high vs. low 
 
high to low 
 
low to high 
constant -0.625 
 
-2.123**  
 
-1.992**  
 
(-0.57)    
 
(-2.47)    
 
(-2.31)    
Δinvestor_sent 0.257*   
 
0.119    
 
0.092    
 
(1.78)    
 
(0.96)    
 
(0.77)    
below_average 0.037 
     (1.02)    
    Δinvestor_sent*below_average -0.345*   
    
 
(-1.76)    
    O t-1P t 
  
0.057    
  
   
(0.85)    
  Δinvestor_sent*Ot-1Pt 
  
-0.564*   
  
 
  
(-1.69)    
  P t-1O t 
    
-0.116    
     
(-1.23)    
Δinvestor_sent*Pt-1Ot 
    
-0.730*   
 
    
(-1.75)    
roa 0.482 
 
3.156    
 
1.515    
 
(0.47)    
 
(1.48)    
 
(1.22)    
sue -0.006 
 
0.102    
 
-0.167    
 
(-0.05)    
 
(0.62)    
 
(-0.97)    
accruals 0.253 
 
0.868    
 
0.394    
 
(0.52)    
 
(1.44)    
 
(0.64)    
earn -0.317 
 
-2.570    
 
-0.588    
 
(-0.66)    
 
(-1.58)    
 
(-1.11)    
sd_earn -0.356 
 
0.100    
 
2.662    
 
(-0.62)    
 
(0.07)    
 
(1.63)    
ret -0.204 
 
-0.327    
 
0.092    
 
(-0.46)    
 
(-0.59)    
 
(0.15)    
sd_ret -0.537 
 
-0.369    
 
-0.855    
 
(-1.18)    
 
(-0.54)    
 
(-1.40)    
logestimates 0.08 
 
0.153**  
 
0.099    
 
(1.58)    
 
(2.26)    
 
(1.54)    
btm 0.08 
 
-0.021    
 
0.091    
 
(0.68)    
 
(-0.13)    
 
(0.62)    
tover 0.038 
 
0.018    
 
0.032    
 
(0.82)    
 
(0.33)    
 
(0.57)    
logmarkv 0.021 
 
-0.017    
 
0.011    
 
(0.51)    
 
(-0.35)    
 
(0.24)    
logGeo -0.018 
 
0.015    
 
-0.026    
 
(-0.20)    
 
(0.14)    
 
(-0.24)    
logBiz -0.049 
 
-0.052    
 
-0.017    
 
(-0.62)    
 
(-0.59)    
 
(-0.18)    
MA 0.035 
 
0.111    
 
0.090    
 
(0.23)    
 
(0.71)    
 
(0.59)    
si -0.314 
 
0.420    
 
-0.032    
 
(-0.48)    
 
(0.41)    
 
(-0.04)    
age -0.026*** 
 
-0.022*** 
 
-0.028*** 
 
(-9.83)    
 
(-6.54)    
 
(-9.96)    
leverage -0.094 
 
0.124    
 
-0.183    
  (-0.34)     (0.38)     (-0.54)    
Quarter /Year/ Firm FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 7970 
 
7970 
 
7970 
Adjusted R
2
 3.20% 
 
4.10% 
 
4.30% 
The table reports the regression of the change of uncertainty on the change of investor sentiment. ΔUncertain is the proportion of uncertain words in the current 10-Qs, 
subtracted by the prior quarters and divide by the standard deviation of the tone in the past 10-Q filings made within the preceding four quarters. Δinvestor_sent is the 
change of investor sentiment at current quarter and last quarter.  below_average equals to 1 if a company has below average firm-specific investor sentiment for quarter 
j (i.e. pessimistic firm-specific investor sentiment compare with peers in the same quarter), otherwise 0. Ot-1P t is a dummy variable, which equals to 1 if investor 
sentiment was in high investor sentiment group at quarter t-1 and is in low investor sentiment group at quarter t, otherwise 0. Pt-1O t is a dummy variable, which equals to 
1 if investor sentiment  was in low investor sentiment group at quarter t-1 and is in high investor sentiment group at quarter t. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
are clustered by firm. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All other variable definitions are 
as reported in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.8 
Regressions of tone, readability and uncertainty of 10-Q filings on firm-
specific investor sentiment from an alternative investor sentiment period 
      (1)      (2)        (3) 
     Tone      Fog   Uncertain 
constant -0.008*   
 
16.877*** 
 
0.007**  
 
(-1.83)    
 
(15.41)    
 
(2.53)    
investor_sent2 0.001*** 
 
-0.224* 
 
0.023   
 
(2.80)    
 
(-1.63)    
 
(0.09)    
roa 0.011*   
 
-2.320    
 
0.002    
 
(1.81)    
 
(-1.62)    
 
(0.55)    
sue -0.000    
 
0.367*   
 
0.001    
 
(-0.26)    
 
(1.83)    
 
(1.10)    
accruals 0.004**  
 
0.348    
 
-0.002*   
 
(2.11)    
 
(0.62)    
 
(-1.93)    
earn 0.001    
 
0.145    
 
-0.001    
 
(0.11)    
 
(0.18)    
 
(-0.46)    
sd_earn -0.003    
 
2.457*   
 
-0.001    
 
(-0.86)    
 
(1.84)    
 
(-0.26)    
ret 0.001    
 
-1.127*** 
 
-0.001    
 
(0.40)    
 
(-2.59)    
 
(-1.47)    
sd_ret -0.003    
 
-0.692    
 
-0.000    
 
(-1.35)    
 
(-1.37)    
 
(-0.32)    
logestimates -0.001*   
 
-0.014    
 
0.000    
 
(-1.90)    
 
(-0.20)    
 
(0.53)    
btm -0.002*** 
 
0.344    
 
0.000    
 
(-3.69)    
 
(1.64)    
 
(0.09)    
tover 0.000    
 
0.145**  
 
0.000    
 
(1.15)    
 
(2.36)    
 
(0.28)    
logmarkv 0.001*   
 
-0.013    
 
0.000    
 
(1.75)    
 
(-0.19)    
 
(1.32)    
logGeo -0.000    
 
-0.203    
 
0.000    
 
(-0.46)    
 
(-1.42)    
 
(1.02)    
logBiz -0.001    
 
0.159    
 
0.000    
 
(-1.41)    
 
(1.26)    
 
(1.41)    
MA 0.001*** 
 
0.108    
 
-0.000    
 
(2.77)    
 
(0.65)    
 
(-0.02)    
si -0.003    
 
-0.645    
 
0.002    
 
(-1.56)    
 
(-1.17)    
 
(1.58)    
crisis -0.010*** 
 
0.000    
 
0.010*** 
 
(-9.84)    
 
(.)    
 
(19.22)    
age 0.000*** 
 
-0.028*** 
 
-0.000*** 
 
(8.55)    
 
(-6.35)    
 
(-19.92)    
leverage -0.004**  
 
0.267    
 
-0.002*   
  (-2.03)     (0.48)     (-1.67)    
Quarter FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Year FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Firm FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 10826 
 
10826 
 
10826 
Adjusted R2 17.90%   17.70%   33.20% 
The table reports the regression of tone, readability and uncertainty on the change of investor sentiment 
using alternative investor sentiment. investor_sent2 is firm-specific investor sentiment when managers 
prepare 10-Q filings, 40 to 47 calendar days before firm’s filing date. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors are clustered by firm. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. All other variable definitions are as reported in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.9 
Regressions of the change of tone, readability and uncertainty of 10-Q 
filings on the change of firm-specific investor sentiment from an 
alternative investor sentiment period 
Variable (1) ΔTone      (2) ΔFog   (3) ΔUncertain 
constant 3.819*** 
 
1.711*   
 
-2.080*** 
 
(4.03) 
 
(1.9) 
 
(-3.03)    
Δinvestor_sent2 0.216*   
 
-0.342*   
 
0.247*   
 
(1.68)    
 
(-1.95)    
 
(1.84)    
below_average -0.044    
 
0.007 
 
-0.001 
 
(-0.71)    
 
(0.18)    
 
(-0.04)    
Δinvestor_sent2*below_average -0.499*   
 
0.407*   
 
-0.310*   
 
(-1.84)    
 
(1.79)    
 
(-1.72) 
roa 3.221*   
 
-3.853*** 
 
0.626 
 
(1.73)    
 
(-3.14)    
 
(0.60) 
sue 0.229    
 
-0.077 
 
0.023 
 
(1.30)    
 
(-0.57)    
 
(0.20) 
accruals 0.963    
 
0.835 
 
0.155 
 
(1.57)    
 
(1.56)    
 
(0.33) 
earn -1.042    
 
2.551*** 
 
-0.442 
 
(-0.90)    
 
(3.54)    
 
(-1.01)    
sd_earn 1.320**  
 
-1.099 
 
-0.129 
 
(2.29)    
 
(-1.00)    
 
(-0.22)    
ret 0.478    
 
-0.21 
 
0.028 
 
(0.89)    
 
(-0.42)    
 
(0.07) 
sd_ret -0.753    
 
0.181 
 
-0.462 
 
(-1.33)    
 
(0.34)    
 
(-1.07)    
logestimate -0.046    
 
0.057 
 
0.079 
 
(-0.69)    
 
(0.89)    
 
(1.47) 
btm -0.526*** 
 
0.358*** 
 
0.154 
 
(-3.47)    
 
(2.83)    
 
(1.28) 
tover -0.189*** 
 
-0.013 
 
0.012 
 
(-3.24)    
 
(-0.23)    
 
(0.29) 
logmarkv -0.026    
 
0.036 
 
0.018 
 
(-0.44)    
 
(0.77)    
 
(0.44) 
logGeo -0.023    
 
0.089 
 
0.135 
 
(-0.19)    
 
(0.89)    
 
-1.49 
logBiz -0.092    
 
0.006 
 
(0.02) 
 
(-0.83)    
 
(0.04)    
 
(-0.26)    
MA -0.469*   
 
0.152 
 
-0.035 
 
(-1.90)    
 
(0.70)    
 
(-0.22)    
si 0.081    
 
-1.688**  
 
-0.175 
 
(0.08)    
 
(-2.23)    
 
(-0.30)    
age -0.012*** 
 
-0.048*** 
 
-0.029*** 
 
(-2.75)    
 
(-29.70)    
 
(-11.64)    
leverage 0.359    
 
0.424 
 
0.12 
  (0.98)     (1.39)     (0.37) 
Quarter FE   Yes 
 
    Yes 
 
    Yes 
Year FE   Yes 
 
    Yes 
 
    Yes 
Firm FE   Yes 
 
    Yes 
 
    Yes 
Observations   7934 
 
    7934 
 
    7934 
Adjusted R2   5.40%      8.60%      3.50% 
The table reports the regression of the change of tone, readability and uncertainty on the change of investor sentiment using alternative 
investor sentiment. ΔTone, ΔFog, ΔUncertain and Δinvestor_sent2 represent change in optimistic tone, readability, uncertain tone in 10-
Qs and change in firm-specific investor sentiment between current quarter and prior quarter. Δinvestor_sent2 is the difference between 
investor sentiment 40 to 47 days before the filing issue date (isent40) at quarter t and isent40 at quarter t-1.  Heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors are clustered by firm. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. All other variable definitions are as reported in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.10 
Regressions of tone of 10-Q filings on firm-specific investor sentiment 
using delta control variables 
Variable (1) ΔTone    (2) ΔFog   (3) ΔUncertain 
constant -1.836    
 
4.090*** 
 
-0.457    
 
(-0.88)    
 
(4.30)    
 
(-0.75)    
Δinvestor_sent 0.403**  
 
-1.238**  
 
0.268*   
 
(2.36)    
 
(-2.46)    
 
(1.87)    
below_average 0.049    
 
-0.043    
 
0.050    
 
(1.09)    
 
(-0.32)    
 
(1.44)    
Δinvestor_sent*below_average -0.546**  
 
1.409*    
 
-0.335*   
 
(-2.23)    
 
(1.63)    
 
(-1.71)    
Δroa -0.955    
 
-1.047    
 
0.091    
 
(-0.91)    
 
(-0.52)    
 
(0.13)    
Δsue -0.171    
 
0.005    
 
-0.003*   
 
(-0.88)    
 
(1.01)    
 
(-1.87)    
Δaccruals 0.094    
 
-2.005    
 
-0.992    
 
(0.12)    
 
(-0.36)    
 
(-1.41)    
Δearn 6.406*** 
 
1.601    
 
-0.426    
 
(3.24)    
 
(0.99)    
 
(-1.00)    
Δsd_earn -3.489*   
 
-1.484    
 
1.097    
 
(-1.66)    
 
(-0.48)    
 
(0.96)    
Δret 0.462    
 
-4.162**  
 
0.119    
 
(1.12)    
 
(-2.24)    
 
(0.43)    
Δsd_ret -4.005*** 
 
3.978**  
 
1.947*** 
 
(-4.15)    
 
(2.02)    
 
(3.08)    
Δ logestimates -0.049    
 
-0.058    
 
0.105    
 
(-0.54)    
 
(-0.24)    
 
(1.58)    
Δ logBTM 0.283    
 
0.424    
 
-0.265    
 
(0.94)    
 
(0.38)    
 
(-1.36)    
Δtover -0.188**  
 
-0.072    
 
0.139**  
 
(-2.50)    
 
(-0.36)    
 
(2.54)    
Δ logmarkv 0.701*** 
 
-0.613    
 
-0.216**  
 
(4.79)    
 
(-0.78)    
 
(-2.23)    
Δ logGeo -0.270    
 
-0.626    
 
-0.149    
 
(-0.82)    
 
(-0.54)    
 
(-0.42)    
Δ logBiz -0.028    
 
-0.686    
 
0.253    
 
(-0.10)    
 
(-1.26)    
 
(0.98)    
MA -0.376*   
 
0.938    
 
0.001    
 
(-1.68)    
 
(0.89)    
 
(0.01)    
Δsi 2.152    
 
0.248    
 
1.300    
 
(1.32)    
 
(0.06)    
 
(1.56)    
age -0.020*** 
 
-0.038*** 
 
-0.029*** 
 
(-4.49)    
 
(-5.65)    
 
(-15.75)    
Δleverage 0.828    
 
0.449    
 
-0.529    
 
(1.53)    
 
(0.38)    
 
(-1.23)    
Quarter FE    Yes    Yes     Yes 
Year FE    Yes 
 
  Yes 
 
   Yes 
Firm FE    Yes 
 
  Yes 
 
   Yes 
Observations    7692    
 
  7692    
 
   7692    
Adjusted R2 4.80%  3.00%  4.40% 
The table reports the regression of the change of tone, readability and uncertainty on the change of investor sentiment,with the change of 
all control variables. ΔFog, ΔUncertain and Δinvestor_sent represent the change in optimistic tone, readability, uncertain tone in 10-Qs 
and the change in firm-specific investor sentiment. Δinvestor_sent is the difference between isent50 at quarter t and isent50 at quarter t-1. 
below_average equals to 1 if a firm has below average firm-specific investor sentiment for quarter j (i.e. pessimistic firm-specific investor 
sentiment compare with peers in the same quarter), otherwise 0. All control variables, except age and MA, are measured in the same 
way as Δinvestor_sent, that is, the difference between level at quarter t and level at quarter t-1. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
are clustered by firm. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
All other variable definitions are as reported in Table 3.1. 
